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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
A GENEALOGY OF NEOLIBERAL AND ANTI-NEOLIBERAL RESILIENCE IN 
THE ECUADORIAN PACIFIC COAST 
by 
Vanessa León León 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kevin Grove, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Dennis Wiedman, Co-Major Professor 
Resilience appears to be everywhere, morphing and seducing global discourses, 
national governmental practices, and scholarship.  Inasmuch as hegemonic discourses and 
national governments promote resilience through both disaster reduction and sustainable 
development policies, critical resilience scholars have emphasized resilience as a 
neoliberal security technique. By reinforcing resilience as a governmental practice 
embedded in neoliberal rationale, theory and practice are neglecting other areas to 
contextualize resilience. My dissertation traces a genealogy of neoliberal and anti-
neoliberal State interventions underpinned by resilience thinking, organizing coastal rural 
lives in Ecuador. No matter the Ecuadorian governments’ rationale, both genuflected to 
global hegemonic discourses on resilience that justify government intervention to secure 
the population’s future.  My analysis also reveals that both governmental rationales 
promoting resilience implemented similar techniques: legal framework adaptations, 
decentralizing processes, technocratic planning, and participatory management.  
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After I captured resilience practices morphing through neoliberal and anti-
neoliberal governance, a comprehensive ethnographic account also discloses unintended 
outcomes threatening the beach ecosystem. Ecosystems are a critical foundation of the 
socio-ecological relationship; however, profound changes in the beach ecosystem are 
now a consequence of the neoliberal and anti-neoliberal governmental emphasis on 
protecting the population and tourist infrastructure.  More importantly, this research 
untangles resilience precepts underlying the neoliberal and anti-neoliberal 
problematization of nature to justify governmental intervention in coastal management.  
My particular critique of resilience does not replicate academic emphasis on 
catastrophic events. Hegemonic frameworks underrepresent the slow, local, and small 
emergencies by emphasizing acute and sudden events. However, resilience theory admits 
that continuous processes can also change the nature of a complex system. Thus, I focus 
on slow emergencies, those not regular, not acute emergencies, which also demand 
collective political or ethical response. My dissertation captures the constructive role of 
slow emergencies, frequently missed in disaster resilience analysis, to argue that 
resilience is a political process among nature, population, and governmental security 
techniques. The politics of resilience captures the social and cultural dimension of nature; 
then, nature emerges as an object of political struggles within complex, socio-ecological 
indeterminacy.  
 
 
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
CHAPTER                                            PAGE 
 
I.     Neoliberal and anti-neoliberal resilience in the complex relationship among nature, 
development, and security ........................................................................................... 1 
Life amidst tides and waves. Introduction ................................................................. 1 
Theoretical framework: neoliberal and anti-neoliberal resilience ............................. 7 
Methods: from a genealogy of resilience toward the politics of resilience ............. 18 
Overview of the chapters ......................................................................................... 27 
 
II.    Untangling complex relations among state, government, population, and nature .... 31 
The biopolitics of socio-nature governance ............................................................. 33 
State, government, and the social  ....................................................................... 33 
Environmental governmentality .......................................................................... 40 
Biopolitics of resilience ........................................................................................... 46 
The path of resilience .......................................................................................... 46 
A biopolitical critique of resilience-building ...................................................... 57 
Biopolitics of alternatives  ....................................................................................... 62 
Biopolitics of sovereignty  .................................................................................. 63 
Transformative possibilities ................................................................................ 65 
Conclusion: social research in entangled socio-nature governance ......................... 68 
 
III.  Untangling Comuneros rural lives in the Ecuadorian Pacific coast .......................... 70 
Ecuadorian governments and neoliberal policies, from the 1980s to early 2000s ... 73 
A decade of anti-neoliberal state pracitce in Ecuador (2007-2017) ........................ 76 
Struggles and adaptation in Santa Elena’s rural coast ............................................. 83 
Climatological issues in Santa Elena ................................................................... 87 
Territory and communal management in Santa Elena ........................................ 91 
Identity issues in Santa Elena .............................................................................. 97 
Development issues in Santa Elena ................................................................... 102 
Decision-making over territory, identity, and development in Libertador  
Bolívar  .............................................................................................................. 105 
Conclusion: adaptive processes in Santa Elena ..................................................... 110 
 
x 
 
IV.  Neoliberal and anti-neoliberal risk and disaster management in Ecuador .............. 112 
The neoliberal concern surrounding disasters in Ecuador  .................................... 113 
Dimensions of the Ecuadorian Civil Defense .................................................. 114 
Disasters and the modernization of the state .................................................... 116 
ENSO lessons in Ecuadorian disaster management ......................................... 120 
Disaster management going into the twenty-first century ............................... 124 
Anti-neoliberal resilience and a culture of risk in Ecuador ................................... 126 
Adoption of international frameworks of resilience since 2007 ....................... 127 
The anti-neoliberal integrated logic of resilience building  .............................. 128 
The anti-neoliberal risk management machinery pervading ecuadorian lives .. 134 
Resilience building and risk management in the Province of Santa Elena ............ 139 
A biopolitical appraoch to social construction in Santa Elena .......................... 144 
Armoring beaches: the structural measure to protect Santa Elena .................... 147 
The weakening of ecuadorian risk mangament ..................................................... 155 
Conclusion: making resilient comuneros? ............................................................. 160 
 
V.   A different genealogy or resilience in Ecuador through integrated coastal resource 
management ............................................................................................................. 163 
International concern on coastal management ....................................................... 166 
Integrated coastal management methodology ........................................................ 169 
An adaptive model of coastal resource management ........................................ 173 
Integrated coastal management in Ecuador ........................................................... 175 
Issue assessment ................................................................................................ 176 
Program preparation .......................................................................................... 177 
Program formalization ....................................................................................... 177 
Program implementation ................................................................................... 178 
IDB assessment ................................................................................................. 180 
Ecuadorian coastal resource management program phase II ............................ 183 
Integrated coastal management legacy in the coast of Ecuador ............................ 188 
Conclusion: a connected but distinct genealogy of resilience in Ecuador ............. 191 
 
VI.   Local emergencies and the politics of resilience .................................................... 194 
Neoliberal and anti-neolbieral tourism development management in Ecuador ..... 196 
 
xi 
Tourism in Indigenous and rural common-property territories ......................... 199 
Community tourism in Santa Elena  .................................................................. 204 
Tourism, beaches, and local threats in the seaside village of Libertador Bolívar . 207 
Tourist beach management in a common-property territory ............................. 210 
Entanglements between tourism development and risk management policies . 215 
Natural and human-made changes at the beach ................................................ 219 
The increasingly frequent local threats ............................................................. 228 
Conclusion: local threats, slow emergencies, and the politics of resilience ...... 228 
 
VII. Between development and security:  the governmental problematization of  
 nature ....................................................................................................................... 236 
The ongoing problematization of nature in the coast of Ecuador .......................... 238 
 
VIII.  Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 245 
Research contribution ............................................................................................ 246 
Limitations ............................................................................................................. 248 
Further research ..................................................................................................... 248 
 
List of cited References ………………………………………………………………. 250 
 
Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………. 271 
 
VITA ……………………………………………………………………………….…. 279  
 
 
 
  
 
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE                                            PAGE 
 
1. Map of Cantons in Santa Elena Province...………………………………..………... 3 
2. Comuna Montañita in the 1970s……………………………………………………72 
3. A day of low tourist demand at Montañita in 2018 …………………………….…. 72 
4. Map of Manglaralto Parish and coastal communities…….………..……………… 85 
5. Map of Libertador Bolívar and seaside comunas in Manglaralto Parish………….106 
6. Seawall at Chanduy …………………………………………………………...…151 
7. Coastal protection at Comuna La Entrada …………………….………….………152 
8. Seawall at Comuna Montañita ………………………………………………..…..153 
9. Seawall at Comuna Manglaralto …………………………………………….……153 
10. River mouth of Atravezado River protection at Comuna Libertador Bolívar …….154 
11. Manglaralto river wall ………………………………………………………….…157 
12. Dirt road in the north beach in November 2016 …………………….……………213 
13. Damages at Libertador Bolívar south beach during November 2015 …....…….…221 
14. Damages at Libertador Bolívar south beach during September 2018 ……..….…..221 
15. Libertador Bolívar north beach in 2006 ………………….…………………….…227 
16. Anthropic effects at Libertador Bolívar north beach in 2016 ………………….…228 
17. Waves battering the dirt road on May 2, 2015 …………………..………..………229 
 
 
 
xiii 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ADG Autonomous and Decentralized Governments  
BEDE Ecuadorian State Bank 
CAS Complex Adaptive Systems 
CBT Community Based Tourism 
CD Civil Defense 
CONAIE Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador  
COPEFEN Coordination Office of the Program to Confront El Niño 
 Phenomena 
 
CORPECUADOR Executive Corporation for the Reconstruction of Zones Affected  
 by El Niño Phenomena 
 
CRC-URI Coastal Resource Center of the University of Rhode Island  
CRMP Coastal Resources Management Program  
CT Community Tourism 
CTOAD General Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomies, and 
 Decentralization  
DIPECHO European Commission of Humanitarian Aid Disaster Preparedness 
 Program  
 
ENSO El Niño Southern Oscillation 
EOC Emergency Operation Committee  
EPFCT Ecuadorian Plurinational Federation of Community Tourism 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
ICM Integrated Coastal Management 
 
xiv 
IDB Interamerican Development Bank 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
LB Libertador Bolívar 
MT Ecuadorian Ministry of Tourism 
NGO Non-Governmental Office 
PHRA National Public Health Regulation, Control and Vigilance Agency  
PRODECOS Community Ecotourism Program 
RM Risk Management 
RMS Ecuadorian Risk Management Secretariat 
RPC Rural Promotion Center  
SES Socio-ecological system 
SD Sustainable Development  
TGW Technical Working Groups  
UN United Nations 
UNDRR  United Nations Disaster and Risk Reduction office  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
Neoliberal and anti-neoliberal resilience in the complex relationship among nature, 
development, and security 
 
Life amidst tides and waves. Introduction 
Loud voices desperately cross the usually quiet seaside rural village of Libertador 
Bolívar, in the Pacific Coast of Ecuador. Some villagers are calling and urging other 
villagers to come down to the beach. Again, waves are battering the shoreline. It is the 
fourth time in less than two months that seawater fiercely runs up onto the beach, 
eventually damaging the tourist cabanas. Wooden sticks, pieces of roof, broken bamboo 
branches, electrical appliances float on the beach while the seawater runs unstoppably 
back into the ocean. Relentless waves continue breaking on the beach. Seawater uprushes 
again while the villagers desperately try to grab their business supplies and parts of the 
now shattered cabanas.  A few seconds of high tides breaking into the beaches at 
Libertador Bolívar are enough to devastate the small-scale tourism businesses, the main 
contributor to the village's economy.   
Libertador Bolívar is one of the sixty-eight native communities inhabiting the 
rural areas of Santa Elena, the southwestern Pacific province of Ecuador.  Despite having 
an arid and dry climate (Garcia-Garizabal et al. 2017), the province of Santa Elena and its 
parishes (Figure 1) are prone to severe flooding increased during El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO),  a very complex anomaly, which includes changes in the 
oceanographic and the atmospheric systems with worldwide consequences in different 
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levels and different seasons (Gasparri et. al. 1999). Since recording began, ENSO has 
catastrophically impacted Latin American countries several times (Santos 2006), 
particularly the Ecuadorian and Peruvian coasts. A report issued by the Corporación 
Andina de Fomento (CAF 1998), the Latin American Development Bank, states that in 
Ecuador, ENSOs have generated pluviometry levels ranging between 40% and 130% 
over average rainfall during non-ENSO years. Furthermore, the extraordinary ENSO 
events in the years 1982–1983 and 1997–1998 increased the sea level by 0.20-0.40m 
above the average, causing coastal erosion on the Ecuadorian shoreline (Cornejo 2007). 
The 1997-1998 ENSO was the most severe natural disaster in Ecuador (Solberg et 
al. 2003). Damages equaled 17% of Ecuadorian GDP (OPS 2000). The shrimp industry 
estimated a loss of US$3.5 million and US$4 million for the cost of shrimp farm recovery 
(Gasparri et al. 1999). In Libertador Bolívar and other rural communities of Manglaralto, 
the northern parish of Santa Elena, roughly 80% of the economically active population 
collected shrimp larvae during the 1990s (PMRC 1993).  However, the 1997-1998 ENSO 
devastated the shrimp-larvae collection-led economy of those comunas (CAF 1998).  
From 2007 onward, the government has implemented an early warning system, 
that monitors ENSO’s repetitive but unpredictable behavior. In addition, the government 
promoted anticipatory methods and built mitigation infrastructure to reduce the possible 
damage ENSO can bring to the Ecuadorian coast (SGR 2012).  ENSO monitoring and 
mitigation works are part of a governmental apparatus aiming to fulfill the constitutional 
duty to protect populations and secure future national development. 
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Figure 1 Map of Cantons in Santa Elena Province. Elaborated by Daniel Garces 
Despite governmental efforts to protect the population from catastrophe, 
comuneros’ economic survival is now at stake due to the constant struggle between 
waves, tides, and development of their small-scale tourism industry.  In recent years, 
swells, increasing sea level, and the aguajes or spring tides are progressively affecting 
Santa Elena’s beaches (SENPLADES 2017, GAD-PSE 2015, GAD-M 2014). For 
instance, on seven occasions from January to October 2015, waves battered seashore 
infrastructure at Libertador Bolívar (Sanchez 2015). August 2, 5, and 9, 2015 were 
particularly disastrous for this comuna. Waves reached the dirt road built next to the 
beach and damaged some cabanas, fences, and sewage pipes (Community Assembly, 
May 15, 2015).  Later, on September 28, 2015 swells concurred with the Super Moon –
Legend 
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moon’s closest approach to earth– strongly affecting Libertador Bolívar beaches 
(Sanchez 2015). Tides, the gradual rise and fall of the sea level, result from the 
gravitational forces between the moon and the sun, and the rotation of the planet. During 
the full moon, tides rise higher than usual. Consequently, threats increase when swells 
coincide with the Super Moon. In other seaside comunas of Santa Elena, the conjunction 
of swells and tides also impacted (El Comercio 2015), and continues to impact, beaches 
(El Comercio, 2019). However, the effects are uneven and disconnected among the 
seaside comunas of Santa Elena. Waves do not impact Santa Elena’s beaches in the same 
way or at the same time. Damages are local.  
The constant threat of waves pummeling and flooding Santa Elena’s beaches does 
not meet the categorization of a natural disaster.  ENSO is catastrophic. It is an acute 
natural event that suddenly disrupts and changes coastal socio-ecosystems. On the 
contrary, the disruptions that waves and tides bring to the shore are small, local, and 
chronic. According to Davoudi (2012), unnoticeable internal processes or “chronic slow 
burns” can also change the “very nature of systems over time with or without an external 
disturbance” (302). Indeed, over time, the endless tidal increase and decrease of sea level 
erodes the beach.  In populated coastal zones, waves and tides also damage infrastructure 
built next to the shoreline, such as the case of the comunas in Santa Elena. However, 
those cases do not attract global attention. Small and local effects of waves threatening 
the beaches of Santa Elena instantiate what Elizabeth Povinelli (2016) calls quasi-events, 
events that “never quite achieve the status of having occurred or taken place. They 
neither happen nor not happen” (13).  Povinelli highlights the necessity of collecting 
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quasi-events and connecting them to global processes. In doing so, they will inform 
place-specific contentions between huge and disastrous events. 
In the case of Libertador Bolívar, those small episodes achieved the status of 
having occurred only after locals demanded governmental actions to protect the villagers 
and the village infrastructure. The aguaje on August 5, 2015, destroyed the north beach 
infrastructure in the comuna. Immediately afterward, the comuneros blocked the main 
highway claiming their constitutional right of protection. In response, an Emergency 
Operation Committee started to operate with the goal of effective mitigation intervention. 
Three days later, on August 8, 2015, local government staff declared the emergency in 
the comuna (Municipal Resolution No. 0108082015-IMSE-A). A temporary solution was 
to pile up some rocks in front of the beach. A long-term solution was a seawall built in 
the year 2017. Occasionally, waves have continued running up without disrupting 
comuneros’ lives, however, on September 12, 2018, waves destroyed the south beach 
infrastructure at Libertador Bolívar (NicoPenínsula 2018). Immediately, a Community 
Assembly and local government appointed an emergency committee to address the issue 
(El Universo 2018, Community Assembly September 13, 2018). Since January 2019, an 
extension of the north beach seawall protects the south beach. However, seaward threats 
at Libertador Bolívar do not end, neither have they ended at other comunas, nor at any 
other coastal zone. Moreover, climate change is inducing stronger storms, sea-level rise 
and other seaward hazards on a global scale (McGrahan et al. 2007, Guzman et al. 2009). 
Anderson et al. (2019) propose the descriptor slow emergencies to explain 
ordinary circumstances that demand urgent governmental action. Thus, the concept 
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introduced by Anderson et al. counter the disaster-led emergency management promoted 
worldwide.  Instead, slow emergencies highlight those not regular, not acute emergencies, 
which also demand collective political or ethical response. Thus, slow emergencies are 
constant and imperceptible episodes, locally endured by those who coexist with non or 
mis-recognized threats, argue Anderson et al. In the case of the Santa Elena's seaside 
comunas, there is a misrecognition of the increasingly frequent damages the waves cause 
to the local cash-strapped economy.  Moreover, in Libertador Bolívar, the local 
government intervened only after comuneros protested on the streets, demanding that the 
government protect both the population and beach infrastructure. Recently, concerns over 
coastal erosion have been introduced at the national level (SENPLADES 2017); however, 
the impact on comuneros’ livelihood continues to lack official attention. No doubt, the 
intensifying aguajes, stronger swells, sea-level rise and their unnoticeable effects are 
perceived as part of the nature of comuneros’ lives.   
My dissertation emphasizes small and chronic disruptions rather than well-
documented catastrophic events.  In doing so, I posit a critique on global panaceas for 
local lives and environmental problems (Ostrom et al. 2007). Thus, when focusing on 
local and chronic disruptions, the spotlight on the political ecology of resilience turns 
toward the internal processes within the social, ecological, economical and the political 
interplay. In the next section, I explain the theoretical framework guiding my thinking, 
more broadly explained in chapter 2. Next, I detail the methods that constituted my 
research, and my positionality as an Ecuadorian, born and raised on the coast. I will 
conclude this chapter with an overview of each of the chapters of my dissertation.  
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Theoretical framework: neoliberal and anti-neoliberal resilience  
I borrow from Anderson et al. (2019) the concept of slow emergencies to amplify 
critical work on emergency claims on the coast of Ecuador. The notion of emergency 
claims, according to Anderson et al., point out a distinction between the normal notion of 
emergency – which the government assigns to those formally recognized emergencies 
structured through uncertainty and risk – and those ordinary situations that also demand 
some urgent response. Emergency governance in Santa Elena mainly emerged from the 
technical analysis of the Ecuadorian Risk Management Secretariat (RMS), as I document 
in chapter 4. Thus, top-down risk and disaster management has mapped risk and 
vulnerabilities throughout the country.  RMS has also built social and engineered 
mitigation capabilities at local levels in accordance with global criteria on resilience 
building.  However, in the case of Libertador Bolívar, the ordinary threats to the tourism-
based economy are growing in frequency since global environmental changes are 
affecting wave and tide behavior. They are slow emergencies that require governmental 
intervention. Indeed, the government built a seawall to protect beach infrastructure. 
Consequently, governmental emergency responses in Santa Elena have also emerged 
from the local, after comuneros’ emergency claims appeared.  
The beach is very significant in comuneros’ everyday lives. After the ENSO 
1982-1983, comuneros’ economy relied on shrimp-larvae harvesting. However, after the 
1997-1998 ENSO, when natural shrimp-larvae almost disappeared, the comuneros 
decided to venture into tourist development (see chapter 3). Supported and assisted by a 
long-lasting national coastal management program, the comuneros realized the economic 
and recreational value of the beach ecosystem (see chapter 5). Nowadays, the comuneros 
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are owners of small-scale tourism businesses while they make collective decisions on 
future developments in Community Assemblies, a customary and legal form of ruling 
common-property lands in Ecuador. Most of the small-scale tourism businesses of Santa 
Elena are built in what the RMS declared “risky zones”, where edifices are banned.  In 
Libertador Bolívar, the most visited restaurants operate on an unstable cliff on the south 
beach. In the recently developed north beach, comuneros built their cabanas on the shore, 
next to the river mouth. Since RMS bans construction in those areas, the Ministry of 
Tourism cannot issue tourist operation certification to most of the tourist businesses at 
Libertador Bolívar and several other communities in Santa Elena. Indeed, comuneros’ 
livelihoods continue to play out where national policies do not match. Thus, national 
policies have become part of the socio-ecological entanglement in the ordinary lives of 
comuneros. It is in those interstices of governmental coastal management that comuneros 
demand actions for their development and security. 
Since the early 2000s, resilience thinking, pursuing environmental and societal 
security, has pervaded worldwide governance. The most imprinted concept of resilience, 
which derives from the UN Disaster and Risk Reduction (UNDRR) framework, aims to 
increase communities’ response and adaptive capacities to confront disasters (McEvoy et 
al. 2013, Chandler and Reid 2016). Consequently, individuals and communities increase 
resilience and reduce vulnerability to natural and anthropic (human-made) threats through 
governmental policies and programs. In disaster management, resilience building was 
formally institutionalized through the hegemonic Hyogo framework for Action 2005-
2015, endorsed by the UN General Assembly (Grove 2013a, 2014a). Ecuador engaged 
such framework through the Comité Andino de Naciones or Andean Nations Committee, 
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while regional concerns on disaster management emerged (Rebotier 2016). Worldwide, 
the concept of resilience grew exponentially post 9/11, when global insecurities located 
resilience within security discourses and policies (Chandler 2012; Mulligan et al. 2016). 
According to the UNDRR webpage, one hundred thirty countries are building resilience 
under the light of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (issued 
after the Hyogo framework), while sixty-five countries have developed national 
platforms which provide recommendations toward a post-2015 framework.  
The increasing inclusion of resilience thinking in state practices has drawn the 
attention of critical social scientists, who have unpacked the hidden effects of promoting 
resilience policies. For instance, Dunn et al. (2015) argue that governmental programs to 
build resilience create a desirable resilient subject prepared to deal with change. 
However, Dunn et al. also reveal that the desirable resilient subject: 1) responds 
according to governmental rationale, and 2) eventually, becomes a subject in constant 
need of state intervention.  Paradoxically, the premise of resilience building cultivates 
within the State, the moral obligation to enhance citizens’ own responsibility to secure 
life (Chandler and Reid 2016). Moreover, Davoudi and Madanipour (2015) argue, "when 
resilience is used in the social context, the principle of self-organization is translated into 
self-reliance" (21). Thus, resilience building transfers security responsibility to 
individuals or communities.  
Furthermore, governments advocate numerous strategies to achieve the goal of 
building more resilient communities and individuals. However, Kevin Grove (2013b, 
2014b) reveals that mechanisms applied by resilience building programs –such as 
planning, participatory processes, training– actually order locals’ relations with others 
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and modify local knowledge. Consequently, resilience building removes possibilities of 
freedom and political action (Grove and Chandler 2017). Furthermore, argues Grove 
(2018), resilience thinking inhibits collective capacities "to imagine and bring about 
possibilities for different forms of life not organized around institutions such as private 
property, the market, and the territorially based nation-state" (Grove 2018a, 22). Thus, 
critical approaches to resilience thinking reveal that it actually counters resilience 
theory’s main theoretical pillars, based on complexity, non-linearity, and emergent 
outcomes.   
However, resilience “appears now to be everywhere,” argues Ben Anderson 
(2015, 60) in his article questioning “What kind of thing is resilience?” The reason for 
resilience becoming a ubiquitous term, argues Anderson (2015), relies on the 
“seductiveness of resilience as it morphs and changes” (62) through “complex fields 
alongside other ways of governing life” (64). Anderson’s arguments join critical 
scholarship currently showing that resilience has become an essential component of 
neoliberal governance (Anderson 2010, Chandler 2012, Chandler 2014, Frerks 2011, 
Grove 2013a, Joseph 2013, O'Hare & White 2013). Governments that adopt neoliberal 
policies advocate for supposedly universal recipes, rely on experts’ economic 
management, and deploy invasive and participatory policies, while pursuing a market-
based equilibrium (Peck and Tickell 2002).  
Responding to market, commerce, and commodities, subjects become active 
consumers and entrepreneurs (Barnett 2005). Thus, the market determines appropriate 
government action, excluding State calculation of social welfare. Consequently, 
neoliberal practices decentralize responsibilities to local institutions and individuals 
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(Peck and Tickell 2002). In line with neoliberalism, resilience also advocates for 
decentralized responsibility on a local scale. Indeed, resilience appeals for security by 
inculcating anticipatory criteria among individuals (Smith 2015, Coaffee & Fussey 2015). 
Important for this dissertation, neoliberalism and resilience are grounded on rejecting 
predictability and managing complexity with tools such as contingency plans or crisis 
prevention (Walker and Cooper 2011). Consequently, argue Walker and Cooper (2011), 
resilience colonized global policies after fitting neoliberal ontology in complex systems.  
In Ecuador, the government formally adopted and implemented UN resilience 
frameworks from 2007 through 2017. It was a decade ruled by an openly socialist and 
anti-neoliberal government (Gamso 2016, Becker 2013).  In rejecting neoliberal state 
practices, Ecuador followed the socialist and anti-neoliberal trend enveloping Latin 
America since the late 1990s. According to Walsh, the left-led ideology pervading Latin 
America “purport[ed] to break with neoliberalism and construct different social, political, 
and economic orders” (2015:19).  Despite the leftist resurgence in Latin America being 
called post-neoliberalism (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009, Radcliffe 2012), this 
dissertation focuses on the rejection of neoliberal state practices that guided the 
Ecuadorian left-led government. Thus, through the whole dissertation I focus on the anti-
neoliberal rationale steering Ecuador for a decade. Overall, the anti-neoliberal discourse 
in Ecuador highlighted a detachment from market-driven logics while furthering the 
centralized and regulatory function of the state (SENPLADES 2013, Correa 2009). 
The anti-neoliberal practices in Ecuador included rigorous planning and an 
administrative decentralization. The population's protection was one of the most critical 
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concerns for the anti-neoliberal rationale ruling Ecuador. As stated in the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution, article 389:  
"The State shall protect its people, communities and nature against the 
adverse impacts of natural or human-made disasters through risk 
prevention, disaster mitigation, restoration and improvement of social, 
economic and environmental conditions, to minimize the condition of 
vulnerability."  
Thus, the anti-neoliberal government in Ecuador created a risk management 
national system, which, according to Maria del Pilar Cornejo –first Risk Management 
Secretary, “aimed to confront adverse events, recurrent or not, in a way that would not 
affect Ecuadorians’ properties, economy and life” (interview with author, June 12 2018).  
Mainly, the RMS implemented anticipatory methods to mitigate natural and anthropic 
disasters throughout the country (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the Ecuadorian anti-
neoliberal government tied resilience to Indigenous and rural livelihoods, where 
catastrophic events had previously devastated the local economy (Rebotier 2016). Indeed, 
Ecuador had faced many natural and anthropic disasters during the 1990s (Demoraes & 
D’Ercole 2001, Solberg et al. 2003).  On the coast, the 1997-1998 ENSO left hard lessons 
that paved the way for disaster management policies (CAF 1998).  However, then-
governments, characterized by adopting neoliberal state practices, did not achieve a 
national system of disaster and risk management as the anti-neoliberal government 
accomplished in a single decade. Therefore, in Ecuador, resilience exceeds any simple 
equation with neoliberal rule. 
 
13 
Drawing upon Ben Anderson’s (2015) question of the nature of resilience, it is 
imperative to understand “how resilience transverses contexts,” how it “changes across 
contexts" and how “an ethos moves across contexts" (62). In line with Anderson’s call, 
critical scholarship has recently shown that resilience is tied up in ongoing and place-
specific contestations over development and security (Brown 2016, Grove and Chandler 
2017).  Throughout my dissertation, I critically contextualize how resilience intersects 
with historical trajectories of coastal development and security, and with specific 
political-economic apparatuses ruling the country. In doing so, I address the malleability 
of resilience, as it flows smoothly in the complicated relationship among nature, 
development, and security. 
To understand the contextually specific relationship between resilience and 
governmental rationales in Ecuador, this study will probe three key questions: 
1. How does the Ecuadorian government approach, promote, and operationalize 
resilience in neoliberal and anti-neoliberal Ecuador? 
2. How does the Ecuadorian government approach, promote, and operationalize 
tourist development in neoliberal and anti-neoliberal Ecuador? 
3. How have comuneros strategically mobilized tourist development and resilience 
in response to both neoliberal and anti-neoliberal development? 
I argue that resilience is a political process among nature, population, and 
governmental security techniques.  In the case of Santa Elena, the use (and abuse) of 
natural resources, individuals living in the interstices of policies, and governmental logics 
toward securing future wellbeing, configure dynamic and continuous subsets of political 
processes within the endless and complex human-in-nature relationship. An uneven 
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political process between the three aforementioned techniques will lead to unnoticeable 
damage to nature, the population, and the world.  Hence, the politics of resilience must 
capture the social and cultural dimension of nature, viewing it as an object of political 
struggles.  
Firstly, my approach to nature in this dissertation focuses on coastal zones, which 
involve the interface between marine and terrestrial environments and the triple action of 
the sea, the land, and the air. Thus, coastal zones are dynamic areas incessantly 
influenced by other complex subsets of systems such as the gravitational forces between 
the moon, the sun and the earth, the wind, the ocean, the intertidal zone, geological 
attributes, population, and other stressors. In addition, the increasing global 
environmental changes threatening coastal zones increase the complexity and uncertainty 
in those areas. The delimitation of coastal zones' extension varies according to programs 
and legislation. McBride and Seminack (2017) define the landward and seaward limits of 
coastal zones based on the geomorphic regions. It includes the coastal plain or seaward 
edge, the shore face from the mean low-tide line to the average wave base (5m to 10m 
water depth), and the continental shelf from average wave base to the shelf break. In 
Ecuador, coastal zone circumscribes from 50 meters (164.03 feet) seaward to the highest 
tide line, up to 50 km (31.06 miles) inland (PMRC 1993). Throughout my research I have 
worked with seaside comunas located in low-elevation coastal zones, or “the contiguous 
and hydrologically connected zone of land along with the coast and below 10m of 
elevation" (Neumann et al. 2015, 3). 
Secondly, in Santa Elena, the comuneros have historically resided next to the sea. 
They remain within coastal landscapes and withstand the threats they entail, such as high 
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tides, ENSO, extreme rainfall and severe droughts. Migration out of the communities of 
Santa Elena is rare, due to the deep attachment comuneros have to their ancestral lands. 
Rather than relocate, they adapt to disturbances brought about by human influence, such 
as the Spanish Conquest or the Incas’ invasion (Alvarez 1999) and by natural disruptions, 
such as ENSO. In the interval of those massive disruptions, the comuneros deal with mis-
recognized events, among them, waves severely battering the beaches, putting seaside 
villagers’ livelihoods at risk, and mismatches between coastal management and tourism 
development, as I detail in Chapter 6.  
Thirdly, by governmental security techniques, I refer to the "bundle of strategies, 
techniques, procedures, mechanisms, and practices through which authorities seek to 
make government programs operable" (Davoudi and Madanipour 2015, 5). Such 
"technologies of power" structure and shape the lives of individuals and the collective 
(Foucault 2007). They include institutional arrangements, material forms, and other kinds 
of processes providing “guiding norms and an oriented telos” (Collier 2009, 89).  Such 
techniques aim to “normalize” social life by adapting to the problems of the population to 
redeploy state interventionism (Collier 2009). I disclose discourses and mechanisms 
Ecuadorian neoliberal or anti-neoliberal governance have deployed to achieve the 
insertion of policies based on concepts of resilience. 
In my dissertation, I demonstrate how Ecuadorian governments, advocating 
discourses of resilience and sustainability under neoliberal or anti-neoliberal logics, 
problematize nature to justify the moral duty of protecting coastal zones.  More 
importantly, the longitudinal analysis of such interventions reveals current 
counterproductive effects on the beach ecosystem. The environmental worth of the beach 
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has been undervalued after the comuneros realized its recreational value. Yet, in 
synchrony, it provides the economic security of the comuna.  Nonetheless, an uneven 
environmental, recreational, and economic value of the beach ecosystem does not 
promise environmental and economic security over time. In coastal zones, the growing 
tourist demand affects the previously pristine and undeveloped beaches (Adgel et al. 
2005). Across the Pacific coast of Ecuador and many other coastal areas in the world, 
such as the Caribbean Islands (IRF 1996), Papua New Guinea (Diedrich et al. 2019), 
Indonesia (Cushnahan 2003), Malaysia (Hamzah & Hampton 2013), small-scale tourism-
businesses have emerged as a means of improving locals' livelihoods. Furthermore, in 
other coastal regions of the world, small tourist ventures challenge the mass tourism 
economy (Smith and Eadington 1992, Weaver 2011). Accordingly, tourism of a small-
scale nature should promote keeping coastal natural resources unaltered. Conversely, my 
research discloses the population’s and government's rationales for pressuring the beach 
ecosystem in response to securing the tourism-led economy of Santa Elena. 
The insights on the politics of resilience may be beneficial, particularly for 
decisions on coastal zone management, economic development models, and mitigation 
strategies on local and global scales. Firstly, sustainable development and risk 
management policies adopted in Ecuador emerge from the United Nations’ global 
frameworks. However, those frameworks are not panaceas for local struggles where 
common property and decision making prevail over Western notions of the market, 
private property, and individual responsibility. Indeed, UNDRR frameworks adopted by 
Ecuador are part of those policies not reaching rural Ecuadorian lives.  Secondly, the 
politics of resilience disclose the different ways people and the government approach 
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risk. My case reveals a human logic to securing future progress that exceeds the national 
policy's perception of risk. It becomes important, considering populations settling in 
coastal zones. According to census data, in Ecuador roughly 45% of the population lives 
in one of the Pacific Coast provinces. Globally, the populace in coastal zones has doubled 
in less than two decades. Small and Nicholls (2003) estimated 1.2 billion people (23% 
world’s population) lived within 100 km of the coast in 1990. By June 2017, the Ocean 
Conference organized by the UN estimated that nearly 2.4 billion people (roughly 40% 
world’s population) lived within proximity to the coast. The numbers are of greater 
importance in low-elevation coastal zones, where more than 600 million people 
(approximately 10% world’s population) reside despite increasing sea hazards.  
My dissertation aims to move debates of resilience from a mere critique of the 
effects of resilience thinking to unveiling resilience in the realm of politics. What can 
inform the politics of resilience within policy making and academia? As previous 
paragraphs imparted, the common concern of the critical resilience scholarship lies in 
reducing “individual and collective capacities to act politically” (Grove 2018a, 22); and, 
consequently, alternative possibilities not arranged according to dominant institutions 
such as private property. Critical resilience scholars have adopted Michel Foucault’s 
biopolitics, a concept developed for the analysis of power relations, to unfold resilience 
thinking as a mechanism of power “normalizing” collective lives. Accordingly, 
geographers approach biopolitics for a “spatialized analysis of power” that upholds “the 
centrality of the population” within the configuration of technologies of power (Philo 
2007, 342). I turn to Foucault's notion of biopolitics as a “problem space for thinking 
through how life and power intertwine in contextually specific ways” (Grove 2018b, no 
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pagination), to look into the unintended outcomes emerging from both, the interstices of 
regulatory mechanisms of security and populations’ struggles with nature. In doing so, 
slow emergencies can capture the constructive role of feedback emerging from mis-
recognized episodes, where locals campaign for present and future security from the 
ground.  My dissertation shows how transgressing critical resilience analysis on the 
effects of resilience unpacks harmful effects of resilience over nature. In doing so, I 
emphasize the complementary value of the ecosystem and the social system within a 
socio-ecological arrangement. In the next section, I expand on Foucault’s examination of 
power relations to explain the methodological approach in my dissertation.  
 
Methods: from a genealogy of resilience toward the politics of resilience 
A biopolitical approach allows me to identify power relations among three main 
driving forces interplaying in my research: nature, population, and governmental 
techniques. However, how to study the indeterminacy of complexity is multifaceted.  In 
my dissertation, I draw upon three reputable contributors to different but related fields of 
biopolitics. Firstly, Stephen Collier’s (2011) model developed from analyzing the birth of 
biopolitics in Soviet modernity facilitates the comparison of the neoliberal and anti-
neoliberal resilience governance in Ecuador. Secondly, I adopt Kevin Grove’s (2018a) 
approach to resilience as a style of thought. Thirdly, Foucault's genealogy of power sheds 
light on tracing mechanisms of security centered in nature's need for intervention. In the 
next paragraphs, I clarify why these three are important for analyzing the indeterminacy 
of complexity. 
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The reflection on neoliberal and anti-neoliberal rationales promoting resilience in 
Ecuador is categorical for my research. Here, my concern turns to the biopolitics of 
successive forms of governments, deeply analyzed by Stephen Collier (2011).  Collier 
develops a model to compare state-led transformations of collective life promoted by 
socialist and neoliberal rationales in Russia. The model identifies an object of 
intervention and the analytical instruments for intervention. In my analysis, the rural life 
of Santa Elena, specifically the seaside comunas, are the object of intervention while 
policies on coastal management, risk management, and tourism development became 
main analytical instruments for intervention. Through this scrutiny, I unpack the rationale 
behind problematizing governmental intervention in coastal lives. 
Within the multiple analyses on what kind of thing resilience is, Grove (2018a) 
addresses resilience as a style of thought which facilitates the understanding of 
indeterminacy.  Illuminated by Grove, I approach resilience as a conceptual relation 
among humans, nature, and governmental mechanisms of security assembled in contexts 
of threats and change, which ultimately produce hidden effects over nature. Thus, 
resilience is not one thing, not a discourse or a policy, not a particular skill a government 
can enhance among the population.  Resilience as a style of thought allowed me to keep 
in mind the initial approaches to socio-ecological resilience where, the ecological and the 
social, both function in a constant co-evolution (Berkes 2010).  This co-evolution is 
complicated by the presence of external or internal disturbances and, moreover, by the 
technologies of power, which sometimes neglect feedback emerging from its own socio-
ecological system. Thus, keeping in mind the socio-ecological indeterminacy, this 
dissertation untangles each layer within the complex systems that no-one “can neither 
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fully know nor completely control”; layers where uncertainty and insecurity have become 
“problems of how to live with and manage complexity;” and layers “intervening in 
complexity in order to bring about desirable outcomes” (Grove 2018a, 20).  
While resilience, as a style of thought, allows me to capture each layer and its 
interconnections, a genealogy of how resilience traverses social and ecological changes 
allows me to capture pieces of evidence in my longitudinal analysis.  Michel Foucault 
called “genealogy” a methodology to trace techniques that governments create to 
discipline and secure populations.  A genealogy addresses “what is specific about the 
mechanism of power at a given moment, for a given period, in a given field” (Foucault 
2007, 17). According to Philo (1992), the genealogy developed by Michel Foucault 
“opens up a heightened sensitivity to the way in which space and place are inextricably 
bound up in the history” (137).  It is crucial since the critique of resilience has explored 
how the aftermath of past events and hope in a desirable future shape the present (Dunn 
et al. 2015) in which people need to be prepared to confront and adapt to sudden and 
abrupt changes. However, rather than focusing on acute emergencies, I propose to 
capture Anderson et al.'s slow emergencies. Thus, a genealogy of how Ecuadorian 
governments have practiced resilience in coastal zones and how resilience has constituted 
a technique operating in multiple processes (Foucault 2007) allows me to capture the 
seduction of resilience, which morphs alongside ways of governing life (Anderson 2015). 
I also apply a tool of causal interference called “process tracing,” developed by 
David Collier (2011). Process Tracing is “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and 
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a 
temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (824). This methodology achieves a) to 
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describe political and social phenomena, and b) to evaluate causal claims. The 
longitudinal analysis of resilience in Ecuador has several breaks over time that 
profoundly influence the trajectories on beach use and governance. These include, on the 
one hand, neoliberal and anti-neoliberal state practices, and on the other, the 1997-1998 
ENSO. 
Accordingly, Process Tracing begins by “taking good snapshots at a series of 
specific moments,” then, "observing change or sequence" (Collier 2011, 824). Therefore, 
I first describe, in a comprehensive manner, coastal management, risk management, and 
tourism development in Santa Elena. Then, with “a sense of 'static' description" (ibid, 
823) of each layer in trajectory, I pay close attention to sequences of independent, 
dependent, and intervening variables to analyze trajectories of change and causation. In 
doing so, I express how resilience transverses and morphs in complex milieus. 
Despite the geographical insights of my research, my work presents an 
anthropological account of the interstices of local struggles in Santa Elena. I used to 
spend my school vacations in the rural parish of Manglaralto, when a dirt road connected 
the northern parish with the main town of Santa Elena. Pristine landscapes between the 
river mouth and the wide sandy beaches were well worth the long and tiresome journey 
there. At the surf zone, the larveros strained their arms to handle large nets in the 
swinging waves to collect natural shrimp larvae, while fishers arrived at the beach with 
their pangas or small boats full of fresh fish. After some decades, I started to visit the 
north of Santa Elena again. From 2008 through 2013, I participated in several projects 
managed by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transportation. The unspoiled beaches had disappeared together with the larveros, while 
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a handful of pangas spent more time on the beach than on the sea. Numerous bamboo 
cabanas stretch out along the beach into the distance while tourists enjoy their leisure 
time.   
I position myself as a native anthropologist to portray the coastal development in 
Santa Elena. Having born and raised in Guayaquil, the main port of Ecuador, embedded 
me of the Ecuadorian coastal identity, which emerges amidst the Pacific Ocean, beach 
landscapes, and estuarine zones.  I learned the traditions of rural seaside villages since I 
was a child when I visited my relatives who lived in Santa Elena, practically every year. I 
deepened my understanding on Santa Elenians' rural life after performing several 
fieldworks a decade ago. In the early 2000s, I inventoried natural and cultural tourist 
attractions for the Ministry of Tourism. I also collected socio-economic data for the 
Ministry of Transportation and Public Works in several seaside villages of Santa Elena. 
While working in rural Santa Elena, I realized how far are the rural and urban traditions 
on the coast of Ecuador. Although the marine and coastal environments strongly 
influence coastal identity, the regional administration centralized in Guayaquil influenced 
relationships between Santa Elenians and those who grew up in the city of Guayaquil. 
The city port has long-lasting centralized administration of the coast. Furthermore, such 
centralization was one of the main reasons for separating the current Province of Santa 
Elena from the Province of Guayas in the year 2007. Although my position as a visiting 
tourist, as a government employee, and then as a visiting scholar distances me from the 
rural life of comuneros, my long stays in the comunas allows me to understand 
comuneros engagements with nature and development.   
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Nowadays, Santa Elena’s coastal landscapes highlight the inequality between 
development and resources. Initially, I did not understand how those changes arose, what 
caused them, or the conflicts that have emerged as a result. Through this dissertation, I 
disentangle the configurations of power among ecosystems, population, and decision-
making to determine both the winner and loser in the subset of driving forces pressuring 
Santa Elena’s beaches. As a native anthropologist, I have also experienced the 
consequences of unstable politics in Ecuador which has seen numerous presidential 
impeachments and resignations over the last decades. However, rather than analyzing 
conditions of changing governmental practices, I concentrate my efforts on their effects, 
concurrent with the adoption of global development and security managerial practices. I 
focus on how governments have managed the coastal environment and natural resources 
according to the logic of neoliberal and anti-neoliberal governmental practices, paying 
particular attention to coastal zone governance, where the intertidal connection between 
the ocean and humans provides ecological, economical, and recreational value.  Thus, I 
sought out governmental rationales and policies ruling coastal zones, and everyday life 
interactions with the intertidal zone, to hear the petitions of rural individuals and the 
demands of nature as well.   
Additionally, I am speaking from the Ecuadorian coast to open analytical 
discussions from a local perspective. In doing so, rather than replicating another 
pervasive Northern approach to underdeveloped societies, I am taking a post-colonial 
stand of ethical responsibility on the representation (Slater 2004) of Ecuadorian coastal 
people.  My post-colonial approach motivates me to rethink patterns of dominant global 
(northern) frameworks largely shaping governmental policies in Ecuador. Firstly, they are 
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ineffective in the rural realities of the coast. Secondly, they are not limiting rural demands 
for development and security. According to Slater (2004), northern imaginaries of the 
rural south depict an immature individual who is unable to assert his reality.  Similarly, 
critical resilience scholars contend that resilience building neglects opportunities for 
alternative lives. However, comuneros’ demands for protection are actually demands for 
allowing them to create their own realities within contemporary complexities of 
development and security. Furthermore, despite neoliberal or anti-neoliberal 
governments, comuneros continue making decisions on – and adapting to – the effects of 
processes such as the alignment of the moon, the sun, and the earth influences nature, 
development and security. Thus, the primacy of local processes in Santa Elena challenges 
global conceptions of risk, security, and development.  
During fieldwork, I visited nine coastal communities in Santa Elena: Valdivia, 
Libertador Bolívar, San Antonio, Olón, Manglaralto, Curía, Cadeate, San José, and La 
Entrada. I also visited Salango, the southern community in the Province of Manabí, 
which has historical connections to northern Santa Elena. The research specifically 
targeted individuals representing different social groups with ongoing roles in risk and 
coastal management, tourism development processes, and rural life in Santa Elena. I 
conducted one-on-one formal and semi-formal in-depth interviews with governmental 
officials including the first Risk Management Secretary (1 person); former (4 people) and 
current (5) risk management officials; former (5) and current (9) Tourism Ministry 
officials; Santa Elena's seawalls Designer Engineer (1); Public Works Ministry officials 
(3); and Executive Managers of NGOs (2). I also conducted formal one-on-one in-depth 
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interviews (and many walking interviews on a day-to-day basis) with community leaders 
in rural villages (8).  Appendix 1 shows the IRB approved interview templates I applied. 
I also conducted one group interview with the members of the Asociación de 
Servidores Turísticos “Rio-Mar” or the “River-Sea” Association of Small Tourism 
Businesses (13 members) and two additional group interviews with leaders of 
communities (5 people). I also conducted one-on-one, semi-formal interviews with 
individuals working in the tourism industry, such as hotel and restaurant owners (8); hotel 
and restaurant staff members (4); paragliding guides (2); handcraft makers and sellers (6); 
surfing trainers (1); informal sellers on the beach (4); and lifeguards (2). I conducted 
participant-observation in four rural villages in Manglaralto parish, Province of Santa 
Elena, but particularly in Libertador Bolívar, a community that keeps their territory free 
of foreign investors due to their deep attachment to their communal land. In this 
dissertation, I avoid pseudonyms for high-ranked officials and comuneros leaders. 
However, in particular quotes I gave codes, such as E1 or E2, to protect their identities, 
based on what interviewees requested. 
The dissertation also presents thick ethnographic accounts of interactions with 
villagers and leaders. I engaged in participant observation in ordinary events. I 
accompanied comuneros riot claiming on a seizure of 7.5 hectares of their territory. With 
my friends Milton and Osvaldo I toured the northern comunas of Manglaralto. I had 
relaxing times in the hammocks while chatting with the comuneros after a holiday of high 
tourist demand, and I also experienced the rush of salvaging everything we could while 
waves destroyed the cabanas on the beach. I attended community assemblies (August 
2015, November 2016, June, July, and August 2018), where, in my previous role as 
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consultant, I presented governmental projects. Archival research is crucial in my research 
to connect local decision-making with place-specific contestations on development and 
security. I capture local episodes by analyzing fifteen years of Libertador Bolívar 
Community Assemblies' minutes, from the year 2003 to 2018.   
I also conducted policy analysis. During fieldwork, government staff facilitated 
numerous policies and programs regarding risk management and development, Santa 
Elena’s provincial projects, and municipal by laws. I also downloaded official plans, 
policies, and programs from official websites or requesting them by email to government 
departments.  Additionally, I gathered information from relevant newspapers and social 
media sites. Most documents (policies, news, community assembly archives) I analyzed 
throughout my research are written in Spanish. As a native Spanish speaker, I have done 
all translations myself, except where otherwise noted.  
Almost all of my interviews were recorded and transcribed accurately to preserve 
validity. The transcribed interviews were then coded using NVIVO Software 12.4.0 
twice. From a first coding emerged main themes, grounding my theoretical discussion. 
Then, I elaborated a matrix of codes (Appendix 2), which included concepts, perceptions, 
and practices of resilience in the coast of Ecuador. Notably, the code matrix established 
breaks over time to capture local episodes between stronger driving forces that have 
shaped the history of the comuneros: neoliberal and anti-neoliberal regimes, and the 
1997/1998 ENSO. The second coding process also included policies and other official 
documents such as agendas, plans, and technical reports. In doing so, I captured the 
claims from slow emergencies and the politics of resilience they entail.  
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Overview of the chapters 
Illuminated by Foucauldian analysis of government, in Chapter 2, I theorize on 
the effects of biopolitics in different fields: social, nature, sovereignty, and alternative 
possibilities. The first section addresses the governance of the social to emphasize how 
environmental governmentality spread throughout the world. In doing so, the analysis 
reveals the urgency of providing nature with a political space in the complex socio-
ecological relationship. Second, I address the biopolitics of resilience to understand the 
malleability of ubiquitous resilience. I collect initial ecology scholarship that introduced 
complexity as an approach to human-in-environment research. Then, I shift to the 
pervasive logic of resilience building and its critique, to unpack a discourse and practice 
that actually is limiting local alternatives. The third section collects debates on 
alternatives limited by other governmental politics. Particularly, I address sovereignty as 
a way to show local decision-making processes embedded in governmental logics. Then, 
I disclose critical approaches to introduce alternatives into academic discussions. In sum, 
the literature review aims to capture post-colonial claims on the political.  
In Chapter 3, I outline multiple stressors pressuring everyday life on the coast of 
Ecuador. By stressors, I refer to a) political and judicial fragility in Ecuador; b) seaside 
villagers' desire for development and progress; and 3) natural processes in a complex 
coastal physical geography, all of which are dynamically interconnected, shaping and 
reshaping the socio-ecological landscape. A biopolitical approach suggests that 
governments structure and shape the field of possible action of subjects (Foucault 2007, 
Dean 2010). Thus, I trace governments ruling Ecuador for 40 years, illuminating the 
different rationales that emerged during thirty years of neoliberal state practices and a 
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decade of the left-led anti-neoliberal regime. My approach here is far from any critique of 
economic policies. Instead, I focus on “relations between the ways in which people are 
governed and the ways in which [people] are advised to govern themselves” (Rose 1996, 
340).  Having elaborated a national frame, I move down to the local complexity of Santa 
Elena, drawing upon anthropological (Erazo 2013, Simpson 2008) and geographical 
(Agnew 1994, Coleman & Grove 2009) debates on sovereignty to unveil that comuneros 
continue being self-conscious subjects. They do not solely rely on governmental 
interventions. Instead, comuneros decide and negotiate their economic development 
despite the uncertainties with which they coexist.  I argue that Santa Elena’s rural 
villagers practice their own resilience; they continuously adapt to new realities. Chapter 3 
elaborates on a setting that clarifies two rationales governing Ecuador, crucial for tracing 
how resilience has traversed Ecuadorians' lives.  
Chapters 4 and 5 engage a genealogical analysis of policies, programs, and 
strategies operating on the coast of Ecuador. Chapter 4 traces how the Ecuadorian 
governments have addressed disaster management to understand the influence of 
resilience thinking on such programs. Overall, the chapter reveals the evolution of 
disaster management from response to anticipatory and mitigation logic.  Chapter 5 
traces a long-lasting coastal management program, which introduced tourist development 
in Santa Elena. Interestingly, the research reveals that the program was rooted in adaptive 
governance, a concept developed by resilience ecologists. My goal in both chapters is to 
1) disclose global discourse influencing Ecuadorian coastal governance; and 2) capture 
governmental techniques of security during neoliberal or anti-neoliberal governments. 
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Both chapters uncover how resilience has traversed neoliberal and anti-neoliberal 
contexts by adapting discourses on nature, development, and security. 
Chapter 6 delves into the micro-politics of everyday life in Santa Elena. By 
cataloging the social and environmental changes Santa Elena has gone through, the 
chapter discloses current struggles, and unpacks the interstices between tourism, risk and 
coastal management policies, in which comuneros autonomously decide on the use of 
communal lands and the future development of the comuna. Importantly, this chapter 
highlights beach ecosystems as a crucial resource for tourism development and discloses 
the effects of this industry on beach ecology. However, new stressors such as global 
environmental changes are now influencing the slow emergencies and the claims of rural 
comuneros that I capture in this chapter.  
Chapter 7 collects my reflections on social and ecological changes Santa Elena 
has undergone in four decades. Drawing upon the previous chapters, I disclose the 
unintended consequences of governmental policies applying resilience in managing the 
coast of Ecuador. On the one hand, global discourses of sustainable development strongly 
shaped neoliberal tourist development in Santa Elena. On the other hand, global 
anticipatory and mitigation criteria influenced Santa Elena’s anti-neoliberal tourist 
development. However, both governmental rationales have problematized nature to 
justify intervention while having unintended consequences on beach ecosystems. Finally, 
no matter what rationale and technologies of security Ecuadorian governments have 
deployed to rule coastal management, the effects are now on the beach ecosystem as well 
as on the social system.  Chapter 8 provides conclusions on my theoretical and practical 
contributions. 
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This dissertation approaches the struggles of rural lives in seaside communities, 
and the struggles of nature within an open-ended human-in-environment relationship. I 
only hope that in disentangling socio-ecological indeterminacy, researchers and 
policymakers can hear both, the claim of nature and the claim of the social in an ever-
changing world. 
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CHAPTER II 
Untangling complex relations among the state, government, population, and nature 
 
Countering modern dualisms between nature and culture, social science has 
disclosed an intimate human-in-environment relationship that admits numerous vectors 
within an open-ended system.  Thus, a global socio-cultural study requires the researcher 
to untangle the ongoing interplay of the vectors within such complex systems. This 
chapter examines contemporary literature regarding complex relationships among the 
State, the government, the population, and nature. In doing so, the analysis provides a 
foundational theory to address interstices emerging from dominant discourses about 
socio-nature dispositions.   
Biopolitcs, a term coined by Michel Foucault (2008), illuminates the discussion 
about power relations and the multiple mechanisms through which "human species 
became the object of a political strategy" (Foucault 2007, 16). Foucault discloses how 
governments create governable subjects through mechanisms of power that have effects 
on both, the population and the body of individuals (Foucault 2003, 2007; Rabinow & 
Rose 2006). Those mechanisms deployed over the population ultimately create a sense of 
normality (Anderson 2011, Rabinow 2010). Stephen Collier (2009, 3) elucidates 
biopolitics as "the attempt to govern a population's health, welfare, and conditions of 
existence in the framework of political sovereignty." Thus, a biopolitical analysis 
unravels hidden strategies and tactics allowed to control social life through government's 
virtuosity.  
 
32 
Foucault's biopolitics also opened opportunities for debates on locals’ encounters 
of resistance and alternatives (Foucault 1978, Foucault 1982, Rabinow 2010). This 
bottom-up approach to power acknowledges the interstices of collective action and 
individuals' agency despite strategies of normalization or social control. Thus, the 
analysis of biopolitics also dislocates and compels the idea of a sovereign State having 
control over people's lives: their will, their future, and their progress.  For instance, 
Jessica Catellino (2006) traces how the US government modernized Seminoles’ housing 
in Florida during the 1960s. The Western logic of development overlooked Seminoles' 
social meaning behind customary housing and introduced modern housing systems with 
windows and poor circulation of air, as well as housing technologies, such as ovens and 
fans. US governmental housing programs caused a total reorganization of Seminoles’ 
kinship, gender, and space. 
Interestingly, Catellino (2006) also traces the effects after the Seminole Tribe of 
Florida started to control the Housing Department in the late 1990s. The tribe promoted 
traditional and hybrid dwelling structures, such as chickee and thatched-roof houses. 
More importantly, after policy shifted to permitting construction beyond designated 
development plots, housing practices have also changed. Several families returned to a 
more scattered settlement pattern, argues Catellino.  Thus, tracing the contemporary 
history of government-motivated modernization also reveals changes in future social 
relations with the environment. From the new socio-ecological stability, alternatives ways 
of living also emerge. 
Illuminated by Foucault's biopolitics, three theoretical foundations undergird this 
dissertation. The first set of literature focuses on the governance of society and nature. 
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The analysis reveals the need for providing nature a more important political space. The 
literature review then shifts towards resilience, a current trend of governmental 
intervention pursuing societal security. In the third section, the literature review addresses 
the alternatives that have continued to exist outside of government-induced normality.  A 
brief conclusion sums up the need for dismissing juridical-legal normality and rather 
highlighting the alternative possibilities emerging from the complex socio-ecological 
relations.  
 
The biopolitics of socio-nature governance 
The literature in this section addresses contemporary discussions about the 
complicated social, ecological, and economic relationships the State and the government 
entail. Under a biopolitical scope, this section focuses on the government's virtuosity and 
its effects over the population and nature. First, the analysis addresses the governance of 
the social, then moves to examine the governance of nature. This literature review also 
examines the entrenchments among capitalism, sustainable development, and nature to 
show the effects of governmental intervention in contemporary history.  
 
State, government, and the social  
A pre-constituted juridical structure within a territorial functioning continues to be 
a comprehensive understanding of nation-state. However, nation-states (hereafter State) 
coexist within complexities beyond the juridical-legal relationships among inhabitants 
and territory. Michel Foucault (2003), in his Lectures at the College of France, identified 
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those complexities as "other things." Those "things" relate inhabitants' daily activities 
with nature, environment, culture, and security; for instance, crop traditions and 
misfortunes. Drawing upon Foucault, Swyngedouw (2004, 9) addresses such 
complexities as "network of interwoven socio-spatial processes that are simultaneously 
human, material, natural, discursive, cultural, and organic." Thus, the State "does not 
exist in the phenomenal world, […] what does exist is a collection of individual beings 
connected by a complex system of relations" (Trouillot 2001, 127, quoting Radcliffe-
Brown 1995[1940]: xxiii). Then, complex systems include "set of practices and processes 
and their effects" (Trouillot 2001, 131). Thus, processes and effects both profoundly 
influence socio-ecological relationships. Consequently, the State becomes an abstraction 
that compresses tangible objects, subjects, and several institutional forms: family, 
community, society, economy, policy, government, and others. 
Moreover, the State assumes the condition of coordinator among those multiple 
institutions (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Among them, the government reifies the State's 
abstraction by operating its incessant social, political, and economic transactions 
(Ferguson & Lohman 1994).  The government mediates the State/society relationships 
through the state apparatus, which comprises those public and private institutions. Thus, 
the state apparatus comprises not only state offices, but also offices indirectly serving the 
State, or those non-statal or para-statal organizations through which the State spreads its 
power in a multiplicity of social contexts (Ferguson 1994, Trouillot 2001). The 
increasingly close-fitting roles of State and private agencies hinder any separation of 
responsibilities within the state apparatus. Indeed, state apparatus is inclusive and broad 
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ranging (Whitehead et al. 2007). In doing so, the state apparatus can operate throughout 
the population. 
The population became the subject of government after governance rationales 
decentered the model of the family. Foucault (2003) reveals how mid-18th century 
statistics began to show regularities in the population (i.e., rate of deaths and diseases), 
aggregate effects on the population (epidemics, ascending spirals of labor and wealth), 
and specific economic effects irreducible to the family. Then, the family became an 
element internal to population and "population comes to appear above all else as the 
ultimate end of government” (Foucault 1991, 100). Once the population becomes a 
collective subject, "mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect on [the 
population]" (Foucault 2007, 43). Thus, the government appears as a "mode of action on 
actions" or "the conduct of conduct" (Foucault, 2007), which ultimately shapes the 
conduct of humans by direct or indirect means. 
Foucault (2007) focuses on the government's indirect forms of intervention, which 
appear "with the function of modifying something in the biological destiny of the 
species" (10). One of the examples Foucault analyzes is the epidemic and inoculation 
campaign in the eighteenth century. Through such campaigns, the government satisfies 
the population's health demands.  Foucault additionally highlights, “[the population] is 
both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it" (2007, 105). Thus, 
the government achieves care for the population through conducting them and controlling 
social life. 
Thus, government operates over subjects' conduct "entailing new relations 
between the ways in which people are governed by others and the ways in which they are 
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advised to govern themselves," argues Nikolas Rose (1996a, 340). In a similar vein, 
Mitchell Dean (2010, 20) argues that government "entails an attempt to affect and shape 
in some way who and what individuals and collectives are and should be." Consequently, 
concludes Dean (2010, 200) "government is crucially concerned to modify a certain 
space marked out by entities such as the individual, its selfhood or personage, or the 
personality character, capacities, levels of self-esteem and motivation the individual 
possesses." Hence, government pervades the population to achieve social control.  
In doing so, the government comprises "a whole series of specific governmental 
apparatuses" (techniques and tactics) and "complex of saviors," that include knowledge 
and discourses (Foucault 2007).  Firstly, mechanisms in motion throughout the state 
apparatus are easily identifiable as a legal and disciplinary mechanism. However, 
Foucault (2007) highlights the mechanisms of social control which respond to reality by 
regulating that reality. Thus, the law works in the imaginary by imagining the negative to 
be prevented. In a complementary sphere working over individuals, discipline faces the 
nature of reality. Contemporary "mechanisms of security" make the components of 
reality work with each other through calculations and specific arrangements. Foucault 
clarifies, "there is not a succession of law, then discipline, then security" (2007, 25). They 
all operate to normalize and control social life. 
According to Davoudi and Madanipour (2015), regulatory mechanisms of security 
encompass the "bundle of strategies, techniques, procedures, mechanisms, and practices 
through which authorities seek to make government programmes operable" (81). 
Furthermore, those mechanisms of security are disguised through and assembled into the 
apparatus of the State (Sharma & Gupta 2006).  Furthermore, mechanisms of security 
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increase the government's capacity to manage the population while responding to 
governments' concern on how to foster life (Foucault 1978). Thus, the government needs 
to create the necessary conditions of possibility to secure the population. In doing so, 
governments create complex "saviors" and a set of mechanisms, relations, and procedures 
that "normalize" the population (Foucault 2008, 2007). Those "politics of truth" become 
an imperative discourse highlighting what government dictates as normal and abnormal 
(Foucault 2007). Thus, the government’s normal emerges as a reality within social life.  
Such reality is not a natural phenomenon; it emerges from the organization of 
knowledge responding to specific rationality (Said 1978). Furthermore, the politics of 
truth configure an "imagined territory" upon which the government and its politics should 
act, argues Dillon (1995). For Nikolas Rose (1996a, 331), those "new political languages 
are embodied in the ways in which a whole series of issues are problematized – made 
amenable to authoritative action in terms of features of communities and their strengths, 
cultures, pathologies." Consequently, the population "is now something to be 
programmed" (Rose 1996a, 332), by discourses, programs, and policies.  
Relevant here is Mahmood’s (2005) argument that central to the formulation on 
social control is what Foucault "calls the paradox of subjectivation: the very processes 
and conditions that secure a subject's subordination are also the means by which she 
becomes a self-conscious identity and agent” (17). It turns upside-down the idea of 
individuals' agency. Paradoxically, argues Mahmood, individuals' agency is not merely "a 
synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that 
specific relations of subordination create and enable" (2007, 18 original emphasis).  In a 
similar vein, Tania Murray Li (2007) argues how many governmental schemes appear as 
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the natural expression of every day.  Mahmood and Li critique the government's 
virtuosity to control social life. 
Since its origin, the State must achieve an adequate disposition of the social, 
biological, and economic life of the population. That is what Foucault (2007) calls "the 
art of governing."  However, Foucault’s analysis of governmental practices reveals that 
the best possible way of governing responds to a "reasoned way of governing best" 
(Foucault, 2008:2). Consequently, according to Foucault (2007), the political rationale 
guiding a government determines socio-economic-nature arrangements. Foucault coined 
the term governmentality to refer to how governments assemble "institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics" that "has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instruments" (2007, 108). However, according to Dillon (1995), the 
power of governmentality resides in being a domain of cognition rather than legislation. 
Moreover, the art of governing "does not merely make use of knowledge; it is comprised 
by knowledge" (Dillon 1995, 330). Therefore, governmentality intensely depends upon 
experts and institutions of knowledge devoted to "the calculated administration of diverse 
aspects of conduct" through "education, persuasion, inducement, management, 
incitement, motivation and encouragement" (Dillon 1995, 330).  
Nikolas Rose’s (1996a) arguments clarify the present discussion about Foucault's 
governmentality and its relation to the creation of knowledge. Nicolas Rose understands 
governmentality as "the deliberations, strategies, tactics, and devices employed by 
authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure 
good and avert ill" (1996a:328). This notion highlights the focus on the goals, intentions, 
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or interests of the authorities operating within a territory. Consequently, Rose proposes to 
analyze governmentality according to the political rationality or governmental reasoning, 
through which the state apparatus deploys mechanisms over the population (Rose 1996b). 
To emphasize his analysis, Rose highlights two sections in the word governmentality. 
The first – govern – referring to the ensemble of processes, and the second – mentality – 
denoting the way the government thinks. Rose argues that, although both the State and 
the population pursue wellbeing as their primary goal, the government carries an 
"idealized schemata" on how to achieve that purpose (Rose 1996b, 42). In order to create 
the most favorable relation among inhabitants, nature, culture, and security, the 
government also creates "intellectual machinery," which "render[s] reality thinkable and 
amenable to political programming" (ibid). Thus, a governmental authoritative criterion 
"regulate[s] decisions and actions of individuals, groups, and organizations" (Rose 
1996b, 42) by creating a series of knowledge and discourses, the "politics of truths." 
In sum, Foucault's governmentality opened contemporary examinations of the 
effects of the ruling, governing, normalizing, regulating, and controlling social life 
through the creation of mechanisms that make the population amenable to authoritative 
criteria. The virtuosity of government resides in its art of controlling social life by 
problematizing social phenomena through techniques and tactics of knowledge which, 
ultimately, makes individuals unaware of their subjectivization. In the next section, the 
literature review addresses the analysis of environmental governmentality, the way 
governments approach and manage nature.  
 
 
40 
Environmental governmentality 
The above section reviews how governments arrange social relations according to 
their rationale. In light of this, the following paragraphs review discussions on the 
construction of nature, the deep engagement of governments acting over nature, and the 
politics of nature. Nowadays, it is not usual to enjoy pristine landscapes; instead, nature 
emerges as a product of culture. Indeed, scholarship has extensively shown that nature is 
the product of human intervention. For instance, Stephen Lansing (1991) shows how 
religious beliefs and a desire to live peacefully among many villages led to a system that 
distributed water equitably, kept insect populations low, and fed many people living over 
a large area. The Bali case shows the complex cultural intervention over nature. Science 
has been another form of intervening nature since science translates nature into 
knowledge. For instance, Bruno Latour (1999) describes how experts collect, categorize 
and transfer the Amazonian forest-savanna in Brazil into expert knowledge.   
Governments also intervene in nature. For instance, Jeffrey Sasha Davis (2005) 
traces the transition of the Bikini Atoll from a site of nuclear tests and radioactive waste 
to a tourists' paradise for divers. In his analysis, Davis discloses the production and 
reproduction of nature led by the US government and, later, by the Bikini Government. 
The logic of both governments prevailed over the island's nature and shaped individuals' 
conceptualization of nature. The logic of the government also shapes human relations 
with nature. For instance, Agrawal (2005) traces numerous environmental practices and 
perceptions adopted by the Kumaonis in northern India after implementing forest 
councils. The Indian Forest and Revenue Departments supervised forest councils through 
a robust technical bureaucracy, while government assembled regulatory legal frameworks 
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towards forest conservation. Ultimately, Agrawal reveals that Kumaonis became 
"environmental subjects," concerned for the environment and its conservation according 
to governmental discourses.  
According to James Scott (1998), the logic of the State focuses on nature's 
utilitarian value, the fiscal and commercial value derived from an ecological habitat, such 
as forest and plants.  Thus, forest and plants become "natural resources" – the forest 
becomes wood, while plants become crops.  After the notion of "natural resources" 
replaced the term nature, it thus "can be appropriated for human use" (Scott 1998, 13).  
Scott additionally examines governmental formulas of simplification of nature in forms 
of knowledge (using maps, cadastral surveys, land-records), which ultimately makes it 
possible to control and manipulate the forest.    
States often see nature as merely a source of wealth, contributing to a capitalist system 
of production which approaches nature as a commodity, a means of production through 
labor (Escobar 1995). Capitalism has transformed forest ecosystems into monocultural 
landscapes (Gudynas 2010), mangroves into industrial shrimp farms (Pazmiño et al. 
2018, Arriaga 2000), pristine beaches into modern resorts (Padilla 2015). Since colonial 
encounters, such transformation of nature accompanies global trading and political 
economy. Thus, nature has become a natural resource serving to provision the 
population’s wellbeing. As a result, degradation of natural resources became a new social 
phenomenon in the lands occupied by rural peasants and Indigenous peoples.  
Under the label of Sustainable Development, a worldwide environmentally 
sensitive view emerged in response to the capitalist transformation of nature (Adams 
2009, Gudynas 2011). The focus here is the acknowledgment of the biopolitical 
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articulation of Sustainable Development (SD). Since the early 1970s, UN efforts to 
address conflicts between environment and development have spread throughout the 
world through the notion of SD. Notably, after the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s report 
“Our Common Future,” followed by the Agenda 21 at the Rio Conference in 1992, 
countries have adopted SD criteria as a poverty panacea. Since 2005, 17 Goals of 
Sustainable Development, issued from a global dialogue mediated in the UN, are a 
reference foundation for social and environmental planned intervention (Cano et al. 
2019).  Certainly, SD is reformist, argues Adams (2009). Thus, governments, politicians, 
and development bureaucrats have enthusiastically incorporated SD programs and plans 
worldwide, while the literature shows SD locating human beings and nature as the object 
of a political strategy. Thus, SD became a contemporary "mechanism of security," which 
requires the components of reality to work through a series of expert knowledge and 
specific arrangements. In addition to a planned organization at the local level, SD 
practices also include the impulse of social institutions (Cano et a. 2019) and social 
movements (Kates et al. 2005).  In broadening SD actions from ecocentric to 
anthropocentric initiatives, an intricate link between environment, development, and 
poverty emerged, argues Adams (2009). Thus, the concept SD “maintains a creative 
tension between a few core principles and an openness to reinterpretation and adaptation 
to different social and ecological contexts” (Kates et al. 2005). It is therefore a key locus 
for the analysis of environmental governmentality.  
Luke (2006) traces a parallel between Foucault's biopolitics and international 
efforts of managing nature. Luke instantiates his argument analyzing the Worldwatch 
Institute, an international environmental movement that continually attempts to reinvent 
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the forces of nature into economic terms and managerial procedures. In doing so, Luke 
argues that international environmental management aims "the right disposition of 
things" (263, quoting Foucault 1991, 93). Consequently, environmentality "would govern 
by restructuring today's ecologically unsound society through elaborate managerial 
designs to realize tomorrow's environmental-sustainable economy" (Luke 2006, 266). 
Thus, international institutions concerned about environmental management create eco-
knowledge in the form of specific bioeconomic terms of nature. Additionally, 
environmentality disciplines sustainability through discourses that signal “who-can” and 
“how-to” manage nature (Luke 2006, 267). Thus, environmentality has become a practice 
that challenges State borders while imposing international forms to construct sustainable 
environments.   
Similarly, Tanya Murray Li (2007) discloses the biopolitics of environmental 
governance through the analysis of the Indonesian governments. Li argues that 
Indonesian governments' "will to improve" required: 1) the problematization of 
deficiencies that need to be rectified, and 2) the practice of "rendering technical," that is 
to say, making governance an intelligible field of experts.  Interestingly, Li traces how 
the Sulawesi highlands became privatized and commodified, mainly through the 
introduction of cacao crops, but also due to international conservationist goals in 
conflictive zones within the Lore Lindu National Park. In doing so, Li not only addresses 
the governmental rationalities arranging the socio-ecological and economic relationships 
in Indonesia, but also highlights the political conflicts within the socio-ecological 
relationship and governmental arrangements. 
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In a similar vein, Whitehead et al. (2007) focus on how States frame nature 
through governmental techniques, particularly territorialization and centralization. 
Territorialization constructs boundaries that facilitate regulation of nature, while 
centralization refers to the creation of knowledge regarding nature. In doing so, 
Whitehead et al. argue that the State provides a political context for constructing nature. 
In the state/nature relation, nature appears as a knowable and controllable object, a 
national resource that benefits the whole population, and a geopolitical target of modern 
states. Thus, Whitehead et al. reveal nature as "an object of political struggle" (2007, 7), 
among contemporary States. 
The environmental governmentality discussed by Luke, Li, and Whitehead et al., 
moves nature from mere ecological existence to a political sphere. Relevant here is the 
work of Marisol de la Cadena (2010), who argues that politics have denied nature.  De La 
Cadena asserts, "earth-beings" are now "more public than ever" (2010, 352).  By "earth-
beings," she refers to mountains, forest, fish, landscape, and all other-than-human beings. 
They are “sentient entities” with material existence, argues De La Cadena.  The reason 
for the problematic understanding of earth-beings’ participation in politics comes from 
the disjunction between science and politics about nonhumans’ participation in politics. 
De La Cadena argues that nature needs translators and proposes the visibility of earth-
beings by a reconfiguration of the political.   
In this sense, Australia, New Zealand, and India have recently provided legal 
rights to the rivers (O’Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018).  Ecuador has concreted the most 
crucial innovation in environmental policies, recognizing rights to nature in the 2008 
Constitution (Gudynas 2016). Bolivia followed such recognition in 2009. However, 
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Gudynas (2010, 2016) stated that Ecuadorian and Bolivian governments have continued 
relying on the country’s economy based on extractive industries, which profoundly affect 
the population and the environment.   
Thus, the work of Arturo Escobar (1999) disclosing an antiessentialist political 
ecology must remain active in current analyses of nature's transformations. Escobar 
defines three regimes of nature: organic, capitalist, and techno-nature. The organic nature 
articulates local forms of transformation, distant from dominant modern capitalist nature, 
which is uniform, legible, and manageable. The capitalist appropriation of nature, on the 
other hand, led to environmental degradation. Then, discourses of ecological 
sustainability, biodiversity, and conservationism emerged within the capitalist nature. 
Techno-nature, Escobar’s third form of nature articulation, creates radical biological 
alterity of nature and causes alterity to proliferate; for instance, biotechnology, which is 
believed to have universal application. Clearly, the organic, capitalist, and techno regimes 
of nature historically "co-exist and overlap" (Escobar 1999, 5). Thus, Escobar argues, 
political ecology should historically examine the mutual articulations and contradictions 
of regimes of nature since "nature has ceased to be essentially anything for most people, 
including […] those attached to organic natures" (Escobar 1999, 15). Escobar favors 
raising questions on nature within the historical constitution of subjectivity since nature 
can be seen as regimes of discursive articulations and is differently experienced and 
produced. Thus, the analysis of environmental governmentality should reveal the 
biopolitics of socio-nature relationships by addressing the always open and incomplete 
contradictions between the plurality of natures’ creation and intervention. 
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Biopolitics of resilience 
Resilience has become a new governmental practice that aims to reorganize socio-
environmental relations, particularly responding to increasing natural or anthropogenic 
threats. Indeed, following global frameworks, worldwide national governments and cities 
have adopted organizing socio-ecological relations under the concept of prevention. This 
section analyzes how resilience has reached ubiquity in the global scene. The first section 
addresses the resilience path from ecology to the social sciences and reaching its 
institutionalization through governmental policies and programs. Then, the discussion 
analyzes the current critiques of resilience-driven initiatives.  
 
The path of resilience 
The ubiquitous term resilience has a long journey in academia and policymaking. 
Complexity is a pillar to understand resilience. However, complexity has been 
approached in different fields. Anthropology has addressed complexity particularly after 
Roy A. Rappaport discussed the notion of equilibrium-based systems including the 
ecological, the social, and the cultural components, in the late 1960s. In his book Pigs for 
the Ancestors (1967), Rappaport approaches the Tsembaga people of New Guinea as "an 
ecological population in an ecosystem that also includes the other living populations and 
the nonliving substances found within the boundaries of Tsembaga territory" (1967, 6). In 
resilience words: as a socio-ecological system. Human and ecosystem relation was a 
fascinating idea, particularly, in a time of an "ingrained habit of seeing the inorganic, 
organic, and sociocultural as separate realms or levels of phenomena" (1967, xiii). These 
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interrelations, according to Rappaport, imply a system with variables that change and, 
hence, emergent outcomes toward survival appear. 
Furthermore, Rappaport asserts that human-environment systems have the virtue 
of self-regulation. Mechanisms of systemic relationships and internal processes allow the 
system, the Tsembaga people, to survive, concludes Rappaport.  Later, Elliot Fratkin's 
(1986) work in a pastoralist community in Kenya focuses on stability and resilience in 
biological populations. Motivated by the novel approach introduced by Holling, Fratkin 
calls for introducing these concepts in the analysis of social adaptations and reinforcing 
the ideas of complexity in anthropological work. 
Indeed, the idea of complexity continued among anthropologists — for instance, 
Stephen Lansing (1991) shows how Indigenous Balinese people managed the timing of 
stream-fed irrigation of rice terraces in such a way as to sustain many farmer's access to 
water while avoiding pests, while the externally-imposed technical solutions introduced 
by the Dutch government failed. By going back and forth between the ecological 
systems, the social system, and the cultural system, Lansing aimed to reveal how 
Indigenous expertise can generate adaptive non-linear networks. Furthermore, processes 
of self-organization construct and will continue constructing the rice terraces (a 
humanized nature). Thus, Lansing provides an anthropological analysis of human-
environmental complexity. 
Within the field of Ecology, from which the analysis of resilience emerged, 
complexity contributed to linking biological and physical interactions between 
ecosystems. In his foundational article published in 1973, C. S. Holling addresses 
ecosystems’ persistence, change and unpredictability approaching resilience, a concept 
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largely accepted in materials and physics.  In engineering, the term describes the capacity 
of a material to recover its initial state in response to any disturbance and before losing its 
own properties. Holling (1973) argues that the engineering description of resilience 
works perfectly in closed systems, where constancy and predictability are the primary 
responses. However, ecosystems behave differently, mainly due to ecological 
complexity. An ecological system involves biotic and abiotic elements dynamically 
interacting and shaping its components. Holling demonstrates that the dynamic 
integration of complex systems does not respond as predictably as in closed systems. 
Holling (1996) also reveals that ecosystems 1) can absorb or buffer any 
perturbation; 2) can return to a previous state after a disturbance, what Holling calls 
engineering resilience; and 3) can also adapt their components to new and different 
stabilities. Thus, ecological resilience (ibid) allows the ecosystem to change variables 
and processes that control its behavior before the system reconfigures its structure to 
adapt to other stabilities (Berkes et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2010). The buffering function of 
the ecosystem reveals a self-regulatory mechanism that can constrain and modify the 
structure of the system for maintenance and survival (Folke and Berkes 1992). 
Consequently, resilience in complex systems refers to both the degree of disturbance the 
system can experience without changing its functioning and the degree of self-
organization.   The latter endows complex systems with the capacity to adapt by learning 
(Felicitti 2016). 
Fascinated by the socio-ecological complexity and its adaptive capacity, a large 
group of resilience ecologists documented non-Western ecological management and 
techniques. Cases from South India, the Andes, Western Himalaya, Java, the Peruvian 
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Amazon, and the Solomon Islands among others, reveal humans as another element 
influencing and influenced by the ecological system (Berkes et al. 1995, Gadgil et al. 
1993, Berkes et al. 1996, Folke 2006, Folke 2016). The resilience ecologists’ works show 
that the ecological and the social both function in a constant co-evolution. Consequently, 
according to ecological resilience, the delineation between the social and ecological 
systems is artificial and arbitrary (Berkes and Folke 1994). Thus, the notion of socio-
ecological systems as complex interconnections of human-environment systems breaks 
from modern understandings of nature/society dualism (Kueffer 2015, Folke et al. 2007).  
Moreover, it is no longer possible to conceive humanity as separated from, above, or 
controlling nature (Grove & Chandler 2017). The complexity of SES entails the 
ecological and the social systems consistently maintaining synergic relations among 
them.  
However, as an open-ended system, SES dynamically integrates new subsystems 
(or layers). Thus, the ecological system involves biotic and abiotic factors, while the 
social system includes human beings and a range of social institutions such as 
livelihoods, economies, and networks (Berkes & Ross 2012). Elinor Ostrom developed 
an SES multilevel framework that comprises more than fifty potential interrelated layers 
(Ostrom 2009, Cumming et al. 2015), including institutions, governmental apparatuses, 
the market, and others. The multilayered subsystems, also known as driving forces (Folke 
et al. 2007), act as stressors or attractors of disturbances (Berkes & Folke 1994, Berkes et 
al. 2003). Thus, layers or driving forces increase SES' complexity since each of them can 
disrupt socio-ecological stability. 
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Consequently, the multilayered complexity makes the SES inherently 
unpredictable. Firstly, disruptions include natural events, such as hurricanes, droughts, 
and severe rainfall. Additional factors disrupting SES could be economic, social, and 
political conditions such as commodity booms, infrastructure development, colonization 
systems, and the like. They are noticeable, sudden, and acute events. Secondly, Davoudi 
(2012) highlights the importance of chronic and quotidian driving forces. They are 
unnoticeable internal processes that can also change the “very nature of systems” 
(Davoudi 2012, 302).  Thus, external or internal disturbances can produce manifold non-
linear responses.  One of the most accepted responses emphasizes that SESs "are able to 
adapt themselves to internal and external disturbances" (Ostrom & Janssen 2004, 247). 
However, Davoudi et al. (2013) argue that nonlinear interactions make the SES 
inherently unpredictable. 
Indeed, SES can produce a disproportionate effect more substantial than the size 
of perturbation, argues Davoudi et al. (2013).  SES can buffer the magnitude of 
disturbances returning to pre-existing stability (engineering resilience) or can adjust the 
system to new stabilities (ecological resilience). Both engineering resilience and 
ecological resilience are features inherited from the ecological system to recover “what it 
was” and conserving “what it has” (Folke et al. 2010, 25). However, Davoudi et al. 
(2013, 302) realized, "once faced with adversity, [SES] hardly ever return to where [they] 
were." SES not only can adapt to internal and external disruptions, they can also cross 
critical thresholds to different new equilibriums to survive.  
Consequently, the adaptive capacity of an SES "offers an evolutionary 
understanding of resilience as continually altering" (Davoudi et al. 2013, 310) the system. 
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That socio-ecological resilience (Berkes et al. 2003) or evolutionary resilience (Davoudi 
et al. 2013) entails the system’s transformation while it goes through adaptive cycles 
(Walker et al. 2004).  
The Adaptive Cycle Model developed by Holling (2001), clarifies SES' adaptive 
and evolutionary capacities and facilitates the understanding of SES adaptive 
transformation. The model – also known as the Renewal Model, includes the natural, the 
social, and the socio-ecological systems linked as "a fundamental unit" (Holling 2001, 
393). The model also includes cyclic and seasonal cycles represented in reclining figure 
eights (Berkes et al. 2003) or the form of infinity curves (Davoudi et al. 2013). The 
transformational model shows phases in which the complex adaptive system (CAS) 
grows, declines, and is renewed again and again (Holling 2001, Davoudi 2012, Davoudi 
2016, Berkes et al. 2003). Relevant here is that each renewal cycle results in unexpected 
outcomes, thus opening opportunities for new directions, new stabilities.  
The CAS model involves four phases. One of two front loops is known as growth 
or exploitation, and the other one is known as conservation or accumulation. Both front 
loops move forward through slowly changing situations, furthering the potentiality of the 
system. Paradoxically, while the complex system itself boosts subsystems' potentiality 
during exploitation and conservation phases, stressors can reduce the degree of 
connectedness among controlling variables of the system (Holling 2001). 
Consequently, over time, the system loses resilience and becomes more 
vulnerable. The CAS model embraces sequentiality of two opposites: growth and 
stability, and change and variety, argues Holling. Thus, after exceeding the limits, the 
system moves into two different back loops, known as a release or creative destruction 
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and re-organization or renewal. Back loops are inventive, innately unpredictable, fertile, 
uncertain, and increase the resilience of the system (Holling 2001, 2004). While the front 
loops maximize "production and accumulation," the back loops maximize "invention and 
reassortment" (Holling 2001, 395).  
The CAS model sketches the SES dynamic; however, complexity entails open-
ended systems. The Panarchy cycle developed by Holling and Gunderson (Holling 2001) 
has the virtue of hierarchically sketching the adaptive cycles nested in more extensive 
subsystems. In doing so, the Panarchy cycle facilitates pinpointing temporalities, 
disruptions, and changes that are boosting the system's evolution. This heuristic model of 
adaptive cycles nested in one another clarifies scalar dynamics of complex systems. It can 
enlarge dynamics from any particular ecosystem to the biosphere: from cells to 
ecosystems, to societies, to cultures (Holling 2001).  
While CAS became a way to understand human-environment systems, resilience 
became a way to deal with complexity and the uncertainty it brings (Berkes et al. 2003). 
In stark contrast to stability and predictability, resilience embraces multiple-equilibriums, 
and the unpredictability of thresholds within the adaptive cycles (Berkes et al. 2003, 
Berkes 2010).  In addition, Davoudi et al. (2013), highlight that CAS adaptive phases 
"are not necessarily sequential or fixed [;] some systems can skip a phase and move from 
the growth phase to release or reorganization phase" (304). An adaptive cycle does not 
exclusively have straightforward steps: growth, conservation, release, and renewal, 
neither does a growth cycle follow a renewal cycle. Thus, Davoudi et al. highlight the 
importance of back loops within the uncertainty of SES' behavior, something missed in 
deterministic perspectives. 
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Observing Holling's model in light of deterministic perspectives, it definitely will 
return to the growth cycle, that is to say, to the initial state (growth after renewal). Such 
an approach neglects the transformative characteristic of complex systems which can take 
unknown directions when reaching the threshold of a renewal cycle. The re-
organizational or renewal cycle becomes a tipping point for new and diverse stabilities. 
Contingent outcomes signal further directions to the following growth cycle — 
consequently, the evolving nature of CAS nests adaptive cycles that change or evolve in 
time and space. This approach counters Western environmental management rooted in 
command-control rationale. Conventional ecological management aims to predict and 
control uncertainties. Thus, methods of ecological management incorporate statistical 
models to predict possible future scenarios. In doing so, managers can maintain 
productive resources (but not precisely sustainable). However, socio-ecological 
uncertainty is increasingly less sensitive to modern assumptions of prediction. 
Resilience ecologists’ interest in SES’ adaptive behavior converged with a 
critique of conventional resource governance of the 1990s. For instance, Olsson et al. 
(2004), through examples from Western Sweden and Canada, showed that governments 
can no longer rely on external interventions that are "legislated top-down," instead, the 
state requires an intervention "that self-organizes bottom-up" (83). The critique mostly 
highlighted those distant technicians who, ignorant of local conditions and overlooking 
human-environment complexity, designed environmental programs. Ostrom (2008, 28-
29) argues, "instead of presuming that one can design an optimal system in advance and 
then make it work, we must think about ways to analyze the structure of common-pool 
resources, how these change over time, and adopt a multi-level experimental approach 
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rather than a top-down approach to the design of effective institutions." After 
acknowledging human-environment complexity, resource management should diagnose 
and monitor the multiple processes occurring in nested SES, claims Ostrom (Ostrom et 
al. 2007, Ostrom 2008).  In this sense, the back loops of the adaptive cycle should inform 
environmental managers to design policies according to local realities.  
Environmental management will then focus on what it can learn from an 
ecosystem's collapse to enhance its adaptability rather than centering on growth and 
conservation, as classical management used to do. Therefore, environmental management 
processes can be adaptively improved (Berkes et al. 2003). In addition to monitoring 
back loops and enhancing self-organization, several case studies also revealed the need 
for participatory processes in adaptive forms of governance (Dietz et al. 2003). For 
instance, Hughes et al. 2005, analyzing the resilience of marine ecosystems, argue that 
coral reefs can successfully detect and react to pressures by traditional forms of resource 
managing. However, once the market integrates the SES, it requires institutional 
frameworks interacting across multiple scales to balance and reinforce the social-
ecological systems and the environmental stewardship. Similarly, Brown (2003), 
analyzing discrepancies between conservation and development programs in the Royal 
Bardia National Park in Nepal, advocates for adopting adaptive co-management 
procedures with inclusive decision-making processes, particularly in developing 
countries and poor regions. Thus, resilience ecologists also incorporated the role of social 
institutions, organizations, networks, and agency into environmental management (Folke 
2016), contrary to top-down management designs.  
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Under this light, resilience scholars started to advocate for and promote Adaptive 
Governance in resource management (Folke and Hahn 2005, Folke 2006, Folke 2016). 
According to Folke (2006) adaptive governance involves "at least four essential parts: 1) 
understanding ecosystem dynamics; 2) developing management practices that combine 
different ecological knowledge systems to interpret and respond to ecosystem feedback 
and continuously learn; 3) building adaptive capacity to deal with uncertainty and 
surprise, including external drivers; and 4) supporting flexible institutions and social 
networks in multi-level governance systems" (262). According to Berkes et al. (2003) 
ecosystem governance should “mobilize society to (a) couple higher-scale governance 
institutions with local ecological feedback, and (b) renew or create local self-governance 
responsive to ecological resilience" (302). Therefore, rather than manage subjects from a 
distance using formulas; government should grant locals managerial independence by 
transferring power to local decision-makers within a circumscribed scope of a local 
authority, suggest Olsson et al. (2004). That is to say, in environmental governance, 
social systems should be able to enhance their capacities to resist disturbances, be flexible 
to adapt, and be innovative to transform. Thus, adaptive governance perceives the social 
system as active agents. This critical contribution of resilience ecologists, which puts the 
agency on individuals, paves the path to translate resilience from the field of ecology into 
broader environmental fields. 
Post 9/11, global insecurities promoted resilience building in human security 
discourses and policies (Chandler 2012, Mulligan et al. 2016). Particularly in disaster 
management, the UN 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action formally institutionalized 
resilience thinking worldwide. This framework is a policy goal for the international 
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disaster management community designed to increase communities' responses to 
disasters, their adaptive capacities to overcome a disaster, and mitigation (Grove 2013a). 
By promoting community participation, this strategy reinforces the social system’s 
agency and emphasizes people's voluntary participation and responsibility in disaster risk 
reduction (Larsen et al. 2011). Davoudi et al. (2013) add to those characteristics of 
disaster management the need for improving the learning capacity for being prepared.  
Consequently, prevention and mitigation became a hallmark in resilience policies for 
disaster management. 
In sum, resilience involves complexity and non-linearity. Complex systems are 
open-ended subsets of systems dynamically interconnected. Subsets may include local, 
national, and global stressors within the socio-ecological system. This dynamic makes 
them always navigate through front loops and back loops, aiming to maintain a 
resilience/vulnerability balance. Self-organization is a central feature to moving forward 
and backward within the adaptive cycle. Ultimately, the complex system gets in the 
renewal cycle in order to subsist, persist, and survive. When the system returns to the 
renewal cycle, it is a tipping point that can bring disproportionate responses, unintended 
outcomes, or radical possibilities. The system can return to the initial state, but, more 
importantly, the system can also start a different or alternative stability. Consequently, 
not only can the system persist, it can adapt, and also transform. 
Furthermore, resilience acknowledges the potential of the social component to 
improve (or constrain) responses of the whole socio-ecological system. Consequently, 
agency and learning capacity become key mechanism to build more resilient and less 
vulnerable individuals and communities. Advantageously, the mechanism to build 
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resilience can be translated to communities, regions, and globally by national policies and 
international frameworks. Is resilience-building another panacea for environmental and 
societal security? The next subsection discloses resilience-building effects over 
individuals and communities.  
 
A biopolitical critique of resilience-building 
Scholars, concerned with the increasing attention given to resilience in academia 
and policymaking, have disclosed power relations and hidden constraints in resilience 
building. This section analyzes critical contributions, showing that the desire of resilience 
thinking to building more resilient communities subjectivizes individuals through 
Foucault's mechanisms of security. Thus, resilience-building creates pieces of knowledge 
regarding threats that justify governmental intervention, while the promotion of a 
preventive logic locates security responsibility on the population and individuals.   
The UK policy under Prime Minister David Cameron, discussed by Chandler & 
Reid (2016), instantiates how resilience discourse about societal security works as a 
mechanism of power. Policy discourse reinforces a preconception about individuals' lack 
of capability to make the right choices to cope with unexpected events and complexities. 
This premise locates the moral obligation to enhance their citizens' free choice-making in 
the almighty governance. In doing so, life, people, and populations become the subject of 
governance.  
Dunn et al.'s (2015) work reveals a resilient subject in constant need of 
government interventions. Since a catastrophic event splits into past and future, Dunn and 
others argue resilience practices can refer to overcoming a past event or to being prepared 
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for potential future disruption, and that both the past and the imagined future event 
determine the present. In the present, people need to cope with or to be prepared for new 
circumstances. While self-organizing capacities allow people to cope with change, being 
prepared for new situations requires adaptive governance. Government intervention is 
critical in the analysis of Dunn and colleagues. Governments building resilience promote 
citizens' active participation and initiatives. In doing so, governments create a desirable 
resilient subject prepared to deal with change. Paradoxically, this desirable subject 
becomes a subject in constant need of state intervention. Dunn et al. discloses the effects 
of improving self-organization capabilities. Governmental intervention actually de-
politicized and reduced any "emancipatory potential," creating and reproducing 
vulnerable individuals who merely are "playthings" of governance, argue Dunn et al. 
(2015, 7). In a similar vein, the Dutch risk management policy discussed by Frerks et al. 
(2011) also reveals how building resilience ultimately victimizes, disempowers, and 
creates external dependency. 
Grove (2014a) unpacks resilience as a mechanism of security that "immuniz[es] 
communities against their own excess of adaptive management" (242). Grove centers his 
attention on the techniques of resilience "de-potentializing socio-ecological life" (242). 
Firstly, education and training disconnect past and present experiences from local 
knowledge, recoding them through Western categories. Then, education and training 
"attempt to deterritorialize local knowledge of hazards and re-territorialize it within the 
global disaster management assemblages" (Grove 2014a, 246). Additionally, both 
techniques ascribe environment "as a source of everyday danger," in stark contrast with 
nature stewardship (ibid). In another article, Grove (2013a) analyzes another technique of 
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security frequently applied in resilience-building strategies: planning. During an 
emergency, when social order, law, and norms are absent, disaster management plans 
surpass "the sovereign law or social norms" (575). Education, training, and planning 
require participatory or community-based work partnering with governmental agency 
staff.  
Paradoxically, the deployment of techniques to increase locals’ capacity to 
prevent disasters produces a new experience of the self, while it regulates the relationship 
with the other (Grove and Adey 2015). Eventually, those techniques limit the 
population's constituent power to build their particular forms of life (Grove & Chandler 
2017). Consequently, while improving communities’ resilience to confront disturbances, 
resilience building is also reducing possibilities of locals’ own agency and the systems' 
capacity for "becoming-otherwise" (Grove & Chandler 2017, 85). Thus, when the system 
reaches the tipping point of renewal –through a catastrophe or a sudden perturbation – 
then, resilience-building limits possibilities of contingency since trained communities 
will respond according to resilience programs.   
In a similar vein, Chandler (2013) posits that resilience discourses and practices 
increase dependency on external protectors while reducing local opportunities. 
Particularly in human security, "the more we inculcate these ethical reflexivities, called 
upon by resilience approaches of relational and associational embeddedness, the less we 
can separate ourselves as subjects capable of acting politically or ethically in the world" 
argues Chandler (191). Furthermore, this new form of policy intervention called 
resilience thinking has become a post-interventionist mechanism since resilience policies 
do not undermine states' sovereignty. Instead, governments support this post-
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interventionism in the name of building more resilient communities and individuals. 
Chandler (2012) suggests that post-interventionist capacity has enabled the re-articulation 
of the dominant agendas of Western intervention.  
Thus, a hidden effect of resilience building is the creation of a resilient-minded 
subject, or the desirable resilient subject mentioned above. According to Evans & Reid 
(2015), the resilient-minded subject is a subject permanently struggling to accommodate 
itself in the actual world. Why does the subject struggle while encompassing resilience 
policies? In contradiction to resilience-building efforts to create resilient subjects, 
individuals are not passive, instead they are active. However, while government programs 
improve resilience, the subject "does not seek to resist change," rather, the individual 
facilitates "self-knowledge, self-growth, and self-transformation" (Chandler and Reid 
2016, 14). According to Foucault, a technology on the individual situates the constitution 
of thought as a field of subjectivity (1997) and normalization (2007). Thus, individuals 
respond to what has been created as normal.  In an age of catastrophe, such as the one we 
are living in globally, resilience-building becomes a new mode of subjectivity, while the 
resilient minded individual seeks to bounce back to the "normal" conditions (or 
conditions prior to the disruption). Thus, resilience building neglects the non-linearity of 
complex systems and the attendant alternative possibilities. 
Techniques deployed through resilience programs reinforce reliance on 
individuals' own powers and resources; consequently, the moral responsibility to confront 
disaster relies on the self-reliant individual. This engineering resilience, argues Davoudi 
(2016), involves the return to a status quo framed in liberal and neoliberal state-
citizenship relations (individualism, privatization, free market). By doing so, resilience 
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negates the reorganizational capacity and the creativity of SES’s back loops. Then, 
resilience is negating individuals’ transformative opportunities.  
The biopolitical analysis reveals resilience as a set of discursive practices 
governing through societal security (Chandler and Reid 2016) or constructing ways of 
thinking based on disaster prevention and mitigation (Grove 2013a, 2013b).  In addition, 
resilience has become, more often than not, a mechanism of power despite the intention 
to empower people to confront adversity. Firstly, resilience-building reduces particular 
capacities and knowledge - of people, communities, societies, cultures – to adapt to 
changes and risks. Secondly, resilience-building changes and neglects transformational 
opportunities that may emerge from socio-ecological systems' intelligence. Thirdly, 
resilience-building produces a series of truths and systems of knowledge amenable to 
governmental intervention and regulation, reinforcing hierarchies of power and 
knowledge (Chandler 2015). Thus, resilience policies reinforce an engineering resilience, 
which returns the system to its original state, rather than promoting an evolutionary 
resilience, an essential feature of human-environment systems. 
The literature has shown that resilience-building counters initial ecological 
resilience approaches of complexity. Thus, resilience, which entails complexity, is "not 
considering the constructive role of synergies and feedbacks" consequently, resilience 
"necessarily implies winners and losers, the latter having to ‘adapt' while the former 
having not" (Scoppetta 2016, 36). Recently, Julian Reid (2017, 2018), a critical resilience 
thinker, has been concerned with the Saami people who live in the Arctic zone. Instead of 
praising how resilience thinking is practiced, Reid's concern highlights the possibility that 
colonial exploitation of Indigenous ecological intelligence will be replicated. 
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Resilience in general, and as a biopolitical technology in particular, has mostly 
been documented in neoliberal discourses and policies (Anderson 2015, Joseph, 2013 
Chandler 2012, Frerks et al. 2011, Grove 2013a, Anderson 2010, Chandler 2014, O'Hare 
& White 2013, McEvoy 2013, Schmidt 2015). On the contrary, academia does not report 
contributions documenting resilience policies responding to forms of governing other 
than neoliberalism. Pelling and Dill (2006) compare democratic and authoritarian 
regimes' responses to disaster, including the Cuban and Chinese cases of leftist regimes 
managing disasters.  However, additional examples of states constructing different social, 
political, and economic orders, detached from neoliberal policies, can offer a counter-
history of rationalities on resilience. Accordingly, Hannah (2011) highlights the lack of 
analysis of "biopolitical impulse of left-leaning welfare statism," and its "governmental 
impulse and injunction to care for the life of a population of human beings" (1035). 
Therefore, it is imperative to understand the calculative rationalities of resilience in non-
liberal or anti-neoliberal governments to understand how resilience morphs to adapt to 
different governmentality, and, more critically, disclose possibilities of alternatives when 
building resilience. 
 
Biopolitics of alternatives 
The above literature review evidences the capillarity of governmental virtuosity to 
engineer nature and social life. Foucault's analysis of continuous circularity of ideas, 
wills, and orders to normalize the population, also unravels spaces for resistance that co-
exist in the entangled state/society relationship (Foucault 1978, Rabinow 2010). This 
section addresses the alternatives emerging from complicated interstices of regulatory 
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mechanisms, and approaches alternatives from the ground up.  The analysis of popular 
sovereignty in light of biopolitics reveals spaces for social self-organization and decision-
making despite governmental efforts denying, disguising, or obscuring locals’ political 
participation.  Such analysis paves the way to understand immanent alternatives out of 
dominant strategies for future wellbeing. 
 
Biopolitics of sovereignty 
Government's virtuosity depends on reinforcing the notion of borders. Within the 
territory, the state pursues the population's wellbeing and prosperity, while the 
government organizes "things" in what it believes to be the best way (Foucault 2003). 
While the concept of State's sovereignty is inscribed and functions within a territory, the 
notion of borders fails when confronting supranational spaces. For instance, market 
capitalism, which expands globally (Hardt &Negri 2004), or global hegemonic 
frameworks, such as resilience-building or sustainable development outlined in the 
previous sections. 
Within contemporary state practices, including those projects to expand beyond 
the limits of nation-state, a collective decision making that represents the interests of the 
population continues to exist (Balibar 2004, Agnew 1994).  In a similar vein, Hardt & 
Negri (2004) acknowledge the existence of an alternative social organization that is not 
sovereign. Hardt and Negri elaborate their arguments through the analysis of guerrillas 
and peasants. They are organizations with a non-sovereign territory, with polycentric 
forms of decision-making, and the ability to self-organize the political, the social, and the 
economic. Consequently, democratic or popular sovereignty undermines such assumed 
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exclusive role of the state to arrange population and their milieu. A significant 
contribution from Hardt and Negri's work is the understanding that social organizations 
have their "own biopolitical activity" which "opens up possibilities for alternative social 
relations" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 206-208). Thus, Hardt and Negri open spaces for 
approaching alternative social relations, apart from the Western-led dominant 
governmental normality.  
Indigenous studies have shown that self-organization and self-determination have 
been crucial for Indigenous peoples to successfully circumvent the almighty 
government’s disposition. For instance, US Tribes legally fought to retain the right to use 
peyote in their traditional medicine and religions (Wiedman 2012); the Florida 
Miccosukee in the US (Wiedman 2010) and the Quechua People of Taquile in Peru 
(Canessa 2005) successfully engaged tourism industry; Hawaii’s Molokais circumvented 
private investments in the pristine islands (Baker 2011).  Thus, self-determination is 
crucial within intricate and continually negotiated relations with the State.  
 Among these intricate and continually negotiated social relations, Erazo (2013) 
discloses the ongoing sovereignty enactment among the Amazonian Rukullakta people in 
Ecuador.  Interestingly, Indigenous people enact sovereignty while they seek alternative 
futures, argues Erazo. Similarly, Fixico (2013) argues that Indigenous peoples in the US 
have resourcefully challenged, circumvented, and adapted to Western forms of life, 
including market integration. Amidst global integration of development, some Latin 
American peasants additionally confront ethnic recognition politics. For instance, the 
Indians in Brazil (Warren 2001) and the comuneros in Ecuador (Alvarez 1999) – to 
whom this dissertation is devoted – live within ambiguous spaces between mestizaje 
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practices and new Indigenous recognition policies, consequently, constraining their 
alternatives. In sum, despite governmental politico-legal practices enabling Indigenous 
peoples and peasants to build their own spaces, paradoxically, the practices of social 
control limit their possibilities.  
 
Transformative possibilities 
Government mechanisms limiting alternative possibilities contrast with the 
promotion of individuals’ self-capabilities, self-reliance, self-determination disseminated 
through discourses and practices of sustainable development, resilience building, or 
popular sovereignty.  Indeed, the previous biopolitical approach to the governance of 
nature and the social has shown hidden logics engineering the self and their milieu 
through what Foucault (2007) called mechanisms of security.  Government organizes a 
series of truths through the creation of knowledge. Within the State apparatus, specialists 
of all kinds analyze causes to be incorporated in policymaking. Such technocracy more 
often than not relies on global hegemonic practices of anticipation, such as sustainable 
development which foresee progress, or resilience building which prevents hazards. 
 Specialists work with known causes, particularly environmental deterioration and 
increasing risk. Discursively, those causes justify the need for securing the population 
and its milieu. As a result, a sense of the normal continues between regulatory 
mechanisms and individual conduct (Anderson 2015). However, according to Davoudi 
and Madanipour (2015), it is the undesirable normality, the alternatives, the otherwise, 
that must be located in new spaces of contestation.   
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Thus, crucial for social research is to address those alternatives arising out of 
regulatory mechanisms engineering self-capabilities. The starting point for addressing 
alternatives is admitting the complexity of socio-ecological relationships and the 
biopolitics of governing social life and nature. As stated in the previous section, through 
the Complex Adaptive Cycles, systems can take unknown directions when reaching the 
threshold of a renewal cycle since complexity entails non-linearity, uncertainty, and 
transformation. Then, it is important to focus on the emergent outcomes that complexity 
involves. 
 In this sense, Chandler (2015) highlights that policy interventions, per se, do not 
cause transformation. Instead, alternatives emerge from those self-capabilities promoted 
by the government. Then, Chandler proposes an intervention he conceptualizes as "the 
governance of the effects." It addresses those effects emerging from internal socio-
ecological politics rather than exclusive attention to the effects of policy intervention.  
Then, the "governance of the effects" addresses self-capabilities promoted by policy 
intervention and accordingly normalized in the population. They will inform what 
underlies such outcomes, such as in the CAS's back loop. In doing so, emergent outcomes 
will be excluded from the logic of the government.   
David Chandler (2014) also posits that "the interaction between emergent 
complex life and governing intervention is held to be open and therefore full of immanent 
possibilities" (2014, 49). Instead, he argues, liberal and neoliberal practices rely on 
known causes, and both governmentalities admit underlying epistemic processes (known 
causes) that determine the known effects or can prevent the unknown effects.  However, 
“the unknowable is not a result of hidden determinism (as in simple complexity), nor can 
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it be the result of blind chance or luck” (2014, 56). Then, deterministic or modernist 
cause-and-effect relations cannot approach complexity which entails emergent outcomes. 
Thus, Chandler shifts to the analysis of the unknown-unknown cause-effect relationship 
since “contingent outcomes only reveal concrete causality after the event and are 
impossible to know beforehand” (2014, 50). The effects of the promoted self-capabilities 
will reveal causalities separated from governmental reasoning.  In this regard, Chandler 
paves the way for conceiving life from the object of governance and the radical 
possibilities excluded by any form of governance.  
In a similar vein, Elizabeth Povinelli (2016) collects historical disturbances in 
“stanzas” to visualize multiplicity of scales. The upper stanza, explains Povinelli, 
sketches the global periods, which highlight juridical-legal narratives of catastrophic or 
crisis-laden events; huge events distort ordinary or chronic ones. Povinelli emphasizes 
that those ordinary events are hardly reflected in the global landscape; they are “quasi-
events;” or events that "never quite achieve the status of having occurred or taking place; 
they neither appear nor not happen" (Povinelli 2016, 13) - for instance, local projects, 
local decision-making. Thus, the bottom stanza must include the quasi-events, so when 
adding "all our stanzas and re-stanzas," it reveals "alternative social projects" across the 
practices of governance variants (Povinelli 2016, 169). Povinelli’s stanzas aim to link 
lags from global to local, and visualize past-present inter-relational figurations, such as 
thresholds, scales, and performative realizations.  This form of connecting the unknown 
local with known global facilitates understanding politics in complicated spaces.  
In this context, social research furthers Anthony Giddens' approach to the analysis 
of social issues. According to Giddens (1984), some of the essential tasks of social 
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sciences are to be found in the investigation of the boundaries given by "the significance 
of unintended consequences for system reproduction and the ideological connotations 
which such boundaries have" (282). While Giddens systemically and structurally 
approaches social institutions in space and time, Foucault’s “art consisted in using history 
to cut diagonally through contemporary reality” (Foucault 2008, xv).  
Thus, under a contemporary history in light of the emergent complexity theory, 
the emergent outcomes - feeding either Povinelli's stanzas or Holling and Gunderson's 
panarchical cycle - should allow pinpointing emergent causalities in time and space. In 
doing so, research spatially gathers politics of everyday life and politics over life coming 
from, and responding to, internal socio-ecological interdependencies.  
 
Conclusion: social research in entangled socio-nature governance 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics opened understandings within the tangled 
relationships among the State, the government, the population, and nature. Such 
understandings disclose the multifarious efforts governments utilize, according to their 
logic of governance, to fulfill the population's wellbeing. In this chapter, the literature 
addressed environmental governmentality, resilience building, and sovereignty to 
disclose governments limiting the alternatives available to locals, despite promoting self-
capabilities, self-reliance, and self-determination. Thus, the State, the government, the 
population, and nature navigate normality that responds to the way the government 
thinks. However, that governmental-induced normality has not stopped the emergence of 
collective actions and individuals’ agency. Interstices for local decision-making and 
mediations emerge despite the governmentally promoted local self-capabilities. 
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Paradoxically, most of the time, those local events are quasi-events. Acute and huge 
events usually mark a present, a future, and a past, neglecting recurring events (Povinelli 
2016), denying alternatives that the non-linearity of complexity involves. This literature 
review has shown that local decision-making and mediation must inform the complex 
adaptive systems beyond the limits of governmental logic. Thus, the social scientist must 
document, trace, and record decision-making and mediations, emerging from the 
interstices of juridical-legal State apparatus to break with government’s disposition of 
normality. 
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Chapter III 
Untangling Comuneros rural lives in the Ecuadorian Pacific coast 
 
The deep blue of the Pacific Ocean hypnotizes, the salty breeze relaxes; suddenly, 
the endless sound of the waves fades with the noise of rushing villagers in the peninsula 
of Santa Elena. They are busy. The sun is splendid.  The villagers are setting up their 
cabanas on the beach. They have to be ready for the incoming tourists.  Villagers no 
longer collect shrimp larvae in the surf zone, as they used to a couple of decades ago. In 
the peninsula, as Santa Elena is known, villagers used to live surrounded by pristine 
beaches interspersed with mangroves in the mouth of clear, low-flow rivers. Later on, 
Santa Elena's beaches were dotted with numerous villagers harvesting shrimp larvae. 
With colorful red meshes tied to floaters made out of mangrove, the villagers captured 
shrimp larvae from the endless waves breaking into foamy bubbles.  
Currently, many of those shrimp larvae collectors are owners of small tourism 
businesses at those no-longer pristine beaches. Figures 2 and 3 show profound changes in 
the comuna Montañita, in the northern rural parish of Manglaralto. An untouched beach 
in the 1970s transformed into a surfing hotspot after forty years, and today, the sound of 
the waves continues harmonizing villagers’ lives, sunsets close each day in the normal 
cycle, while novel actors and stakeholders have arrived at the peninsula. How did Santa 
Elena change so quickly? What caused social and ecological changes? 
In this chapter, I analyze multiple stressors pressuring everyday lives on the coast 
of Ecuador. By stressors, I refer to: a) Political and judicial changes in Ecuador, b) 
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natural processes in complex coastal topography, and c) seaside villagers’ desire for 
development and progress. All of these stressors are dynamically interconnected while 
reshape the ecological landscape.  I approach the ecological landscape of Santa Elena as a 
complex subset of layers interplaying around future progress and the everyday lives of 
rural villagers. Among the different subset of layers, the State and the government are 
intense stressors (Chapter 2).  In Ecuador, governments adopted neoliberal state practices 
from the early 1980s (Pineo 2007). Since 2007, a government countering neoliberal state 
practices ruled the country for a decade.  The goal of this chapter is far from an economic 
critique of both governmental practices. Instead, I focus on "the purpose of the 
governmental actions and the means by which it is achieved" (Davoudi and Madanipour 
2015, 4) in order to understand social and economic changes in Santa Elena, in general, 
and the rural communities in particular. 
In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the effects of neoliberal state practices 
upon Ecuador during three decades, despite the political instability that characterized the 
country during the 1990s and early 2000s.  The second section addresses ten years of 
anti-neoliberal state practices inaugurated on January 15, 2007. In the third section, I 
trace interplaying actors pressing Santa Elena’s new beginnings and adaptive processes in 
the aftermath of climatological impacts and governmental interventions.  I analyze the 
intricate processes of local development and local politics in Santa Elena to identify 
struggles on developmental, territory, and identity issues additionally stressed by 
climatological impacts. In the final section, I argue that the comuneros, rural villagers in 
Santa Elena, continuously look for and adapt to alternative futures despite governmental 
logics.   
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Figure 2. Comuna Montañita in the 1970s. Source: Amigos del Patrimonio de Santa 
Elena 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A day of low tourist demand at Montañita in 2018. Source: Author 
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Ecuadorian governments and neoliberal policies, from the 1980s to early 2000s 
Ecuador began to apply neoliberal state practices in the early 1980s after the 
military regime returned democracy to the country. Captivated by the development 
discourse to reduce poverty, Ecuador decided to modernize in pursuit of the population’s 
future progress.  The panacea of development would bring economic growth as well as a 
solution to social problems, inequalities, and poverty.  However, development critique 
has unpacked external and northern global dominance, directing how countries must 
modernize, progress, or develop (Ferguson 1994).  Moreover, post-development 
scholarship has revealed poverty as a crafted discourse to justify US interventionism in 
the aftermath of WWII (Escobar 1995, 2007).  
This section draws upon two related discourses and practices: neoliberal state 
practices and development. The rationale and practices of development deepened during 
the last two decades of the twentieth century, when governments adopted several 
neoliberal recipes supported by US-based global influencers such as IMF, WB, IDB, 
USAID.  Briefly, neoliberal state practices de-regularize the managerial role of the state 
by promoting the privatization of services (education, health, telecommunications). 
Furthermore, neoliberalism “combines a commitment to the extension of markets and 
logics of competitiveness” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381). Additionally, neoliberal 
practices rely on the expertise of ruling, while the idea of wellbeing becomes, more often 
than not, synonymous with Northern development, building infrastructure that actually 
supports the market economy. Neoliberalism is not a unique recipe executed by a 
government. Neither is it a “homogenous doctrine” (Reid 2018). Neoliberalism mutates; 
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it has transformative and adaptive capacity by which it neoliberalizes all spaces (Peck & 
Tickell 2002), as happened since Ecuador returned to democracy in 1980.  
Ronn Pineo, in his book Ecuador and The United States: Useful Strangers (2007) 
depicts the long-lasting influence of the US on Ecuadorian governments.  According to 
Pineo, state practices during the late 1980s lessened state control over the financial 
sector, decontrolled currency exchange, lowered tariffs favoring foreign investment 
regulations, maintained wage hikes below the rate of inflation (which was growing), and 
raised interest rates. Pineo reveals how the IMF fostered currency devaluation. The 
motivations for embarking into IMF funding were a low-intensity military action in the 
southern border with Peru in 1981, and the subsequent El Niño event that flooded coastal 
regions in 1982/1983 and weakened the country's development plan. According to Pineo, 
the primary goal of the 1985-1988 development plan was the economic liberalization of 
the state, while the IMF swiftly rewarded Ecuador with new loans in 1985 and 1986.  In 
this way, Ecuador entered into US-influenced neoliberal recipes, which continued the 
functioning of the country regardless of who occupied the presidential office.   
Ecuadorian governments continued a tendency to follow neoliberal recipes, US-
based financial assistance, and devoting massive proportions of its discretionary revenue 
to debt service. Legal frameworks enacted during the 1990s reveal the neoliberal 
practices that were regulating Ecuador. For instance, the Law of Modernization approved 
in 1993 promoted disinvestment, privatization, concessions, and state reform. It also 
aimed to reduce the bureaucracy that settled in the capital city by transferring several 
functions and roles to the municipalities. However, a viable juridical, financial, and 
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planning framework was absent in the state.  The law complicated municipal 
management and rural cantons' improvement despite having the territorial administration. 
La Torre et al. (2015, 59) summarizes Ecuadorian neoliberal practices during the 
1980s and 1990s in the following excerpt: 
"A rescheduling of the debt was negotiated, subject to the direction and economic 
adjustment plans of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World 
Bank. These programs prioritized fiscal solvency and inflation control, which was 
to be achieved through market liberalization, privatization and integration, and 
specialization within the world economy. […] While oil continued to be the main 
export, new products were introduced, such as cut flowers, fruit juice and 
preserves, shrimp and garments, which served as leading axes for capital 
accumulation." 
Indeed, shrimp farming experienced a boom in the 1980s-1990s. Like any other 
extractive industry, shrimp farming needs large extensions of land. Thus, the shrimp 
business in Ecuador spread "toward communal mangrove areas where fishermen, 
shellfish gatherers, and charcoal makers had historically secured their livelihood" (La 
Torre 2015, 62). El Niño Phenomena during 1997/1998, in addition to soil 
overexploitation, facilitated a severe disease outbreak, almost collapsing the shrimp 
industry at the end of the 1990s.   
During the 1990s, a series of natural disasters in the Andes and an El Niño 
phenomena disaster during 1997/1998 along the coast (See Chapter 4) aggravated 
economic collapse in Ecuador. Internationally, oil prices fell, thus, Ecuador confronted a 
serious financial crisis in 1998 and 1999.  By the year 2000, the government aimed to 
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stabilize the country's finances by abandoning Ecuador’s national currency, the Sucre, 
and adopted the US dollar as the official currency (Arsel 2012, Eaton 2013, Gamso 
2016).  This motivated a massive emigration of Ecuadorians, mainly to Spain, Italy, and 
the US, while remittances became an essential input to Ecuador's GDP. 
Moreover, Ecuador underwent political instability and social unrest during the 
1990s and 2000s resulting in several Presidential impeachments and resignations. Thus, 
between 1996 and 2006, six different individuals held presidential office. In 2007, 
Ecuadorians elected a new government, this time, a left-led government, which ruled the 
country during the next decade. In the next section, I examine the leftist rationale 
governing Ecuador for a decade.  
 
A decade of anti-neoliberal state practice in Ecuador (2007–2017) 
 Scholars have viewed the anti-neoliberalism that arose in Ecuador as both a 
critique of the irrationality of governments responding to neoliberal deviances, and as a 
return to leftist policies in Latin America (Goertzel 2008, Becker 2013, Coraggio & 
Laville 2014).  Since the early 1990s, an ideology called Socialismo del Siglo Veintiuno 
or Twenty-first Century Socialism sought to challenge neoliberal practices operating in 
Latin America (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). In January 2007, the Ecuadorian leader of 
the Twenty-first Century Socialism, Rafael Correa, was elected President.  Correa’s 
discourses consistently addressed social inequalities arising from the “long neoliberal 
night” (EFE 2009, Correa 2009). The newly inaugurated government persistently 
critiqued the failures of neoliberalism and indicated its intention to detach the country 
from neoliberal development policies.  
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Accordingly, the leftist government shall “correct newly identified – or newly 
created – deficiencies” (Li, 2007:19). Thus, in 2008, Correa’s government reestablished 
the regulatory functions of the state by enacting a new Constitution, which contained 
highly philosophical principles on nature-society relationships. The Constitution's ethos 
entails a systematic state planning to attain good relationships in the country. Thus, 
Article 3 establishes the state's principal duties, among them "planning national 
development."  The Constitution clarifies the planning duty in Article 275 thus: 
“The State shall plan the development of the country to assure the exercise of 
rights, the achievement of the objectives of the development structure, and the 
principles enshrined in the Constitution. Planning shall aspire to social and 
territorial equity, promote cooperation, and be participatory, decentralized, 
deconcentrated, and transparent." (Emphasis added)  
Rather than a simple relation between the state and the society, the rationale of 
development planning in the Ecuadorian Constitution locates the state government’s 
functions as the "internal logic of an administrative apparatus" (Foucault, 2008:93). 
Additionally, Article 277 identifies the general duties of the state, among them, 
"to direct, plan and regulate the development process." Article 279 explicitly creates the 
Sistema Nacional Descentralizado de Planificación Participativa or Decentralized 
Participative Planning National System, the primary function of which is to organize 
planning for Ecuador's development, by combining an array of processes, entities, and 
instruments, and issuing the national development plan. The Secretaría Nacional de 
Desarrollo or National Secretariat of Development is the planning executing agency 
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(Article 279), while the national development plan is the instrument between the central 
government and decentralized autonomous governments (Article 280).   
Within a decade, the Ecuadorian Development Secretariat enacted three national 
plans, all of which emphasized how the state can achieve building a future by regaining 
its planning, regulatory and controlling faculties: 1) The National Development Plan 
2007-2010, the Plan for Citizen's Revolution was described as "an alternative and 
democratic agenda to reach the sustainable and equitable Ecuador." This was modified 
after President Correa's re-election in 2009, birthing the 2) The National Plan for Good 
Living 2009 -2013, Building a Plurinational and Intercultural State.  The second 
presidential re-election in 2013 enacted 3) The Good Living National Plan 2013–2017, A 
better world for everyone. Overall, the three plans clearly detailed objectives, strategies, 
programs, and responsibilities in each public, social, and political sphere toward building 
future wellbeing in Ecuador. The internal policy on planning spread throughout each 
remote hamlet in the country, guiding and controlling Ecuadorians’ everyday lives.  
Thus, planning and spatialization were crucial for the anti-neoliberal rationale to 
achieve economic sovereignty and development.  Correa's second presidential term 
reinforced the planning criterion that defined the appropriate role of the state in the 
economy. Thus, the 2013-2017 National Plan affirms: “Good Living cannot be 
improvised—it must be planned” (SENPLADES, 2013:14). In the foreword section of 
the 2013-2017 Plan, Fander Falconí, then Secretary of National Planning and 
Development explained the legal ensemble underpinning the planning capacity of the 
state: 
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"One of the primary tools in Ecuador's political process has been its planning. 
The Constitution links planning directly with building citizens' rights. The 
National Decentralized Participatory Planning System (SNDPP) was created in 
the 2008 Constitution (Article 279) and comprises the National Planning Council, 
its technical secretariat, the sectorial public policy councils of the executive 
branch, national equality councils, planning councils of decentralized 
autonomous governments, citizens' sectorial councils and other mechanisms for 
participation. The basic units for participation in the system are communities, 
hamlets, neighborhoods, and urban parishes (Article 248). The system is 
governed by the 2008 Constitution, the General Public Planning and Finance 
Code (COPFP - 2010), the General Law on Citizen Participation (2010) and the 
General Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomies, and Decentralization 
(COOTAD - 2010)" (SENPLADES, 2013, 16). 
The leftist government decentralized governance through the General Code of 
Territorial Organization, Autonomies, and Decentralization (CTOAD) and the creation of 
the Autonomous and Decentralized Governments (ADG). Indeed, ADGs are like a 
reinvention of the municipal roles which introduced additional competences to the local 
government. Essential for my research, the CTOAD decentralized tourism and risk 
management to the municipalities while planning became the model towards local 
development.  Rural and urban parishes also have the option to become an autonomous 
and decentralized government as they also need to plan their development and territorial 
ordering.  However, as I will show throughout this research, a lack of legal harmony 
persists in practice.  
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Indeed, territorialization was another national strategy to “bring about a new 
relationship between the human being, nature and its environment of life” (SENPLADES 
2009, 371).  According to the national plan issued in 2009, the territory has two 
characteristics: firstly, it is a complex system in constant transformation: "the territorial 
might not be conceived merely as the physic-spatial, rather, as an actual concentration of 
culture interacting with nature" (372). Secondly, the territory is a flexible instrument to 
achieve the de-concentration of executive power. Thus, without neglecting the traditional 
(and current), administrative distribution of the state – comprising provinces, cities, 
cantons, and parishes – the government established nine zones of territorial planning to 
disperse the state apparatus to different scales while locating the government closer to the 
population. In this way, the government aimed to “warrant the rights of health, education, 
household, food, work and water” (SENPLADES 209, 401) to promote the endogenous 
development model, pivoting the anti-neoliberal economic ideal; and to rationally use 
natural resources.  
Government technicians from the National Secretary of Planning and 
Development mainly promoted this new model of territorialization, structuring 
governmental agencies according to the planning zones, while functioning according to 
the national plans. Territorial organization together with planning entailed "the same 
continuous and cyclical process" aiming "to orient interventions to improve the 
population's quality of life and to define policies, programs, and projects applicable 
within the territory" (SENPLADES 2009:400). Such tailored territorial governance relies 
on the subsidiary principle mentioned in the Constitution and clarified in the 2009 
National Plan of Development: 
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"Complementarity and subsidiarity among levels of the government are basic 
principles of planning and territorial management" (SENPLADES 2009, 129).   
 The subsidiarity principle enlightening the anti-neoliberal government pursued a 
total intervention by decentralizing and de-concentrating administrative functions from 
national to local governments.  
The General Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomies, and Decentralization 
CTOAD, a foundational legal framework on territorial organization, also appeals to this 
principle. In article 3, the law states: 
“Subsidiarity supposes to privilege the management of services, competencies and 
public policies by the levels of government closest to the population, in order to 
improve their quality and effectiveness and achieve greater democratization and 
social control of them.”  
Overall, CTOAD regulatory framework established territorial management, 
decentralization, and de-concentration in the country. Mainly, the law describes the 
functions and responsibilities of all type of ADGs: Regional, Special Regimes, 
Prefecture, Municipality, and Parish levels. The legal framework required a local Plan de 
Desarrollo y Ordenamiento Territorial or Plan of Development and Territorial 
Management for each Autonomous and Decentralized Government (SENPLADES 2009, 
507).  Within three years, consultants throughout the country elaborated roughly one 
thousand plans, which included geographical data, population data, and economical 
production subsystems (Lopez, 2015).   
The government needed to collect a large quantity of data from each site to inform 
territorial management and planning. For instance, once tourism appeared as an economic 
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sub-system in all ADGs, the Ministry of Tourism should provide information about 
tourist infrastructure and attractions. Since 2007, nationwide, the government has 
inventoried each natural or intangible resource. In the case of tourism, I was one of the 
numerous consultants who inventoried each tourist attraction, identifying, coding and 
orderly recording each physical, biological and cultural factor that, actually or potentially, 
could contribute to the country’s tourism offering.  Tourism consultants cataloged natural 
attractions such as rivers, beaches, falls, ecological reservations, forests and cultural 
heritage, such as handicrafts and gastronomic festivities. As was done in tourism, 
censuses were also conducted in agriculture, livestock, fishing, forest reserves, 
environment, culture and heritage, and risk and vulnerability. In addition to the resources 
inventory, urban and rural ADGs’ plans required data about production and business. 
Thus, governmental offices updated cadasters of every kind of supply. In the case of 
tourism, the Ministry of Tourism registered each hotel, restaurant and leisure business. 
Similar to the inventory process, governmental offices collected information by 
deploying consultants to the most remote hamlet of the country. 
Development planning increased exponentially due to the anti-neoliberal 
government introducing a Sumak Kawsay or Good Living as a planned relationship 
between humans, nature and the environment. Paraphrasing Arsel (2012), while Arturo 
Escobar supports the idea of Good Living introduced by the Twenty-first-century 
Socialism in Ecuador, other scholars - and politicians as well, characterize those left-led 
governments in Latin America, “as corrupt authoritarianism buttressed by neo-populism” 
(Arsel 2012, 151). On the one hand, argues Arsel, the case of Ecuadorian anti-neoliberal 
ruling seems to be a "transformative nature of development policies" (ibid). On the other 
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hand, anti-neoliberalism could have been going back to plans for development that were 
introduced during the 1970s.   
In August 2017, Lenin Moreno, former Vice-president of Correa’s first term, was 
democratically elected President of Ecuador. Despite his initial connection to Correa, he 
has consistently distanced his government from Twenty-first-century Socialism. Instead, 
Moreno’s discourse has shifted to what he calls Toda Una Vida, or "A Whole Life," to 
signal the population’s wellbeing from conception to death, while distancing the 
discourse from a human-environment relationship.  In the meantime, Moreno's political 
decisions, according to the news, are seemingly reverting to neoliberal governmentality. 
The IMF is again having an active role in Ecuadorian governance, and uprisings have 
returned to the country.  The new government has opened a new tipping point in 
Ecuadorian politics. A new uncertainty appears between the potential return to the 
neoliberal political instability, or the possibility of continuing with the last decade of left-
led governance. Despite the neoliberal or anti-neoliberal rationale, the government is a 
powerful driving force arranging socio-ecological relations. The following section 
addresses the effects of neoliberal and anti-neoliberal state practices in the peninsula of 
Santa Elena.  
 
Struggles and adaptation in Santa Elena’s rural coast 
The Province of Santa Elena is located in the westernmost region of continental 
Ecuador, occupying 1452.8 square miles.  The waves of the Pacific Ocean break west 
along 112 miles (180 kilometers) of shoreline, while the Chongón-Colonche mountain 
range, which crosses 330 km southwest from the coast of Ecuador, borders the northeast 
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of the province of Santa Elena. Politically, the Province is divided into three cantons: 
Santa Elena, Salinas, and La Libertad. Santa Elena municipality (or canton) extends 
1,416.57 square miles, roughly 98% of the province. The canton of Santa Elena has a 
municipal capital called Santa Elena and seven municipal parishes. The municipality of 
Santa Elena also rules the sixty-eight common property communities or comunas 
scattered throughout the rural areas.  
Echoing the deep attachments to place expressed by the rural coastal inhabitants 
of Colombia, described by Arturo Escobar (2008), for the comuneros inhabiting the 
Province of Santa Elena, the place continues to have a critical meaning.  The comuneros, 
as rural villagers are known in Ecuador, have a deep attachment to their land, which they 
consistently call Tierras Ancestrales or Ancestral Lands. Indeed, archaeological work has 
shown that the Las Vegas cultural group settled in Santa Elena 11,000 years B.P. 
(Stothert 1985). Similarly, archaeological work has shown that the Guancavilcas were 
the last pre-Columbian society living in the western coast of Ecuador, in what is now the 
Ecuadorian Provinces of Manabí (northwest), Santa Elena (west) and Guayas (southeast). 
Additionally, ethnohistorical analysis has traced the negotiations locals undertook to keep 
their population isolated until the early 1900s (Alvarez 1999, 2002).  
  In 1911, Anglo Ecuadorian Oilfields Limited, a British oil company, drilled the 
first oil shaft in south Santa Elena, creating numerous changes in the peninsula. During 
the 1950s, northern Santa Elena continued maintaining pristine beaches, while a few 
communities shipped wood and fruits to the port city of Guayaquil, 87 miles away from 
Santa Elena. Accessibility to the north of Santa Elena was also a factor in keeping 
comuneros distant from abundant state developmental interventions until the late 
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twentieth century.  To understand the several stressors affecting comuneros' lives, in this 
section, I describe climatological, economic, political, and identity issues in the Province 
of Santa Elena, and the Manglaralto Parish in particular.   
 
Figure 4. Map of Manglaralto Parish and coastal comunas. Elaborated by Daniel Garces 
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Manglaralto has nineteen comunas, including the parish capital Manglaralto. This 
research mainly focuses on the northern parish of Manglaralto, which is located between 
the Pacific Ocean and the Chongón-Colonche range (Figure 4). In an extension of 207 
square miles (536.5 square km), the Manglaralto parish has several low-flow rivers and 
streams that flow down west in a watershed that become estuarine zones close to the 
Pacific Ocean. The name Manglaralto is derived from the vast extensions of altos 
manglares or high mangroves that existed in this territory decades ago.  From south to 
north, the rivers are Valdivia River, Atravezado River, Manglaralto River, Olón River, 
Montañita and some other streams. Overall, rivers in the Manglaralto parish do not have a 
consistent, over-ground flow; instead, rivers in this region have a low-flow year around.  
To the west, river mouths intersperse with sandy beaches, tidal ponds, and seaside 
villages.  
Thirteen comunas are next to the shoreline, while six are next to the mostly settled 
Chongón-Colonche range foothills. Some villages have taken their name from the rivers 
next to or crossing them, for instance, the communities of Valdivia, Manglaralto, Olón, 
Montañita, Atravezado or Libertador Bolívar.  The highway E-15 or via Troncal del 
Pacífico connects Manglaralto with the municipality of Santa Elena from the south to the 
northern province of Manabí. Thus, the Manglaralto parish and its comunas are part of 
the tourist corridor named Ruta del Spondylus. Archaeological work has shown that the 
aboriginal Valdivia people settled in this region 3,500 years BC. Indeed, some villages 
continue handcrafting pottery with pre-Columbian techniques, particularly in the comuna 
Valdivia. 
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According to the 1982 Ecuadorian population census, 14,961 people lived in the 
Manglaralto parish. The last census, carried out in 2010, reveals 29,512 people inhabiting 
this parish. Thus, in three decades, the population of the Manglaralto parish almost 
doubled. It is important to highlight that the Ecuadorian national population increased by 
82% in the same period. Clearly, within this twenty-eight-year period, Manglaralto’s 
population growth exceeded the national average. During those decades, comuneros 
experienced two catastrophic events. Specifically, the El Niño Southern Oscillation 
impacted the coast of Ecuador several months during the years 1982/1983 and 
1997/1998. The next section reviews the effects of those disasters, which are closely 
related to climatological issues on the Pacific coast. 
Climatological issues in Santa Elena 
The climate in the province of Santa Elena is dry and arid (GAD-PSE 2015). The 
dry condition results from a slight oceanic evaporation process that, upon entering the 
continent, does not produce precipitation during most months of the year while the 
influence of the Humboldt Current, which flows northward along the South American 
Pacific coastline, is preponderant (PMRC 1993). Moreover, the Inter-Tropical 
Convergence Zone brings annual and interannual climate variability. In this region a low-
pressure zone near the equator, the northeast and southeast trade winds converge, 
producing a plethora of precipitation when air rises due to solar heating (UNDP 2013). 
Along the Ecuadorian coastal region, rainfall and clouds from December to April 
characterize the rainy season with temperatures between 75–82ºF, while the dry season is 
from June through November with lower temperatures, between 68–77ºF.  Some 
occasional rains fall during the dry season because the Chongón Colonche Range blocks 
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the mass of air coming from the Pacific Ocean, drizzling the shoreline during the 
summer. 
The phenomenon called El Niño is another phenomenon with atmospheric, 
hydrological, or oceanographic origins. Oceanographically known as El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO), a phenomenon that is a very complex anomaly that includes changes 
in both the ocean and the atmosphere (Gasparri et al. 1999). The axis of circulation of 
ENSO is the equatorial line of the Pacific Ocean. The temperature of the ocean increases 
as it moves towards the American continent, raising the sea level, and hindering the 
natural drainage of rivers flowing into the ocean.  
ENSO events in Ecuador have been recorded in the following years: 1925, 1934, 
1941, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1965, 1969, 1972-1973, 1976-1977, 1982-1983, 1986-1987, 
1997-1998, 2002-2003, 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 (UNDP 2013).  However, ENSO’s 
frequency, occurrence and intensity stimulate constant debates in Ecuador. On the one 
hand, government officials, whom I interviewed, assert that ENSO occurred in 2012 and 
2015, but there is no official record of that.  
There are official reports of high-intensity rainfall during those years and 
contingency plans implemented in several areas (GAD-MSE 2009). On the other hand, 
the news consistently announced the "potential intensity" of a "probable" ENSO, while 
remembering the catastrophic effects of previous impacts (El Universo 2015, 2016). 
Officials and the news media agree on the catastrophic effect of the ENSO in Ecuador. 
Indeed, on the coast, precipitation levels increase starkly.  A report issued by the 
Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF 1998), a development bank operating in Latin 
America, states: 
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“According to the analysis, all ENSOs (except in1969), were characterized by 
generating [in Ecuador] an excess of precipitation that exceeded averages in 40 
and 130% of the normal years. The highest values of the anomaly in percentages, 
they occur in the semi-arid zones of the coast to the southwest of the littoral (the 
peninsula), because the normal levels of precipitation in them are very reduced” 
(CAF 1998, 26)  
The extraordinary events of El Niño from 1982–1983 and 1997–1998 increased 
the sea level between 0.20-0.40 meters (0.7- 1.31 feet) above the average, causing coastal 
erosion at the shoreline Cornejo (2007).  The most critical condition threatening the 
beaches of Santa Elena occurs when swells, spring tides (higher than normal tides) and El 
Niño occur simultaneously, explains Sanchez, an expert in Santa Elena's beaches 
(Interview with author, June 18, 2018). Sanchez confirmed that this happened in the years 
1982-1983 and 1997-1998.  Furthermore, an OXFAM report points out that the Santa 
Elena was the most flooded region in Ecuador during the decade 1988-1998 and, 
paradoxically, the most exposed to droughts during the same period (Demoraes and 
D'Ercole 2001).  
The El Niño phenomenon also brought profound economic changes to Santa 
Elena. By the late 1970s, the expansion of the shrimp industry had deforested vast 
stretches of mangrove along the Coast of Ecuador. However, as Odum and Arding (1991) 
state, the exceptional El Niño runoff in 1983, accompanied by river surges, favored 
exceptional shrimp and post-larvae production. Post-larvae harvesting was essential to 
seaside villagers’ livelihood during the years following the 1982-1983 ENSO. It was 
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usual to observe beach landscapes portraying locals collecting shrimp larvae with fine-
meshed nets in the surf zone where small waves break.  
Many of the current leaders I interviewed, enthusiastically recalled those years 
working in the shrimp-farming industry in Santa Elena. Many of them were larveros or 
shrimp larvae collectors, while others worked in the laboratorios, as shrimp nurseries are 
known in Ecuador.  Larveros used to make their own nets supported by a mangrove 
frame. Historically they have been making nets for feeding their communities with 
artisanal fishing. However, being larveros allowed them to diversify their livelihood 
economy. Larveros’ or shrimp larvae collectors' contribution to the national shrimp 
industry tripled in fifteen years, from 7 billion seed shrimp in 1986 to 24 billion in 2000 
(Arriaga 2000). By early 1990s, the Manglaralto Management Plan (PMRC 1993) 
estimated that more than 80% of the economically active population in the parish of 
Manglaralto collected shrimp larvae during the aguajes, periods of high tides.  
In the mid-1990s, artisanal larvae collection started diminishing. Firstly, the 
shrimp-larvae nursery introduced new technologies to increase production and 
profitability. Secondly, studies began to show side-effects of the artisanal larvae 
collection on the ecosystem5. An analysis conducted in 1993 revealed that only 18% of 
species captured in the fine meshes fit shrimp-industry requirements. Eighty-two percent 
of the by-catch included juvenile fish, crabs, and other species (Robadue 1995). 
However, it was the El Niño phenomena in 1997-1998 that caused the collapse of larvae 
harvesting (CAF 1998).  Indeed, according to local leaders, such phenomena profoundly 
changed their livelihoods.  
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“Before the El Niño phenomenon, [shrimp larvae harvesting] was my job, it 
supported me. However, when El Niño phenomenon came, the first thing to be 
destroyed were the shrimp nurseries' infrastructure and shrimp farms [...]. Now 
what are we going to do? We asked. I decided to build a small store and put the 
first furniture I made out of guadúa cane on display” Luis Coronado, former 
President of the Cabildo at Libertador Bolívar (interview with author, June 16, 
2018). 
Similarly, Smeling Suarez, former president of the Santa Elena’s Communities 
Federation, born and raised in the village of Libertador Bolívar argues: 
“The shrimp larvae we caught disappeared. Community tourism and handicrafts 
appeared, and [both the] dynamization of economies and the territory issue were 
framed” (Interview with author, June 22, 2018). 
In the aftermath of ENSO phenomena in 1997-1998, recorded as one of the most 
substantial ENSOs in terms of its impacts on Ecuador, people in Santa Elena 
strengthened their capacity to rebuild their social lives, looking toward the uncertain 
future, while keeping their attachment to their communal land. Indeed, communal 
management of rural lands continues to be another stressor in Comuneros’ lives.  
 
Territory and communal management in Santa Elena. 
Territory, ancestral land and communal land are concepts that consistently appear 
in Santa Elenians' everyday discourse. The discourse on land and territory in Santa Elena 
emerges from a long-lasting legal framework ruling their lives since 1937, the Ley de 
Organización y Régimen de Comunas. It is popularly called Ley de Comunas or Law of 
 
92 
Communes.  Consequently, those settlements started to be known as comunas. In this 
section, I analyze the struggles of territorial administration among the comuneros after 
the enactment of the law, which provided recognition to communities and hamlets that 
have held their land for at least thirty years.  
Comunas’ territory and resources are owned and managed collectively. Since its 
enactment, the law designated the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to register and 
control communal lands.  Nowadays, the same ministry continues managing the comunas 
of Santa Elena and legally appoints comuneros. Locals who aspire to become a comunero 
legally make a petition to the Cabildo Assembly. After communal approval, the Cabildo 
staff submit a request to the Ministry of Agriculture to update the information. Initially, 
the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización or Ecuadorian Institute for 
Agrarian Reform and Colonization regulated the Comunas. The anti-neoliberal 
government closed this department in 2011.  Since then, the Subsecretaría de Tierras y 
Reforma Agraria or Land and Agrarian Reform Secretariat, a Ministry of Agriculture 
department, specifically regulates and controls comunas. However, Alvarez (2002) posits 
that the Law of Communes evidences a State paternalism which, ultimately, controls 
Indigenous lands.  
The 1937 Law of Communes also stipulated comunas administration. Comuneros 
must gather in community assemblies chaired by the Cabildo or Community Council, 
which legally represents the comuna in any external activity or connection with the local 
and national government. Each December, comuneros democratically elect the five 
members of the Cabildo: President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Síndico 
(translated Trustee), whose leading role is to measure any plot in the comuna. The law 
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does not establish any budget for the comuna, or for the Cabildo members who volunteer 
for such positions for one year.  They organize Communal Assemblies and execute any 
decision agreed by the comuna in the Community Assembly.  
All inhabitants of a comuna can attend and participate in the assembly, while only 
legally recognized comuneros have decision-making power. In the community assembly, 
comuneros reach consensus on everyday issues, discuss ideas for community progress, 
and make decisions democratically.  At least once a month, the comuneros gather in a 
Community Assembly, but in case of any particular concern, the Cabildo can request 
extraordinary meetings. The Cabildo's main concerns are territory, environment, 
economic development, health issues, or any other activity that could potentially 
positively or negatively affect the population. Overall, the Cabildo's central role entails 
comuneros' wellbeing. In doing so, the Cabildo not only deals with local issues, it 
extensively deals with the elected leaders’ network and with the local and national 
government, as well as private and non-profit organizations. 
The Community Assembly minutes that I have perused reveal extensive 
discussions regarding any internal conflict that was seen as disrupting comuneros’ 
wellbeing, as well as any external driving-force trying to infiltrate their community. 
During the assembly, comuneros discuss quotidian conflicts, e.g., plot possession, 
conflicts between the boundaries of their parcels; permits to build their small business, 
festivities, among other matters. The minutes also reveal heated discussions about 
external projects that outsiders bring to the village, including NGO or governmental 
projects. Once the community assembly makes a decision, the whole community respects 
the resolution, revealing communal organization and decision-making as key features of 
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Santa Elena’s comunas.  Internal conflicts continually flourish, but external projects 
trying to get into the village prompt the comuneros to consistently restate their communal 
ties and their collective land ownership.  
According to Becker (1999), the Law of Communes in Ecuador had an 
assimilationist attitude, following liberal policies governing Ecuador in the early 1900s, 
which aimed at social control of local lives.  Silvia Alvarez (1999, 2002), who wrote the 
first anthropological work in this region, revealed that the Law of Communes worked 
differently on the Coast. Firstly, Alvarez (2002) highlights that the comunas in Santa 
Elena are "historically communal lands" (7) rather than those new comunas constituted to 
get public services after the Law of Communes, as occurred in other regions in Ecuador. 
Secondly, Alvarez (1999) critiques the Law of Communes because it introduced a 
European model of democracy which replaced the Cacicazgo, the customary kinship 
privileges and leadership previously ruling coastal areas of Santa Elena. The Agrarian 
Reform introduced in the 1960s also created land disputes in Ecuador (Becker 1999). In 
this regard, Alvarez (2002) also argues that the new law favored Santa Elena’s native 
people, since the agrarian law recovered the notion of "community" and "communal 
organization" throughout the country.  
Although the Law of Communes reinforced common-property rights while 
providing autonomy to manage a communal territory, Comuneros in Santa Elena have 
circumvented capitalist land grabbing. The 1937 Law of Communes, the 1964 Agrarian 
Reform, and the 2016 Law of Lands all prohibit individually selling the common land, 
but also lack enforcement mechanisms to prevent possible land trade (Herrera et al. 
2006).  Moreover, a communal decision through the Community Assembly can alter 
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common-land usage right, and lands may be sold, or additional land purchased (Castillo 
and Beilock 2004). This weakness in the regulation allowed foreign investors to grab 
lands in Santa Elena.  
Three leading forms of investment transformed communal lands into private 
property: a 1970 state irrigation project, the shrimp industry and tourism development. 
The 1970 state project to construct an irrigation system in Santa Elena sparked sudden 
interest in buying land that would benefit from the project (Alvarez 1999).  Herrera et al. 
(2006) argue that the unclear legal framework and asymmetry of information regarding 
the potential of the project favored nonnative individuals to grab rural lands, particularly 
next to the Chongón-Colonche foothill where a system of canals would bring water from 
the east. As of 2018, this project was still incomplete despite several governmental 
efforts. The anti-neoliberal government successfully promoted farming and agriculture in 
the area while improving a dam's infrastructure, built years before as part of the project.   
The shrimp industry introduced the construction of shrimp ponds and shrimp-
larvae nurseries or laboratorios de larvas in the country. In Santa Elena, this industry 
developed mainly in Colonche and Chanduy parishes. However, in Manglaralto, shrimp 
farming also brought communal land dispossession supported by unclear legal 
procedures. Table #1 shows current shrimp pond areas in Santa Elena and Manglaralto 
(GAD-PSE 2015).  In Santa Elena Canton, 1.08% of lands constituted shrimp ponds, 
while in Manglaralto, this area is small: 0.15%.  Additionally, since 1983, the 
construction of shrimp-larvae nurseries grabbed lands in front of the beaches, which 
provide extensive amounts of seawater to the processes (PMRC 1993). By the year 2015, 
137 shrimp-larvae nurseries operated in Santa Elena, and 33 were inoperative (GAD-PSE 
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2015).  According to the same resource, six shrimp-larvae nurseries operate in 
Manglaralto. Interestingly, the Ministry of Agriculture department that is responsible for 
administering communal lands granted those land concessions (GAD-PSE 2015).  
Furthermore, legal issues regarding communal land transactions which violated the 
prohibition to trade common-property lands continue in Santa Elena courtrooms.  
Tourism development has been another aspect of land grabbing in Santa Elena. 
Tourism development in Santa Elena canton includes vacation homes and hotel 
construction (Leon 2013). For example, the beachfront at the northern comuna of San 
Jose is full of luxury vacation homes.  In Montañita, private investors have built hotels on 
the beachfront, while the comuneros moved inland, and in Olón, foreign retirees are 
arriving to occupy recently built resorts. 
 
Shrimp-Industry  Santa Elena 
Province 
Santa Elena 
Canton 
Manglaralto 
Parish 
Shrimp ponds (sq. mi.) 21.02 15.31 0.32 
Shrimp-larvae nursery (No.) 170 48 6 
 
Table 1 Shrimp industry in Santa Elena. Source: Santa Elena Province Development Plan 
(GAD-PSE 2015) 
 
Thus, territorial issues in Santa Elena reveal comuneros’ capacity for 
rearrangement between the legal interstices introduced after the Law of Communes and 
the new models of development. In doing so, Alvarez (2002) argues, the Comuneros can 
preserve power over ethnic territoriality. Indeed, ethnic recognition is still another issue 
among the Comuneros, as shown in the next section.    
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Identity issues in Santa Elena. 
Collective decision-making and communal organization are crucial to confront 
climatological impacts and territorial challenges without leaving their territory. In this 
section, I borrow, from Alvarez (2002), the idea that the people of Santa Elena have 
focused on the concept of land as “the crucial link of cohesion and reproduction of their 
cultural values” (12) to analyze identity issues the Comuneros confront in their everyday 
lives.   
Alvarez (1999) traces ethnic identification among natives of Santa Elena. In the 
1800s, these natives were known as cholos but not as Guancavilcas, the people settling 
Santa Elena when Spaniards arrived at the area. The cholos of Santa Elena became 
comuneros after the Ley de Comunas was enacted in 1937.  Thus, this term survived the 
miscegenation during the 1960s and 1970s when the Ecuadorian government pursued the 
strengthening of a more universal "mestizo" (mixed European and Indigenous) identity 
throughout the Ecuadorian population.  In order to confront the Agrarian Reform enacted 
in 1964, the natives of Santa Elena joined the Federación de Comunas del Guayas1 or 
Federation of Communes of the Guayas Province, whose primary goal was to defend 
their territories.1 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the comuneros were attentive to the ethnicity 
discourse proliferating in the country, which highlighted the importance of Ecuador's 
Indigenous populations, countering the state's discourse of a more homogenous, mestizo 
population. In 1986, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
 
1  The Federation of Comuneros gathered the communes settled throughout the Province 
of Guayas, to which Santa Elena Canton belonged until the three cantons in the Santa 
Elena peninsula became a province in 2007. 
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(CONAIE) or Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, was created. 
CONAIE sought legal recognition for Indigenous peoples and nationalities.  It is 
noteworthy that CONAIE's first Vice-president was a comunero from Santa Elena 
(Bazurco 2006).  In 1987, CONAIE enrolled coastal comuneros, from Santa Elena and 
Manabí, under the name of Manteño-Guancavilca Town. By the late 1990s, the 
Indigenous movement in Ecuador had become a more powerful force within national 
politics (Becker 2011). However, prior to be able to make appeals for ethnicity-based 
financial or technical assistance, Ecuador's diverse Indigenous groups needed greater 
levels of legal recognition.  
In 2002, the Federation of Comunas in Guayas became Movimiento Indígena 
Manta-Guancavilcas y Punaes or Indigenous Movement of Peoples Manta-Guancavilcas 
and Punaes (Tuaza & Saenz 2014).  Ethnic recognition issues did not displace the 
longstanding federation; instead, Comuneros' association has actively continued its 
organizational work throughout.  In 2004, the Comuneros signed a cooperation 
agreement with Proyecto de Desarrollo de Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador2 or 
Project for Ecuadorian Indigenous People and Afro descendants. The project, funded by 
the World Bank, aimed to restore the ancestral water system in Santa Elena to address the 
long-standing water scarcity issue in the region. Santa Elenians received no tangible 
results through this project. Water scarcity continues to be an important issue in Santa 
Elena. However, the project's emphasis on providing additional resources to Indigenous 
 
2  This project was part of the World Bank’s Indigenous Peoples’ Development Initiative 
in Latin America.  
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people promoted local Santa Elenians became more interested in highlighting their 
indigeneity. 
Governmental interventions emphasizing ancestral heritage grew exponentially 
after 2007 when the government adopted anti-neoliberal state practices. The first and 
most significant action supported by the left-led government was the creation of the 
Province of Santa Elena in November 2007.  Prior to this, there were several revolts in 
Santa Elena claiming provincialización, resulting in their separation from the Province of 
Guayas. While I have spent considerable time examining speeches and other archives, I 
have not found any records in which Santa Elenians identify themselves as Guancavilcas 
during that early period. Interestingly, when the leaders called for the union proclaiming 
provincialism, they use the slogans cholos peninsulares or cholos comuneros. 
In contrast, the Ecuadorian government started recognizing Santa Elena’s 
comuneros as Indigenous people starting after the enactment of the new Constitution in 
the year 2008. The Ecuadorian Constitution in articles about multiculturalism, identifies 
only three categories of people deserving special provisions: 1) Indigenous peoples; 2) 
Afro-descendants; and 3) montubios (the identification for inland coastal peasants 
formalized in 2001).  Santa Elena natives are not Afro descendants, nor are they 
montubios, even though both inhabit the coastal region of Ecuador. Thus, the leftist 
government categorized Comuneros as Indigenous groups.  
Furthermore, the National Plans elaborated under anti-neoliberal practices 
(SENPLADES 2009, 2013) purposed to strengthen interculturality in the country. In 
doing so, the leftist government deployed several interventions. In Santa Elena, these 
included: 
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-    The Ministry of Tourism switched the name of the tourist route that crosses the 
province of Santa Elena from "Route of the Sun" to "Route of the Spondylus," in 
reference to the cultural value of the Spondylus shell. 
-    Since 2006, the Ministry of Tourism, in conjunction with local governments, has been 
promoting whale watching as a major tourist draw to the region. The whale watching 
season starts with an annual parade. While the earliest parades, designed and executed 
by local people, included mostly the ever-popular clowns and beauty queens because 
of their popularity among local residents, subsequent parades changed significantly to 
include more tourist-appreciated components, such as having children display the 
outfits and rituals of their Guancavilca ancestors.   
-    In 2011, the Ministry of Culture returned a monolith considered the Guancavilca God 
of Fertility to the comuna Sacachún.  Previously, it had been kept in Guayaquil for 50 
years.  In the years following, the Ministry of Culture, together with the Ministry of 
Tourism, planned to develop a tourism product called "The Path of the Guancavilca 
Gods" to be guided and operated by the local natives, but it was never launched.    
-    The 2015-2019 Development Plan of the Province of Santa Elena includes among its 
goals: “to promote cultural expressions of the peninsular society to strengthen the 
ancestral Guancavilca identity” (GAD-PSE 2015, 73). The document adduces both the 
census data on self-identification as mestizos, and the lack of cultural promotion, as 
reasons for losing the local identity and cultural values. 
-    The municipal government of Santa Elena also promotes the notion of Tierras 
Ancestrales or ancestral lands throughout the territory. At the entrance, the City Office 
exhibits replicas of the Valdivian and Las Vegas cultures.  Additionally, the 
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municipality installed, at the entrance of each rural community, billboards with pre-
Columbian ceramic pictures and a welcoming message accompanied by the slogan 
“Comuna Ancestral.”  
In stark contrast to governmental efforts, Indigenous self-identification is almost 
nil. Interviews with locals and from focus groups I have conducted in Santa Elena reveal 
the following identity categories to describe Santa Elenians: cholos comuneros, cholos 
Guancavilcas, cholos pescadores (fishermen) or mestizos.   For them, 'Indigenous' means 
someone from the highlands or Amazonia, rather than being an appropriate term for their 
ancestral group. However, the comuneros of Santa Elena have a strong attachment to 
their ancestral lands. It is also noteworthy that they desire to strengthen the symbolic 
value of their ancestralidad (ancestry) and the defense of their territory. Indeed, people in 
the comunas of Santa Elena still exist within ambiguous spaces between dominant 
representations.   
Thus, the Comuneros engaged the ongoing political construction of their identity 
to adapt to new stressors. The analysis has pointed out the interstices of the historical 
transformation of collective identifications among the natives of Santa Elena. In the 
neoliberal regime, these coastal communes fostered and forged ethnic identification as a 
strategy to obtain benefits for their communities. Nevertheless, that strategy did not reach 
an internal recognition of their indigeneity and thus did not leave any legacy of collective 
identification. Currently, common identification strategies come from the government, 
particularly policies associated with the leftist aim of planning everyday lives. Thus, 
natives of Santa Elena have changed from natives to cholos, from cholos to comuneros, 
from comuneros to mestizos and finally from mestizos to Guancavilcas, as a strategy to 
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acquire resources, assistance, and political participation. The Comuneros focus on their 
collective identity revitalization while pursuing economic development. 
 
Development issues in Santa Elena. 
 When Ecuador reinstated democracy in the 1980s, landscapes in Santa Elena's 
northern beaches were still pristine. From 1983, the shrimp industry boomed, introducing 
new developments in the region. In response to the mangrove deterioration that shrimp 
farming brought to coastal areas, the government signed a ten-year initiative promoted by 
USAID and implemented by the University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center. 
The initiative created a remarkable program called Coastal Resources Management 
Program (CRMP). This program operated until the year 2008, when the leftist 
government merged it with the Ministry of Environment. Chapter 5 details more than 
twenty years of CRMP operation in the country. It is important for this section to 
acknowledge that in twenty years of integrated coastal management, the CRMP overcame 
an unprecedented challenge in Santa Elena, and former CRMP executives and technicians 
agree that the project achieved sustainable development of the coastal areas of Ecuador 
The CRMP’s second phase, starting with an IDB operation credit, actively 
promoted and financed community engagement in local proposals and projects. CRMP’s 
crucial feature was the financial component provided by the villagers: locals collaborated 
through community service, communal labor, and materials to build their local projects, 
such as artisan shops, hostels, and restaurants.  In doing so, the CRMP achieved the 
communities’ active participation while developing their responsibility and decision-
making over their entrepreneurship. CRMP also collaborated with NGOs' technical 
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assistance. Tuaza and Saenz (2014) identified aid agencies and NGOs providing support 
in Santa Elena during the neoliberal period in Ecuador (remind us of dates or simply say 
"prior to 2007"). For instance, the Archdiocese of Guayaquil assisted communities with 
local initiatives, particularly the weaving of Panama hats. The US-based Plan 
International improved schools’ infrastructure and supported children and teenagers. 
Fundación Natura (The Nature Foundation), an NGO, promoted Chongón-Colonche 
forest protection, reforestation, and control of forest clearance with the help of funds 
from the Canadian bilateral development agency. The Fundación ProPueblo promoted 
handcrafting with local materials, particularly weaving Panama hats and bamboo cane 
handicrafts. The Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral (ESPOL) or Polytechnic 
University provided technical assistance on sustainable development, agriculture and 
water management.  The Fundación Ecuatoriana de Desarrollo Social, or the Ecuadorian 
Foundation for Social Development, mainly focused on women’s empowerment.  
Additionally, the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation promoted the 
Programa de Ecoturismo Comunitario or Community Ecotourism Project.  This project 
operated through the Ayuda en Acción or Help in Action, a Spanish NGO executing 
integrated plans of development in Santa Elena, and the Centro de Promoción Rural or 
Rural Promotion Center (RPC), a local NGO.  The primary goal was to develop and 
strengthen tourism initiatives offered by comuneros. According to David Zambrano 
(interview with author August 12, 2018), RPC Executive Director, the current community 
tourism initiatives in Santa Elena have emerged from years of combined efforts between 
the NGOs mentioned above, the Tourism Ministry, and CRMP.  
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Since 2007, a few NGOs have continued working with comuneros, however, the 
anti-neoliberal rationale denies foreign NGOs' cooperation, financial aid, or technical 
assistance.  The 2008 Constitution and the National Planning Council endorsed the state 
for having the duty to provide for the wellbeing of the population. Then, the government 
deployed governmental technical staff to all areas. Additionally, the government directly 
contracted numerous consultants to assess the existing situation and train locals according 
to the planned projects, in light of citizens' participation, endogenous development, and 
the so-called "solidarity economy" enacted in the 2008 Constitution.   
The Comuneros found a great ally in the anti-neoliberal rationale of the leftist 
government, which supported several local projects. For instance, in Corozo, an inland 
comuna of Santa Elena, the comuneros were proud of harvesting their long- delayed 
maracuyás (passion fruit) crop, after the Ministry of Agriculture provided technical 
assistance. Similarly, this occurred with beekeeping in other inland communities, such as 
Las Balsas or Manantial de Guangala. In the Manglaralto Parish, several communities 
found an alternative for their cash-strapped economy in community-based tourism, which 
has been strongly promoted by the state social agenda (El Universo 2007).  Community-
based tourism means that revenues from tourism return to the whole community. 
However, in Santa Elena, community-based tourism refers to small tourist businesses 
owned and operated by the Comuneros.  Paradoxically, family-owned businesses operate 
in a plot authorized by the Community Assembly, while having the duty of paying a fee 
to the comuna.   
Thus, development has been an additional driving force impacting Comuneros, 
adding to the climatological, identity and territorial issues in Santa Elena in general, and 
 
105 
the Manglaralto Parish in particular. Among the thirteen seaside comunas in Manglaralto, 
Libertador Bolívar is the only one that has not sectioned the land; instead, they have 
organized themselves to retain their land under communal administration. 
 
Decision-making over territory, identity, and development in Libertador Bolívar   
The comuna of Libertador Bolívar occupies 5.54 square miles (14.76 square km) 
from the Pacific Ocean to the interior land (Figure 5).  The community has two miles of a 
wide and rectilinear beach strip, from Playa Bruja at the south all the way north to the 
river's mouth. The beach at Playa Bruja, the southern area of the village, is banned from 
tourist development due to the risks caused by the currents. The locally known "south 
beach" is a tourist area developed at the entrance of the village, where the cliff faces the 
sea, and where several families manage their hostels, restaurants, and artisan shops. The 
north beach is next to the mouth of the Atravezado River which crosses the town from 
east to west. Curiously, the name of this river means “crossed”, and Elders in the 
community assert that the river’s ancestral name refers to such crossing.  
Indeed, the first geographical study of this area, conducted by Theodore Wolf and 
published in 1892, documents the river as “Travesao” and also identifies the group of 
people living next to this river (Wolf 1892, 185). The river mouth forms a hypersaline 
lagoon (tidal pond), which fills and empties with seawater as the tide rises and falls. 
However, during the rainy season, the tidal pond can disappear while the river stream 
floods the area next to the river. Inland, a handful of villagers subsist from small-scale 
agriculture that is adapted to arid soil and lack of irrigation systems. Agriculture was vital 
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at the start of the twentieth century. However, today, tourism has become the main 
economic activity that supports the entire community development. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Libertador Bolívar and seaside comunas in Manglaralto Parish. 
Elaborated by Daniel Garces. Source: 1993 CRMP Development Agenda 
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Libertador Bolívar is one of the few communities of Santa Elena that has retained 
its territory without external investors, despite having confronted attempts of land 
dispossession. For instance, in 1982, a shrimp farming investor tried to grab the 
mangrove area in the north of the community. In this event, remembered as La Guerra or 
The War, Alberto Floreano, a community leader, died in a riot against the intrusion. 
Floreano conveyed to the comuneros the most ingrained meaning of land defense, an 
everyday discourse among the inhabitants of Libertador Bolívar. In 2016, I witnessed 
how the comuneros organized and recovered a plot of land that a foreigner had 
deceitfully grabbed. Two years later, a juridical resolution decided the case, favoring the 
community.  
According to the records, the Ministry of Agriculture incorporated the community 
Libertador Bolívar on October 20, 1940, three years after the State issued the Law of the 
Communes. However, it was in 1970, in response to the Agrarian Reform introduced by 
the state in 1964, that comuneros in Libertador Bolívar updated the internal regulations 
and actively started their participation in community development, which came together 
with the road construction. The road E-15 connects many of Santa Elena's villages to one 
another, running from south to north, towards the Province of Manabí, among them, 
Libertador Bolívar. 
By the 1980s and 1990s, the primary source of income was the shrimp farming 
industry. Some of the current community leaders, 40 or 50-year-old men, were larveros 
or worked at the laboratorios nearby or in other provinces.  Although tourism was not the 
primary source of income, Libertador Bolívar’s economy had incidentally engaged in 
tourism activities. For instance, people from Libertador Bolívar used to sell their products 
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at other beaches within Santa Elena, mainly fruits, traditionally baked corn tortillas and 
handicrafts. Locals I interviewed remember their parents producing crafts made with 
seashells, including the famous turkey-shaped crafts known as pavitos or little turkeys. 
Others rented tents on different beaches to shelter tourists from the sun. Several 
comuneros worked in food and beverage services in communities that had already 
integrated into the tourist economy, such as Montañita and Olón.  
In the early 2000s, locals purposed bringing tourists to their beaches. In the 
aftermath of 1997-1998 El Niño phenomenon, road construction rebuilt the road in Playa 
Bruja where some shrimp-larvae nurseries operated.  Constructors requested food and 
beverage services in the community. The comuneros built bohíos or cabanas made from 
gadúa cane to offer their dishes. By the year 2000, some families had built eight cabanas 
in the southern part of the town. Several NGOs offered Libertador Bolívar financial and 
technical assistance to improve businesses by providing the minimum infrastructure 
required for tourism development, such as restroom facilities, lifeguard training, and a 
tourist information booth. The Ministry of Tourism in agreement with CRMP also 
provided training in food hygiene, food management, and gastronomy. 
Tourism development also generated heated discussions in the Community 
Assembly regarding land use and rights of any particular family to build the small 
tourism businesses flourishing in the south beach area.  In 2003, the Cabildo issued land 
possession certificates for those businesses and, in a few years, those huts became a 
hallmark of Libertador Bolívar’s gastronomic offerings, a noteworthy place to visit on the 
Route of Spondylus (El Universo 2003). As reported by one of the most important 
national newspapers, traditional dishes, such as the Pescado de la Abuela (Grandma’s 
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fish), revived by native chefs, are now the flagship of Libertador Bolívar’s gastronomic 
offerings, differentiating the village from other communities engaged in community 
tourism development (El Universo 2007).   
In recent years, this scenario has been replicated on the north beach of Libertador 
Bolívar, next to the river mouth of the Atravezado River. In communal assemblies during 
2013, a handful of community members began to request their right to work on the beach.  
Later, they built some huts on the north beach, while tourists found a new space for 
leisure between the river mouth and the sandy beach. Nowadays, the Asociación Rio-Mar 
or River-Sea Association, has thirteen cabañeros, owners of tourist huts in this area 
between the sea and the river.   
The tourism industry also has revitalized Libertador Bolívar’s economy. Fishers, 
divers, groceries, artisan shops and others depend on the increased income they are able 
to earn during tourist seasons. A participatory analysis I conducted with a group of 
Comuneros and officials of COASTMAN, an NGO that has been working in Libertador 
Bolívar since 2003, shows the evolution of tourism in Libertador Bolívar. Tourist 
offerings doubled in two decades. By 2017, there were 14 restaurants, 7 hostels, and 1 
paragliding tour operator. Unfortunately, most of the tourism businesses in Libertador 
Bolívar have not been granted Ministry of Tourism certification (see Chapter 6) because 
they fail to meet all the requirements, mainly regarding security and contingency plans in 
case of disasters. The municipal office that manages tourist development in the Santa 
Elena Canton has registered in its official cadaster only one hotel, ten restaurants, and the 
tour operator. The others operate under legal subterfuge while circumventing risk 
management and tourism norms.   
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The sea and the waves are continually threatening Comuneros' tourist economy at 
Libertador Bolívar.  During fieldwork, I noted the rush the Comuneros experience during 
the aguaje or high tides coming into the north beach.  Each time high tides batter the 
beach, the comuneros struggle to save their huts and the supplies they need to provide 
services to the tourists. Every day, Comuneros coexist with the endless threat of waves 
breaking on the beach, the aguajes, and the rising sea level.   
 
Conclusion: adaptive processes in Santa Elena 
The previous section reveals comuneros’ self-determination emerging from their 
deep attachment to their land. Thus, through communitarian decision-making, Libertador 
Bolívar has kept foreign investors away from their territory, while comuneros have 
adapted to the aftermath of ENSO phenomena. This analysis reveals profound changes 
introduced in the comuneros’ economy after the catastrophic phenomenon. While 1982-
1983 ENSO brought the shrimp-larvae economy, the 1997-1998 ENSO introduced the 
Comuneros to the tourism industry. Comuneros’ response to natural disasters has been a 
process of adaptation to a new socio-ecological relationship on the beaches of Santa 
Elena. However, the longitudinal analysis also shows the vital role of the State during the 
decades analyzed by this research. From 1980 through 2007, the Ecuadorian State 
practiced neoliberal recipes, which promoted coastal resource managerial planning and 
active local participatory processes while advancing tourism development. 
Additionally, neoliberal state practices introduced identity struggles which 
continue to be a source of uncertainty among the Comuneros. From 2007, the leftist 
government, adopting an anti-neoliberal rationale, continued revitalizing ethnicity and 
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indigeneity, and also promoted an endogenous tourism development which, ultimately, 
revitalized the local economy. Now, the Comuneros confront new threats. On the one 
hand, they cannot obtain permits to operate their cabanas legally, and on the other hand, 
the cabanas on the beach are prone to persistent threats.  
Since the beach became the primary resource for the local economy, the sea 
became a greater threat. However, such a threat is not a catastrophic event compared to 
the aftermath of disastrous ENSO events.  Thus, successive Ecuadorian governments 
have deployed numerous interventions to mitigate ENSO’s aftermath.  In the following 
chapter, I analyze the Ecuadorian governments’ concern for disaster and risk 
management, and the will of the State to improve coastal socio-ecological relations. 
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Chapter IV 
Neoliberal and anti-neoliberal risk and disaster management in Ecuador 
 
Disaster prevention has become crucial in a world increasingly threatened by 
natural and human-induced hazards. Scholars have successfully disclosed the role of 
governments integrating human-security concerns and climate risk to national 
development agendas (Arandau 2014; Brown 2016; Chandler and Reid 2016). Currently, 
a global key tool for addressing climate and development security concerns is resilience 
thinking, a hegemonic framework promoted by the United Nations (UN).  By 2019, more 
than one hundred sixty countries are implementing resilience policies as a solution for 
environmental and societal security. The UN Disaster and Risk Reduction framework 
entails a systematic enhancing of national and local capabilities to manage and reduce 
risk. Accordingly, by increasing resilience, populations will be less vulnerable to 
disasters of any kind. The analysis of the effects of policies aiming to building resilience 
have disclosed resilience programs pervading individuals through governmental 
circulatory power tactics (Anderson 2010; Dunn et al. 2015; Davoudi and Madanipour 
2015; Grove 2013b). Thus, resilience has become an art of governing the population 
which creates a series of truths under the vision that life needs to be secured.   
In this chapter, I trace how disaster management in Ecuador ordered relationships 
among population, development, and risk. From the 1980s to early 2000s, Ecuadorian 
governments adopted and adapted the practices of neoliberal states, and from 2007 to 
2017, the government adopted left-led state practices. My goal is to critically reflect on 
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the intimate relations and interconnections of neoliberal and anti-neoliberal approaches to 
disaster management by focusing on how the Ecuadorian governments spatialized 
disaster through social and non-social strategies and techniques deployed through the 
country in general, and coastal areas in particular.  The chapter excavates global, 
regional, and national discourses emphasizing technocratic management of experts, 
which, ultimately, ordered a new relationship between population, development, and risk 
in the rural areas of Santa Elena. In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the 
neoliberal concern for catastrophes in Ecuador and its connections with the 
modernization of the state. The second section traces the emergence of a culture of risk 
during the anti-neoliberal government ruling Ecuador. The chapter concludes by 
comparing the logics and mechanisms that both types of Ecuadorian government have 
developed for securing the population.   
 
The neoliberal concern surrounding disasters in Ecuador 
During the last decade of the twentieth century, numerous natural catastrophes 
significantly impacted Ecuador’s economy. In 1993, a landslide damaged La Josefina 
dam in the southern region, followed by the Nambija mine disaster in the southwest of 
the country. In 1994 and again in 1996, forests on the Galapagos Islands burned. 
Earthquakes occurred in Morona Santiago (Amazonia) in 1995, Pujilí (Andes) and Bahía 
de Caráquez (Coast) in 1996. Between 1997 and 1998, the El Niño climate phenomenon 
devastated the Ecuadorian coast and other regions in the Amazonia. During 1998-1999, 
the Pichincha Volcano, near the capital city of Quito, erupted several times. Another 
earthquake wreaked havoc in the north of the province of Manabí in 1998. The 
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Tungurahua Volcano erupted in 1999. In addition to this series of diverse natural 
disasters, in 1995, Ecuador engaged in a two-month military conflict with Peru (Guerra 
del Cenepa or The Cenepa War), by the end of which both countries achieved a long-
desired peace agreement.   
Furthermore, such crises coincided with governmental instability. From the 1980s 
onward, Ecuador reinstated democracy, with influence from US-based international 
agencies promoting neoliberal practices in Latin America. From 1996 to 2006, political 
instability deepened in Ecuador, when seven presidents got the office after democratic 
elections, impeachments, or resignations. In this section, I trace disaster management 
governance during those years of unrest, deeply permeated by neoliberal state practices. 
According to Rebotier (2016), governmental decisions addressing disaster management 
in Ecuador followed Latin American’s major paradigmatic stages and political-
institutional frameworks of risk management. Nowadays, Latin American countries posit 
risk as a problem of development and as a social matter. However, originally, those 
countries organized disaster management toward response and reconstruction, mainly 
through the Civil Defense. 
 
Dimensions of the Ecuadorian Civil Defense  
Ecuador started to approach the field of disaster management in November 1960 
by issuing the National Defense Law, which defines the role of the state in terms of 
forecasting and reducing potential impacts of disasters and includes the first legal 
normative regarding Civil Defense. However, it was in 1972 that the government created 
the Civil Defense together with the Secretariat of the National Committee for Civil 
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Defense. In 1979, Ecuador adopted a new National Security Law Nº 275/79, which 
created a National Civil Defense System, led by the General Secretariat of the National 
Security Council. The National Institute of Civil Defense, the National Direction of 
Mobilization, the National Intelligence, and the High-Studies National Institute comprise 
the NCDS. During the 1980s, the Consejo Nacional Permanente de Seguridad Nacional 
or National Permanent Council of National Security regulated the National Civil Defense 
System (Carrion et al. 2017), highly focused on relief, while public policy missed disaster 
prevention or reduction. 
After a decade, the government issued the complementary regulation of the 1979 
law.  In Article 75, the regulation defines Civil Defense:  
"Civil Defense is a state activity of permanent service favoring the 
community, reached through the System of Civil Defense, responsible for 
planning, organizing and using personal, sources and services to prevent, 
avoid, reduce, and repair the effects of catastrophes of any origin” 
(emphasis added). 
 
Additionally, the National System of Civil Defense roles should, among others, 
"[d]etermine the areas potentially exposed to disasters and carry out preventive 
information campaigns" (Art. 87). However, most of the articles in both the law and the 
regulation refer to the post-disaster intervention: damage assessment, emergency 
rehabilitation, reconstruction. Prevention in practice was absent. Indeed, some former CD 
volunteers, currently Risk Management officials, agree on the legal gaps reducing the 
CD’s capacity to address prevention. On the contrary, the CD worked reactively, claim 
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former CD volunteers. For instance, “the CD prepared volunteers to respond to 
emergencies and disasters, but did little or no work on prevention issues," explains a 
current Risk Management official and former CD volunteer in Santa Elena (E1, interview 
with author June 6, 2018).  
 
Disasters and the modernization of the state  
 With the arrival of a newly elected president to office in 1992, criteria on national 
development integrated with environmental arguments and decentralization illuminated 
Ecuadorian modernization of the state. In 1993, the state issued the Law of Modernization 
of the State, Privatization, and Provision for Public Services by the Private Initiative, 
simply known as Law 50, which has been highly criticized by the deepening neoliberal 
state practice in Ecuador. Mainly, the law promoted state decentralization with a strong 
privatizing component (Rebotier 2016). In the following paragraphs I describe two main 
factors influencing disaster management and risk approaches during the modernization of 
the State.  
Firstly, in 1995 the National Congress created the Fondo de Solidaridad or 
Solidarity Fund. This autonomous body aimed to alleviate poverty in rural areas, by 
managing energy and telecommunication for state companies — a neoliberal practice to 
de-regularize state functioning. El Fondo, as it was popularly known in Ecuador, will 
exclusively finance education, health, and environmental sanitation programs in rural 
areas, as well as the social effects of natural disasters. The first application of such funds 
financed the post-war conflict expenses in the mid-1990s, due to border problems 
between Ecuador and Peru. Overall, the Fondo de Solidaridad mainly financed sanitary 
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infrastructure projects (sewerage, potable water, residual waste treatment), health and 
education programs, and mitigation efforts in marginal sectors of the country, by 
contracting private providers.  
 Secondly, the Development Agenda 1993-1996 (CONADES 1996) summarizes 
policies and governmental objectives towards state modernization. The agenda highlights 
the environmental deterioration, and the mismanagement of natural resources that 
threatened the country’s sustainable development.  According to this official document, 
Ecuador would achieve sustainable development "only when its three elements: the 
social, the economic, and the environmental are treated in harmonic and balanced ways" 
(CONADES 1996, no pagination).  Thus, environmental approaches became a pivot for 
the development of the country.  
The Development Agenda’s environmental concern dedicated a section titled 
“High risk of the country to natural and anthropic disasters” (CONADES 1996, 61-65). 
The section summarizes various data on the population risk, prone to natural disasters. 
For instance, the agenda highlights that 80% of the population were prone to seismic 
disasters and 35% of the population settled in areas prone to flooding, landslides, 
mudflows, and debris. The Agenda includes tsunami and ENSO-related events directly 
threatening 10% of the population inhabiting the coastline. More importantly, the agenda 
reveals an inadequate regulation of disaster management. Overall, the document reveals 
an absence of policies related to disaster prevention and mitigation, an outdated legal 
framework, inadequate norms for construction, low budgetary allocation, population 
settled in highly vulnerable zones, and erosion of hydrographic basins. The agenda 
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concludes by revealing a lack of political decision regarding disaster-related solutions in 
the country.  
The 1996 Ecuadorian Development Agenda also brought technical identification 
of high-risk areas into focus and the need for developing risk prevention policies. 
Consequently, the agenda aims to "incorporate into the national, regional and local 
planning systems the risk variable as a development concept" (CONADES 1996, 64). In 
doing so, the government allocated funds for technical departments engaged with disaster 
prevention and also opened the Civil Defense's scope of action through the creation of a 
specialized force within the Army. Additionally, risk and environmental impact 
evaluations became a new section in all private or public development projects. 
Nevertheless, neither the Development Agenda nor the Fondo de Solidaridad 
achieved a legal framework towards disaster prevention, according to the Ecuadorian UN 
assessment of the Decade of Disaster report (Burbano 1998). In said report, submitted to 
the UNDRR in 1998, Gustavo Burbano, then-Civil Defense Director, details the actions 
to disaster prevention in response to the natural catastrophes that occurred in the decade 
of the 1990s. The report acknowledges the lack of action in disaster mitigation despite 
including the risk variable in the national development plan. The report also contains 
information on training programs executed particularly among authorities, 
implementation of evacuation drills, and a few contingency plans. 
However, the CD Director revealed that risk awareness was still absent among 
citizens who continued to rely on the criterion "God must not allow these evils to reach 
them," handwrites Burbano.  Furthermore, the report mentions the weakness of Civil 
Defense in implementing regulations on land use, water management, reforestation, 
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construction norms, and others.  It was challenging to achieve since the Civil Defense's 
scope of action addressed post-disaster intervention, argues CD Director. Finally, the 
report denounces scattered disaster prevention regulations among state agencies, 
municipalities or local institutions.  
Rebotier (2016) also reveals the lack of accomplishment on disaster reduction 
during the International Decade for Disaster Reduction. Rebotier points out the lack of 
resources and roles dispersion among different entities. Accordingly, the publication 
Ecuador Lessons from El Niño 97-98 (CAF 1998), an institutional description of Ecuador 
in the face of disasters, reveals that prevention and mitigation “do not have an 
institutional system for risk management,” and, “the existing norm does not internalize 
the concept of risk management" (CAF 1998, 239-240). Furthermore, the document 
highlights the "nonexistence" of policies for prevention or reduction of vulnerabilities 
and damage caused by natural disasters, not even for the agricultural sector and its 
production system (CAF 1998, 240). Additionally, the document discloses the reactive 
response the Ecuadorian governments has had in the face of natural and anthropic 
disasters.  
In sum, the 1990s imprinted a concern over the country’s propensity to deal with 
natural and anthropic disasters, the need of managing funds, and the inclusion of 
environmental issues on development agendas. Additionally, the UN Decade of Risk 
Reduction in Ecuador failed to introduce prevention criteria. Instead, scattered initiatives 
on risk were disseminated through development goals, while the Civil Defense organized 
natural disaster relief and recovery. In the dawn of the new century, the legal framework 
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on disaster prevention and mitigation continued to be absent in neoliberal regimes ruling 
Ecuador. 
ENSO lessons in Ecuadorian disaster management 
ENSO management during the years 1997-1998 instantiates the dispersed roles in 
Ecuadorian disaster management, and the government's reactive response when coping 
with a natural disaster. El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a very complex anomaly 
which includes changes in the oceanographic and the atmospheric systems, with 
worldwide consequences in different levels and different seasons. During average years, 
in the coast of Ecuador (and Peru) the strong southeast trade winds blow the warm 
surface waters, producing an abundant supply of food for small fish, providing a good 
living for fishers (Robbins et al 2014). However, during El Niño-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) phenomenon, trade winds fade for some months. Later, trade winds start to push 
the warm surface water again, returning to normality. Specialists agree that this hydro-
meteorological phenomenon does not repeat at regular intervals and its intensity is also 
variable.  ENSO causes extreme increases in the volume of rain and swells, consequently 
causing floods, mudslides, dike breaks, etc., and disturbing human lives and productive 
systems.   
The event that occurred between 1997-1998 has been the phenomena with the 
most profound impacts on Ecuador. ENSO 1997-1998 flooded 6,381.3 square miles 
(16,527.6 km2), that is to say, 6% of the Ecuadorian territory, mostly in the coastal 
provinces (Gasparri et al., 1999).  This event has been well documented by scholars and 
informed through technical working papers. However, the most relevant document, 
according to the literature, is the report issued in 1998 by the UN Economic Commission 
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for Latin America and the Caribbean3. According to the UN commission’s evaluation of 
the socio-economic effects of ENSO 1997-1998, damages totaled US$2,869.3 million 
($486.4 million for post-disaster rehabilitation and $1,589.1 million reconstruction) (CAF 
1998). A World Health Organization report (OPS 2000) records total damages 
equaling17% of Ecuadorian GDP. The same report reveals that more than 15,000 homes 
were damaged in rural areas, producing migration to the big cities. In addition, 6,276 
severely affected families lost homes and belongings, and had to live in shelters, with 
their relatives or with friends. Between October 1997 through June 1998, 292 people died 
by causes related to ENSO; 162 people were injured and 40 disappeared (OPS 2000). 
Additionally, Gasparri et al. (1999) estimate that the shrimp industry lost $3.5 million 
while shrimp pond reconstruction cost US$4 million. 
 International alerts announced ENSO’s impact in December 1996 and January 
1997 (OPS 2000, CAF 1998). However, the country did not promptly take any political 
action to prevent the disaster caused by ENSO. It is noteworthy that Ecuador again faced 
a political upheaval which intensified in January 1997. The democratically elected 
president stepped down, and an interim president ruled Ecuador from February 1997 to 
August 1998. A national emergency was declared in July 1997, after which the 
Ecuadorian government partnered with the European Commission for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Protection and other international NGOs already operating in the country.  
In September 1997, the Ministry of Public Health planned and executed a mitigation 
plan, which included vaccination, medical supplies acquisition, and contingency plans at 
 
3 Under an agreement between the Government of Ecuador and the Corporacion Andina 
de Fomento (CAF) or Andean Development Corporation - Development Bank of Latin 
America (ECLAC 1998). 
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local and provincial levels. However, according to the OPS report (2000,179-180), those 
previous actions did not have the required strength and continuity, mainly because of the 
lack of permanent financial resources in the Ministry of Public Health's regular budget. 
Therefore, the World Bank authorized US$8 million to the Health Contingency Plan to 
confront ENSO.   
In October 1997, the interim president created the Unidad Coordinadora del 
Programa de Emergencia para Afrontar el Fenomeno El Niño (COPEFEN) or 
Coordination Unit of the Program to Confront El Niño Phenomena.  COPEFEN’s 
primary role was to operationalize the contingency plan the government elaborated to 
confront ENSO aftermath by financing prevention and rehabilitation works4. COPEFEN 
was "the recipient of the funds lent by the multilateral institutions for reconstruction 
projects" (Solberg et al. 2003, 14). However, a "clear" definition of how to distribute the 
resources provided by IDB, World Bank, and other international donors was absent 
(Gasparri et al. 1999).    
In July 1998, Ecuador also created the Corporación Ejecutiva para la 
Reconstrucción de Zonas Afectadas por el Fenómeno del Niño (CORPECUADOR) or the 
Executive Corporation for the Reconstruction of Zones Affected by the El Niño 
Phenomena. CORPECUADOR would receive money from national incomes to "directly 
and autonomously" define, design, contract, and monitor the reconstruction projects 
(Solberg et al. 2003,10)5. Three main national incomes will finance this entity: 0.7% of 
 
4 In 2002, COPEFEN expanded its competences to confront all kind of disasters, not only 
the ENSO aftermath. 
5 In the year 2006 CORPECUADOR managed roughly US$50 million per year  
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banana exports, 25% of Fondo de Solidaridad profits, and 10% of the increment of State 
participation of oil sales (Official Record # 378, issued on August 7, 1998). Both 
organizations CORPECUADOR and COPEFEN concentrated large amounts of money, 
while some national ministries weakened (Solberg et al. 2003).  
In sum, the main criteria for providing public welfare in ENSO’s aftermath were 
the abundant reconstruction works in the entire country, while policies addressing 
disaster prevention and post-disaster management were absent. Additionally, the 
government only undertook disaster relief actions starting in July 1997, even though 
ENSO had already impacted the country since the beginning of the year. D'Ercole & 
Trujillo (2003, 113) argue that Ecuadorian authorities acted late because of the "lack of 
enough criteria to discriminate between types of risk and, consequently, to identify 
vulnerabilities."  Similarly, the 1998 report (CAF 1998) denounces that those policies 
regarding disaster management did not internalize the meaning of risk management, 
neither did it discriminate between vulnerability and risk.  
At the international level, the ENSO 1997-1998 aftermath paved the way to 
address disasters in Latin America. The extensive damage ENSO caused aroused concern 
among the Presidents of the Comunidad Andina de Naciones or Andean Community of 
Nations: Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela. By 2000, the Andean 
community created the Andean Regional Program for Prevention and Disaster Risk 
Reduction. The regional initiative fostered disaster management planning among the 
Andean countries in the following years.  
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Disaster management going into the twenty-first century 
At the start of the twenty first century, initiatives on disaster management 
flourished on the national agenda in response to the series of natural disasters the 
previous decade imprinted on Ecuador.  By January 2000, the country struggled again 
with political turmoil and reached the most profound economic crisis. Another 
democratically-elected president resigned in the middle of a strong coup and the Vice-
President took power. In 2001, the National Planning Office and the Ministry of 
Environment issued the National Program for Natural Disasters Prevention and Risk 
Management in Ecuador, under the UN Disaster and Risk Reduction program and the 
Andean regional initiative umbrella (ODEPLAN 2001). The program aimed to 
systematize disaster management by targeting prevention, monitoring, inter-institutional 
articulation, and financial investment for disaster mitigation. An overarching criterion on 
enhancing local capacities infused the program, including the study of vulnerabilities and 
risks. However, Solberg et al. (2003) critique the political weakness the Ecuadorian 
planning office had to enhance risk management in the country since the Office was 
created by a Vice-president’s decree, without Congressional endorsement. 
Meanwhile, international NGOs continued dispersedly operating in the country. 
For instance, COOPI and OXFAM, European humanitarian NGOs, compiled the first 
systematization of information related to risk in Ecuador by creating natural hazard maps 
by each canton in Ecuador (Demoraes & D'Ercole 2001). The document became central 
to subsequent disaster management policymaking. However, the report notes, 
“phenomena whose extension is mainly local (frosts, gales, hail, forest fires, salinization 
of land) were not taken into account” (Demoraes & D’Ercole 2001, 4) in the analysis, the 
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report states.  Similarly, CORPECUADOR organized workshops to confront ENSO's 
impacts. The workshops aimed to raise awareness of citizens regarding garbage disposal, 
settlements in hazardous sites, and "to adopt a culture of risk prevention," (El Universo 
2002). In early 2007, the Coastal Resources Management Program delivered to the 
coastal municipalities and provincial councils 172 geological maps, which became a 
baseline for infrastructure development (Victor Osorio, Former CRMP Executive 
Director, interview with author July 11, 2018).  
At the international level, Ecuador continued to actively participate in the Andean 
group and its prevention program.  In 2002, the Andean initiative created the Comité 
Andino para la Prevención y Reducción de Riesgos de Desastres or Andean Committee 
for Prevention and Reduction of Risk Disasters (Andean Decision # 529). This 
committee, comprising regional representatives in charge of disaster management in their 
countries, realized on a polarized functioning and dispersed responsibilities managing 
disasters in the region. Thus, the committee's primary goal was: 
"To contribute to risk reduction and natural and anthropic disaster impacts that 
may occur in the territory of the Andean Subregion, through policies of 
coordination and promotion, strategies and plans, and the promotion of 
activities in prevention, mitigation, disaster preparedness, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, as well as through cooperation and mutual assistance and the 
exchange of experiences in the field” (CAN 2002, no pagination). 
 
In 2003, the European Commission and Andean group signed a financial 
agreement by which the Proyecto Apoyo a la Prevención de Desastres en la Comunidad 
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Andina or Project for Supporting Disaster Prevention in the Andean Community would 
contribute to vulnerability reduction and sustainable development promotion from 2005-
2009.  Rebotier (2016), who traces Andean countries’ efforts on disaster management, 
argues that said program would escort Andean countries toward risk management, 
emphasizing the anticipatory configuration of the risk, integrated to the development 
process and territorial planning. The regional initiatives resulted in conceptualizations on 
risk that "progressively" reconfigured the system toward integrated risk management, 
"connected with the ordering of space and the country's development" (Rebotier 2016, 
46).  
Since their inception, regional efforts in the Andean countries have consistently 
coordinated strategies with the United Nations Agency for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNDRR) in the institutionalization of risk management. Those strategies mainly 
included the Hyogo Action framework, an initiative to reduce disaster risk adopted by the 
UN member states in 2005. This framework is a policy goal for the international disaster 
management community designed to increase communities' response, resilience, and 
adaptive capacities. According to Grove (2013a), resilience building was formally 
institutionalized in disaster management, through such hegemonic framework. The next 
section reveals an anti-neoliberal adoption of UN initiatives on disaster and risk 
management.  
 
Anti-neoliberal resilience and a culture of risk in Ecuador 
The Ecuadorian government implemented anti-neoliberal state practices from 
January 15, 2007, when a left-led movement constitutionally obtained the Presidential 
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Office. Contrary to neoliberal de-regulation of state, the leftist government increased the 
regulatory functioning while implementing national planning of collective life (See 
chapter 3).  According to De La Torre (2010), the leftist government aimed to plan 
collective life elements in the country by radically changing the whole national legal 
framework.  Indeed, in a few years, the leftist government completely transformed the 
state's administration, by enacting a new constitution and a plethora of laws, regulations, 
and programs. In this section, I unpack the machinery assembling legal frameworks and 
local programs that created a culture of risk in Ecuador in general, and in the coastal 
province of Santa Elena in particular. I argue that hegemonic frameworks to manage risk 
and disaster pervaded the anti-neoliberal practices in Ecuador. 
 
Adoption of international frameworks of resilience since 2007 
According to Maria del Pilar Cornejo, the former Risk Management Secretary, the 
criteria underpinning RMS in Ecuador were the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks, which 
promote locals' resilience-enhancing. Furthermore, Ecuador became part of the UNDRR 
National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction, by which countries share disaster and 
risk best practices at global and regional levels to improve the Hyogo Framework of 
Action (UNDRR 2019).  Similarly, several official documents reveal that RMS’s primary 
goal was to increase resilience. For instance, a country document RMS issued in 2012, 
asserts:  
"The shift in approach that the National Decentralized Risk Management 
System has implemented, moving from a response to an integrated logic, 
presupposes substantial progress that should gradually result in a better 
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understanding of the process for disaster risk reduction and the increase of 
resilience" (SNGR 2012, 22). 
Similarly, reports RMS issued and submitted to the UNDRR highlight resilience 
as a country’s crucial strategy and goal (MRE 2009; MRE 2011; SNGR 2013). The 
criteria of resilience spread to the local levels through national or local plans, for 
instance, Santa Elena’s Flooding Contingency Plan issued in 2009 (GADMSE 2009). 
One of the main goals of the plan is to increase resilience of urban areas in Santa Elena 
Canton. Interestingly, the plan includes a definition of resilience based on UNDRR 
frameworks:  
“The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to threats to 
adapt, resist or change in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning 
and structure. It is determined by the degree to which the social system can self-organize 
to increase its capacity for learning about past disasters in order to achieve better 
protection and improve disaster risk reduction measures.” (GADM Santa Elena 2009, 
183). 
Overall, as I show in the following sections, the UN definition of resilience as the 
capacity to resist, respond and recover from disturbing events has been the criterion for 
traversing RMS in Ecuador. Thus, RMS' logic of prevention aims to mitigate potential 
disasters by building both infrastructure and a culture of risk throughout the country.  
 
The anti-neoliberal integrated logic of resilience building 
Since entering office in 2007, the leftist government intensely criticized the 
neoliberal technocracy managing disasters in Ecuador. Rejecting neoliberal experts’ 
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policymaking, the anti-neoliberal discourse aimed to incorporate “actors historically 
excluded from the logic of the capitalist market” (SENPLADES 2009, 10). Moreover, the 
anti-neoliberal practice in Ecuador aimed at a society that participates in all levels of the 
national administration. Thus, national planning promoted a vision towards the 
potentiation of human capacities by the active integration of members of society in 
policymaking (SENPLADES 2009). Consequently, the main criteria underpinning anti-
neoliberal state practices in Ecuador aimed to enhance the society, "not the market (as in 
neoliberalism), nor the State (as in the so-called "real socialism")" (SENPLADES 2007, 
45). In this way, the State should address a planned and participatory intervention to the 
most remote hamlet in the country.  
National planning also incorporated a risk management system in Ecuadorian 
society, through an integrated logic to manage disaster and risk (SENPLADES 2007). 
The integrated logic included raising population awareness of threats, a transversal 
inclusion of risk management intersecting development planning, and creating 
monitoring systems. Firstly, the government undertook a reorganization of the National 
Council of Security and the Civil Defense, particularly because disaster prevention and 
prediction were not their institutional priority. In 2008, the government created the 
Secretaría Técnica de Riesgo or the Technical Secretariat of Risk, a national office 
responsible for managing disasters in the country (Decree 1046-A), which later became 
the Risk Management Secretariat. The National Council of Security and the CD merged 
into the new national office, after which all former Civil Defense officeholders and 
volunteers merged with the RMS.   
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Since the creation of RMS, three main areas underpinned its administration: 
Technical, Social and Response. The scope of the Technical Area aimed to identify and 
reduce risk by generating technical inputs (geological, hydrological, and so on) toward 
risk reduction policy. The Social Area addressed enhancing or strengthening capacities 
throughout the country. Social construction is the area “by which risk management 
extended across Ecuadorians' everyday lives,” asserts Enrique Ponce, former Risk 
Management Coordinator in Santa Elena (interview with author August 30, 2018). The 
Response Area operates particularly for disaster relief – this was the most notable area 
during red or orange codes (levels of threats and disasters).  
According to the 2008 Constitution, protection of the population must encompass 
all levels: education, healthcare, social security, habitat and housing, culture, leisure, 
communication and freedom of expression, scientific and traditional knowledge, and risk 
management.  In this sense, risk management became a national policy, critical in the 
national system to address social welfare.  The policy was embedded with an integrated 
logic of prevention, preparedness and vulnerability reduction. Article 389 states:   
"The State shall protect persons, communities and nature against the 
adverse impacts of natural or human-made disasters by risk prevention, 
disaster mitigation, restoration and improvement of social, economic and 
environmental conditions, to minimize the condition of vulnerability."  
 Article 389 also outlines the primary duties of the technical body guiding risk 
management:  
- to identify existing, potential, external or internal risks,  
- to create and communicate timely access to manage risk,   
 
131 
- mandatory incorporation of risk management in public and private spheres,  
- to build up capacities to identify and address risk and vulnerability reduction,  
- timely provision of funds to warrant the risk management system proper 
functioning at national and local levels. 
Thus, Article 389 aims to create a culture of risk in Ecuador through a logic 
centered in notions of preparedness and vulnerability reduction, pervading the whole 
country to secure Ecuadorians. Article 390 suggests that the government will achieve this 
through the principle of subsidiary decentralization (See chapter 3), a de-concentration of 
competences by which the national government transfers to local governments the 
responsibility for administering social, ecological and economic arrangements.  Thus, all 
territorial regimes must organize their territory by planning their development agenda as 
well as their territorial ordering.  Such agenda should include risk management criteria 
according to the different levels of governance stipulated in the constitution.  As shown 
in Table 2, risk management constitutionally permeated all levels of governance.  
The 2009 national plan also addresses the country’s vulnerability to natural and 
anthropic threats. In response, a logic of prevention permeated the anti-neoliberal 
rationale for reducing environmental vulnerability. Thus, adequate planning and 
development of land use management can prevent many disasters. Additionally, 
prevention must strengthen "the capacities of different actors that can intervene in crisis 
prevention of natural disasters, and so on" (SENPLADES 2009, 101). The criterion was 
to "protect the environment and evaluate the risks of the natural disaster by taking 
precautions and implementing mitigation measures" (SENPLADES 2009, 67). In Section 
8, the plan also includes a section titled "Integral management and risk reduction" in 
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which the national plan reveals the importance of transversally incorporating the risk 
variable in the planning and implementation of all public works. In doing so, the plan 
aimed to reduce population and infrastructural vulnerability.  However, this new logic of 
managing and preventing risk in Ecuador required additional changes to the Ecuadorian 
legal framework.  
 
Autonomous and 
Decentralized 
Governments  
Risk Management Scope (2008 Constitution) 
National  Article 261 item 8: Exclusive competence on disaster 
management. 
Provincial Article 263 item 3: To execute works in river basins and 
micro-basins. 
Municipalities 
(Cantons) 
Article 264: 
Item 10: Delimit, regulate, authorize and control the use of 
sea beaches, riverbanks and riverbeds, lakes and lagoons, 
without prejudice to the limitations established by law.  
Item 13: Manage prevention services, protection, relief and 
fire extinction. 
Parrish Article 267: Only in coordination with upper levels of 
governance.  
 
Table 2. Risk Management Roles De-concentration. Elaborated by author.  
Source: 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution 
 
Thus, the leftist government issued the Law of Public and State Security (O.R. # 
35, Sept 28, 2009) which mentions risk prevention among the principles of public and 
state security (Art. 4). Additionally, the law transferred the National Council of Security 
into the Ministry of Security Coordination and upgraded the RMS to the rank of a 
ministry. Thus, the Technical Secretary of Risk Management became the National 
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Secretary of Risk Management (Executive Decree #42, Oct 20, 2009). Later, 
CORPECUADOR, the institutional body created for reconstructing zones damaged by 
ENSO 1997-1998, merged with the RMS (Executive Decree # 208, January 07, 2010).  
In September 2010, the Executive Decree #486 updated RMS regulations. This 
decree connects risk management with the constitutional subsidiary principle, explained 
above. On the one hand, the decree’s Article 26 states RMS’s responsibility for training 
officials, community leaders, and the general population to developing skills on 
prevention, risk reduction, and mitigation.  On the other hand, Article 19 stipulates Risk 
Management System decentralization and transversality:    
"The National Decentralized System of Risk Management is compound[ed] 
by the Units of Risk Management of all public and private institutions in the 
local, regional and national levels" (emphasis added).   
In sum, the Ecuadorian government had the responsibility and the duty of 
securing the population and worked to expand RMS to all levels of societal 
interrelation (public or private). As Ecuador's then-Minister of Defense Maria 
Fernanda Espinoza stated during the opening session of the 4th Regional Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas: risk management must shift from national 
policy to a local practice under the logic of risk.  
"No disaster is a natural phenomenon. If it were, it would be inevitable. 
Disasters in most cases are the result of human error or ignorance. That is 
why the management of risk is our responsibility." (UNISDR-SGR 2014, 38)    
Under this governmental rationale of risk management responsibility, a culture of 
risk emerged in the country. According to the new legal framework, public and private 
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institutions were required to organize risk management units.  The next section 
documents how the leftist government mobilized disaster and risk management to the 
most remote settlement and individuals in the country in the following years, and thereby, 
a culture of risk pervaded Ecuador.   
 
The anti-neoliberal risk management machinery pervading Ecuadorians lives   
 The legal framework on security introduced by the anti-neoliberal governmental 
ruling Ecuador since 2007, demanded risk management intervention in all levels of 
collective life. The National Decentralized Risk Management System ensembled a 
governmental machinery which normalized a culture of risk in the whole country. In this 
section, I show how the governmental machinery traversed local governments under risk 
reduction, mitigation, and resilience enhancing criteria.  
Risk management mandatorily spread through local levels of governance, after 
issuing the Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y 
Descentralización or Organic Code for Territorial Organization, Autonomy and 
Decentralization (CTOAD), in October 2010. Mainly, the regulation focuses on territorial 
management under the subsidiary principle (Art. 390, 2008 Constitution): 
decentralization and de-concentration of functions. Overall, CTOAD describes roles, 
functions, and responsibilities of every type of ADGs: Regional, Special Regimes, 
Prefecture, Municipality, and Parish levels. According to the law, municipal ADGs have 
exclusive control over territorial ordering, land use, and disaster risk reduction. As a 
result of this law, municipal administrations directly assumed risk management as one of 
several functions. Specifically, Article 140 transfers natural or anthropic threat 
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management to municipal administration, however, policies, plans, strategies, programs, 
communication supplies, etc. remain RMS’s responsibility. Thus, by law, risk 
management shifted from the national to the local level. However, this new arrangement 
of local administration was not only an issue of adopting a territorial organization, but the 
lack of municipal budget complicated the de-concentration of risk management.  
RMS tackled the financial concern by introducing the Risk Management 
Financing Program, in agreement with Banco del Estado (BEDE), a state bank that funds 
development programs. Overall, the program funded municipalities to build mitigation 
and prevention infrastructure by subsidizing 50% of the investment. The funding 
priorities were preventing natural or anthropic impacts by building infrastructure, such as 
water systems, sewer systems, road systems, and seawalls to protect beach erosion, 
retaining walls to define riverbeds, and other related work toward risk mitigation. Under 
RMS approval, BEDE distributed funds throughout all provinces in Ecuador.  
Simultaneously, RMS addressed ADGs regulatory gaps by implementing the 
Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Reduction Estimation project at the municipal level.  The 
program, sponsored by the UN Development Program and the European Commission of 
Humanitarian Aid Disaster Preparedness Program (DIPECHO), aimed to estimate socio-
economic, political, legal and institutional vulnerabilities of municipalities. Thus, during 
2010-2011, RMS analyzed 1) socio-economic vulnerabilities, 2) decision-making 
autonomy of each community and the possibility of creating and implementing risk 
management actions under such autonomy, 3) municipal ordinances regarding risk 
regulations, and 4) how municipalities were administering risk management following 
locals' everyday activities. Project outcomes are preliminary cartography on vulnerability, 
 
136 
statistical analyses, and recommendations for future implementation — inputs for risk 
management units at the municipal level. Ultimately, the DIPECHO-sponsored project 
designed a methodology that allows municipalities to coordinate development and 
territorial ordering, including decisions on disaster risk reduction (SNGR 2013).    
Three main areas operationalized RMS’s transversal scope: Technical, Social, and 
Response. They are not, specifically, an organizational chart of the secretary. Instead, the 
areas act as an umbrella for the administrative organization of the national secretary.  
Thus, the technical area generates inputs for risk reduction. The identification of risk and 
vulnerabilities joins a multidisciplinary technical group (experts in geology, hydrology, 
oceanography, among others) to identify risk, vulnerabilities, threats, and so on. The 
second RMS' range of activity is the social area, also known as Enhancing Capabilities 
area, which comprises all levels of collective life, by addressing participatory 
methodologies, including training. “Risk management traversed the whole country 
through “Enhancing Capabilities,” argues Leonardo Echeverría, former Risk 
Management Director in Santa Elena (interview with author August 12, 2018). Thus, 
from public to private institutions and from national to local levels, RMS reached the 
most remote localities, generating a culture of risk. The third area of RMS, Response, 
became relevant when a threat was close to impacting any site, at which point RMS 
accordingly activated orange or red codes.  
The anti-neoliberal risk management in Ecuador adopted the UNISDR 
methodology to respond to threats and manage disasters. This methodology activates a 
Comité de Operaciones de Emergencia or Emergency Operation Committee (EOC) to 
confront a localized threat. EOC is a high-level decision-making group which coordinates 
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an emergency, with the primary goal of risk reduction and disaster response by the 
orderly activating of different levels of Mesas de Trabajo or Technical Working Groups 
(TWG).  
While EOC was the top-level decision-making body during a disaster, "in times of 
peace" – as Ecuadorian Risk Management officials describe periods of no emergency – 
EOC will focus on coordinating risk reduction and capacity enhancing as part of response 
preparation. EOC6 operated at provincial and municipal levels by activating different 
TWG levels: technical, advice, decision-making. TWG detected the need for any 
mitigation or prevention measure at the local level and informed the upper level of 
decision-making. In the case of the Provincial EOC, the Governor and Zonal Directors 
took decisions and followed up mitigation works for lessening adverse impacts. 
Similarly, a EOC and TWG operated at municipal level decision-making on prevention, 
in the elaboration of a risk reduction agenda.    
Thus, since 2008, risk management practice has expanded exponentially 
throughout the country. For instance, the report Avances de Gestion de Riesgos 2008-
2013 or Risk Management Advancements 2008-2013 (SNGR 2014), details the following 
RMS achievements:   
- 665 Risk Management (RM) Community Committees created, 321 elaborated 
their RM Community Plans, practiced 181 drills, and created 67 RM Community 
Networks. Additionally, 701 Schools practiced evacuation drills.   
- 87 Climate Forums in the all 24 Ecuadorian provinces.   
 
6 Later on, EOC changed their name to Comités de Gestión de Riesgos or Risk 
Management Committees. However, the 2014 Risk Management Handbook uses the 
Spanish acronym COE/CGR in the whole document. 
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- All 24 provinces' RM units trained with the RM Committee Handbook. 
- 3 Provincial Governors meetings to implement Risk Reduction Agendas. 
- 19 Risk Reduction Agendas implemented and led by Governors.   
The same document shows communication strategies RMS applied to reach the 
most remote Ecuadorian:   
- The Caravana de Gestión de Riesgos por el Buen Vivir or RM Convoy for the 
Good Living visited 84 cantons to disseminate RM policies through sociocultural 
activities and distribution of brochures to alert the population of threats.   
- Throughout the project, Reducción de Riesgos en la Comunidad Educativa 
Frente a Amenazas de Origen Natural or Risk Reduction in the Scholar 
Community Exposed to Natural Threats, roughly 3000 schools elaborated Risk 
Reduction Plans. RMS trained roughly 35,000 teachers and 16,000 community 
members.    
- One hundred and fifty-six campaigns provided more than three million people 
with clear information on preventing risks of a tsunami, forest fires, flooding, 
mudslides, or seismic activity. 
Furthermore, the same report shows the increasing participation of municipalities 
in risk management strategies. By 2008, only 2% of cantons had signed the agreement 
with RMS to work together on risk reduction. By 2011, agreements increased by 16%, 
and by 2013, 31% of cantons had RM Units (departments) operating. By 2014, more than 
50% of the municipal ADGs had adopted risk management into their administration. In 
addition, by 2013 RMS had trained 101 of Ecuador’s 221 cantons in organizing the RM 
department, and 70 had incorporated risk management in their planning. Although risk 
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management machinery had reached municipal administration, RM departments aimed to 
mobilize risk at the community level. The next section addresses risk management in 
Santa Elena to reveal risk management at rural levels of administration.  
      
Resilience building and risk management in the province of Santa Elena   
Santa Elena is the southwestern and newest province of Ecuador. The province 
has 112 miles (180 kilometers) of shoreline with particular climatic threats due to the 
geographical components: a range in the west, estuarine zones in the north, and the 
Pacific Ocean in the east. The second level of administrative sub-division in Ecuador is 
cantons (or municipalities). Thus, Santa Elena is also the name of one of the three 
municipalities comprising the Santa Elena Province. The canton of Santa Elena has an 
urban parish (third level of government), also called Santa Elena, which occupies 5% of 
the cantonal territory. The other 95% of Santa Elena's municipal territory comprises six 
rural parishes: Atahualpa, Chanduy, Colonche, Manglaralto, San José de Ancón, and 
Julio Moreno. Rural parishes comprise 152 rural villages, most of them grouped in 68 
communities known as comunas, which are common-property territories ruled by a 
special regime (Law of Communes) since 1937.  Consequently, the province of Santa 
Elena comprises provincial, municipal (or cantonal), parish and comunal or community 
levels interweaving local governance.  In this section, I trace anti-neoliberal 
governmentality addressing risk management among the rural communities of Santa 
Elena.  
After enacting Santa Elena into a province in November 2007, the leftist 
government introduced numerous changes and new actors in local governance. The 
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province created a Governor's office, a Prefecture, and a Zonal Government Building. In 
that building, the national government housed several branches of ministries and 
secretariats, including Tourism, Public Works, Education, Health, Foreign Affairs 
(migration services), Telecommunications, Agriculture and Livestock, Energy and Mines, 
etc., to execute the strategies of national planning in Santa Elena, while locals were 
appointed to  most of the new governmental positions. Similarly, in 2009, RMS opened 
an office in the Zonal Government Building. 
The inaugurated Provincial Coordination of Risk Management, later called RM 
Direction, aimed to promote and implement RMS strategies in the province of Santa 
Elena. Under the anti-neoliberal participatory principle introduced into the national 
planning, RMS in Santa Elena promoted the creation of technical committees to address 
El Niño phenomena. Concurrently, other sectoral committees functioned in the province. 
Those committees informed the Provincial EOC, by which the Governor and Zonal 
Directors took decisions and followed up with mitigation works. Similarly, EOC’s 
participative model operated at the municipal level. An example of the scalar and the 
informative process of decision-making in Santa Elena is the First Contingency Plan for 
Flooding issued in 2009.  
RMS' provincial office worked together with the municipality of Santa Elena and 
other stakeholders through the TWG methodology, briefly explained in the previous 
section.  RMS provincial office in Santa Elena also created Risk Management 
Committees (Resolution No. SGR 367-24), another participative process gathering public 
and private stakeholders, to analyze municipal issues. Risk Management Committees also 
operated at the parish and comunas levels. I argue that all participatory encounters 
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produced new experiences to the locals, re-conceptualized risk, and located the need for 
securitization at the center of the comuneros.  
The initial goal of the provincial office was to identify risks and vulnerabilities in 
Santa Elena. RMS achieved it through participatory techniques. RM officials I 
interviewed admit they had initial data elaborated by foreign and local agencies. 
However, the anti-neoliberal participatory scope required a bottom-up approach to 
promote the integrated logic of risk. Thus, the provincial office of RMS created spaces to 
generate local input on furthering risk management policies. Applying the TWG 
methodology, Santa Elena’s RMS staff worked for roughly three years gathering citizens' 
concerns and ideas for addressing local risks and vulnerabilities. The TWG connected 
different levels of participation, from national RMS officials to local government 
officials, to community levels of organization and vice-versa (Emilio Ochoa, former 
RMS staff, interview with the author August 31, 2018). Thus, the bottom-line data 
emerged from the community, including ancestral practices to confront natural disasters. 
For instance, RMS officials reviewed local calendars that annually announce the 
comuneros about drought periods, insect and other infestations, harvesting times, ideal 
times for controlling scrubs and weeds, and so on (E3 interview with author June 16, 
2018). Similarly, "the comuneros showed us the cemetery area is the best site to evacuate 
to during flooding or severe rainfall," comments a former RM official in Santa Elena (E2, 
interview with author June 16, 2018). Thus, active collaboration and participation 
allowed RMS officials to facilitate a process centered on criteria of risk.   
RMS staff also gathered collective memories regarding natural disasters. 
However, it was not an easy task for RMS officials deployed in Santa Elena. Comuneros 
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do not easily remember natural disasters that have affected their communities, argue 
several RM officials I interviewed.    
"The population tends a little to forget what affected them.... they think that 
[disaster] will never happen again" (E17, RMS official, interview with 
author August 12, 2018).    
"Maybe they have not learned the lesson and will still make the same 
mistakes" (Richard Flores, RMS Unit Director at the Prefecture of Santa 
Elena, interview with author July 31, 2018).   
"They consider that the only one capable of deciding if something was going 
to happen or not is God and that they are in the hands of God" (Enrique 
Ponce, former RMS Provincial Coordinator, interview with author August 
30, 2018).     
"Comuneros in general, particularly in Libertador Bolívar, forget about past 
experiences and repeat them"(David Zambrano NGO Director, interview 
with author August 12, 2018). 
 Similarly, comuneros I interviewed did not reflect much on disasters’ aftermath 
despite ENSO 1982-1983 and 1997-1998 having significantly impacted the local 
economy. Instead, they perceived that nature will continue impacting them, and they have 
to adapt to the change such events bring into their lives. They argue that people are 
unable to anticipate a natural catastrophe or its intensity. For instance, Smeling Suarez, a 
comunero leader, asserts: 
"We do not raise awareness .... we do not pay much importance to the events" 
(interview with author June 22, 2018)  
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Thus, RMS workshops addressed memory recovery by applying the practice-
theory-practice methodology, a participatory methodology for social intervention 
developed in Costa Rica, which is derived from everyday life, explains Enrique Ponce, 
former RMS Director (interview with author August 30, 2018). The methodology aimed 
to raise awareness by appealing to emotions based on past experiences.  Ponce recounts 
that RMS-promoted workshops in Santa Elena connected comuneros’ past experiences to 
past emergencies, by guiding the comuneros to remember the events (floods caused by 
ENSO, or problems of water deficit). When remembering these events, the comuneros 
realized that disasters could happen again.  "Sometimes they remembered their 
experiences with much fun, others were unfortunate," comments a former RMS 
technician in Santa Elena who participated in those workshops (E2 interview with author 
June 16, 2018). Thus, sadness discloses comuneros’ mistake, states another former RMS 
staff of Santa Elena who also participated in the workshops (E3 interview with author 
June 16, 2018). For instance, remembering crops lost, mudslides or severe raining 
damages, made comuneros sensible to El Niño’s impacts (E11 interview with author July 
10, 2018). By bringing up emotions, regrets, sensitivity, RMS staff successfully 
connected risk management's preventive criteria to the comuneros' everyday lives.  In this 
way, RMS officials introduced worldwide hegemonic concepts such as risk, threat, 
vulnerability, and prevention. Once locals identified the risk factors, the RM team asked 
them for alternatives to reduce such factors. All the information was fed to upper levels 
of decision-making and came back to the local level in the form of strategies to reduce 
vulnerability. 
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Additional measures – known as non-structured measures –  to reduce 
comuneros’ vulnerability accompanied RMS machinery. Among the non-structured 
measures evacuation routes implementation, community emergency plans, emergency 
brigades. Initially, RMS officials coordinated and participated in evacuation drills at 
schools and created brochures, games and educational material to transfer knowledge to 
students. Currently, the Ministry of Education has an RM policy to address prevention in 
the entire country’s school system.  On a monthly basis, the school staff and students 
practice evacuation procedures in case of a catastrophe of any kind. They are known as 
simulacros or drills. According to the Principal of a school in rural Santa Elena,   
"The more drills done, the more of a habit that is created. They create awareness 
before any event" (E4, Comunera leader, interview with author July 3, 2018)  
Indeed, according to a former RMS official in Santa Elena (E3 interview with 
author June 16, 2018), comuneros know what to do, where to go, how to act. Thus, while 
the comuneros voluntarily accepted RMS' technical intervention, the need to be prepared 
also emerged as normal (Chapter 2). Following international frameworks on disaster 
management, RMS in Ecuador conceived that survival relies in large part on people 
taking care of themselves, and not merely on a quick governmental response to the 
emergency. In doing so, RMS aimed to strengthen locals' capacity as first responders in 
the event of a catastrophe, giving locals more opportunity to subsist when prone to a 
disaster.  
A biopolitical approach to social construction in Santa Elena 
In the case of Santa Elena, training enhanced locals’ capacity to respond to natural 
threats. Kevin Grove (2014b) argues that disaster-management training de-territorializes 
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local knowledge of hazards, and the case of Santa Elena instantiates this argument. By 
de-territorializing knowledge of hazards, Grove points out the displacement of local 
relationship with natural threats and traditional responses to disasters, while new risk-
related ideas are introduced.  For instance, RMS in Ecuador introduced the idea of 
tsunami among the comuneros, particularly after evacuation drills became regular. 
However, there is no memory of a tsunami in Santa Elena. Elders I interviewed do not 
remember stories about the Pacific Ocean's waves battering the coast in a manner that 
destroyed a vast territory. A local story about a community called Olón (translated as 
Huge Wave) tells that the name came about because a giant wave supposedly battered the 
community. On the contrary, another story among the comuneros, argues that the name of 
the comuna Olón originated from the name of the Cacique Olonche. Indeed, there is no 
official record of a tsunami impacting Santa Elena's coastlines.  
The 1993-1996 Development Agenda mentions that tsunamis threaten 10% of the 
population settled on the shoreline. The report was issued after ENSO 1997-1998 
mentions tsunamis three times as a possible threat. However, it does not document a 
tsunami having impacted the Ecuadorian coast (CAF 1998). OXFAM’s analysis of 
natural threats by canton includes a section devoted to earthquakes and tsunamis. The 
report mentions that earthquakes provoke "seaquakes or tsunamis" (OXFAM 2001, 10) 
and merely reports that two cases occurred in 1906 and 1958. Both events affected the 
northern coasts of Ecuador, in the province of Esmeraldas and the southern coast of 
Colombia. Willington Renteria, an expert at the Oceanographic Institute of Ecuador, 
states " there is scarce data of a local tsunami that has hit the [Ecuadorian] coasts" 
(Renteria 2007, 212). However, Reintería noted there were reports that on December 12, 
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1953, an earthquake occurred near the border of Ecuador and Peru that caused a tsunami 
in Japan and increased sea level in Santa Elena by 0.20m.   
I do not deny the possibility of a tsunami hitting the coast of Santa Elena, yet, my 
argument is that the possibility of a tsunami moved the daily coastal life into “a new set 
of worries” (Giddens 1999, 3). Specialized analyses of tsunami threats in Ecuador are not 
new. Since 1976, Ecuador joined the Tsunami Warning System as part of the global 
network of tide gauges. In addition, the country appointed the Ecuadorian oceanographic 
office to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center located in Hawaii (SNGR 2012). During 
the last decades of the 1900s, the Oceanographic Institute also evaluated and modeled 
tsunamis. Finally, in 2007, the Ecuadorian Oceanographic Institute created the Centro 
Nacional de Alerta de Tsunamis or Tsunami Warning National Center, which monitors 
24/7 seismic occurrence in the Pacific Ocean, and keeps the government informed about 
tsunami events in the world (SNGR 2012).  
Later on, the Ecuadorian government installed buoys and tide gauges to obtain 
real-time information, and devices to determine water column deformation from the open 
sea (SNGR 2012). However, as I argue, knowledge about tsunamis must be transferred to 
the community:    
"Another objective of the National Center for Tsunami Warning is to transfer 
information about tsunamis to the community, through written media and other 
means. Therefore, INOCAR [Ecuadorian Oceanographic Office] plans activities 
aimed at improving knowledge about tsunamis in mainland and island coastal 
populations" (SNGR 2012, 73), emphasis added.   
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RMS achieved the transfer of information about tsunamis and other kinds of 
natural disasters to rural seaside villagers by promoting numerous communitarian 
prevention programs. The goal was making people aware, so they are able to protect 
themselves. In doing so, RM built resilient communities (El Universo 2017, emphasis 
added).   
Thus, while the subsidiary principle allowed risk to become transversal to all 
levels of governance, the capacity-building component, achieved locating risk at the 
center of the comuneros. According to this culture of risk, if nature is a permanent threat, 
then locals must be alerted and prepared to respond appropriately. However, several RMS 
staff members emphasize the peculiarity of each community to respond to disasters. In 
the case of Santa Elena, “the comuneros put forward their collective support, there are no 
barriers that inhibit their solidarity,” states Richard Flores, Municipal RM Director 
(interview with author July 31, 2018). Paradoxically, “Comuneros self-organization is not 
the product of RM programs.” RM programs are designed to work in “urban settlements 
rather than rural conditions,” argued the interviewee. In addition to the organizational 
capacity-building, structural measures were also part of the risk management machinery 
in Ecuador. In the next section I address anti-neoliberal governmentality to protect 
beaches at Santa Elena.  
Armoring beaches: the structural measure to protect Santa Elena    
Relentlessly, waves and tides act upon the shoreline moving sand or carving 
headlands, like cliffs. Such dynamic forces remove coastal land while water supplants the 
land, eroding or shrinking the shoreline. In addition, other stressors, such as sea level rise 
and ENSO, also threaten shorelines. Nowadays it is usual to see all kind of physical 
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construction between the sea and the land aiming to control the sea and to mitigate its 
threats. Quite often, we can be walking through a beautified promenade without noticing 
it is built on the top of a seawall. Seawalls are vertical shore-parallel walls to prevent the 
beach and coastal infrastructure from the detrimental influence of huge ocean waves and 
flooding (Sadeghi et al. 2018). This type of coastal protection particularly aims to reduce 
erosion and resist waves’ energy. Revetments, or ripraps are other types of structures to 
protect sandy beaches from erosion or shorelines. Overall, “seawalls, revetments, and 
bulkheads reduce the impact of wave energy and associated erosion on coastal assets 
directly behind them along vulnerable shorelines” (Beavers et al. 2016, 101). Artificial 
barriers are also built in the sea to dissipate the energy of waves, such as offshore 
breakwaters built parallel to the shore. Furthermore, Duggan and Hubbard (2010, 187) 
argue that the construction of physical structures to protect beachfront "is expected to 
escalate in response to the combination of expanding human populations, coastal erosion, 
and sea level rise."  In the province of Santa Elena, the construction of coastal protection 
increased during the anti-neoliberal state practices.  
However, the construction of coastal protection started in the years of 
governments practicing neoliberal formulas. The first one was built in La Libertad, one of 
the three cantons of Santa Elena Province. In 2003, La Libertad inaugurated five offshore 
breakwaters, and a seawall with a pedestrian promenade on top.  Later on, local 
government built a rock revetment on Montañita beach, a surfing hotspot comuna in the 
north of Santa Elena canton. Similarly, the largest cement production company in 
Ecuador built a protection wall in Comuna La Entrada. In 2006, the Coastal Resource 
Management Program financed protection walls in other coastal provinces (Cojimíes and 
 
149 
Bahía de Caráquez, Manabí, and Jambelí, and El Oro).  However, the effects of tidal 
waves and other factors continued in the Ecuadorian littoral. 
According to Enrique Sanchez, coastal engineer and seawall designer, 10% of the 
Santa Elena Province's shoreline is currently eroded, while erosive effects are threatening 
an additional 10% of the shoreline. Furthermore, sea level rise will erode low coasts, 
barrier coasts, and small mangrove areas and existing deltas in a couple of decades, 
argues Sanchez (2016). Additionally, low-flow rivers move down to the Pacific Ocean 
forming tidal ponds that intersperse with the river mouth and sandy beaches.  Drastically, 
during the rainy season (December to May) rivers are prone to extensive flooding. The 
river becomes a threat to the inhabitants settled next to the estero, as locals used to call 
the low-flow river. For instance, in 2010, flooding impacted 14,410 Santa Elenians.  
Between 2009 and 2011, waves battered some beaches in Santa Elena damaging 
infrastructure and putting the local tourism-led economy at risk.  
The Ecuadorian Constitution, Article 73, stipulates the state's duty to apply 
measures to prevent the destruction of ecosystems or permanent alteration of natural 
cycles. Additionally, the Constitution indicates that Ecuadorians have the right to benefit 
from the environment and natural wealth (Article 74), the responsibility to respect the 
rights of nature, and use natural resources rationally and sustainably (Article 83).  In this 
context, RMS is responsible for designing adequate risk reduction strategies but caring 
for nature as well. On the coast, RMS must protect beach and river mouth ecosystems 
while safeguarding the population. Among other norms, RMS issued Resolution No. 005-
2011 (OR #460, 2011) banning destruction or exploitation of the natural defenses of the 
beach, the occupation of berms and beaches' active zone with fixed structures, such as 
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cabins, eateries and any other type of structures. The resolution also exempts RMS from 
compliance with this obligation, as RMS must endorse and approve the execution of any 
infrastructure to safeguard the population.   
In compliance with the 2011 RMS resolution, the Secretariat launched the 
Prevention and Mitigation Program to Reduce Different Threats Risk. The program 
planned to invest US$ 96.5 million in national risk prevention for seven years (2011-
2017). It was RMS’ exclusive decision to endorse and approve construction in each 
province. In the case of coastal areas, the program determined the construction of 
flooding prevention infrastructure. The program also specifies hard and soft engineering 
interventions to protect the beach in coastal areas; examples of hard engineering are walls 
to canalize rivers and walls to reduce the erosion of beaches. Soft engineering includes 
planting suitable vegetation to avoid sliding slopes (such as guadúa cane or vetibet). 
Both the technical and the financial programs provided local governments tools to 
build mitigation infrastructure. Thus, the Prevention and Mitigation Program, along with 
the BEDE funding program, were part of RMS machinery extending down to local 
management. In Santa Elena, the provincial, the municipal and the parish development 
plans included the construction of walls to protect the population. Overall, those plans 
highlight the need for protecting the population from natural threats, particularly 
flooding, high tides, and ENSO.  In 2011, the Santa Elena municipality joined the 
agreement between RMS and BEDE, as the RM machinery was ready to protect Santa 
Elena's socio-ecological system by applying hard engineered solutions. 
During my fieldwork, I recorded six sites in the province of Santa Elena where 
national, provincial or municipal governments had built seawalls and river protections. 
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For instance, in the Comuna Chanduy, located in a southern parish of Santa Elena canton, 
a 427 meter (0.26 miles) long seawall currently protects the seafront (Figure 6). The 
primary goal of this coastal defense is to repair cliff sinking and prevent coastal erosion.  
Sanchez (interview date June 18, 2018) states that cliffs at the beach have retreated 0.5 
meters (2 feet) per year since 1983 and have 1 km (0.6 miles) of eroded coast. However, 
the government did not protect the southern area and locals are currently demanding that 
the seawall be extended to this area.  In Comuna Las Nuñez, the municipality of Santa 
Elena built a seawall in 2015.  This construction required moving two houses (family 
relocation), and several other houses lost roughly 2 meters (6.5 feet) of beach front.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Seawall at Chanduy. Source: Vision360 (2018) 
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Similarly, in La Entrada, the northern comuna in Manglaralto, the government 
reinforced the seawall built fifteen years before. Initially, this seawall was part of the 
social responsibility program of a private company (Figure 7).  Southern, a 493 meter 
(0.31 miles) long seawall protect the north beach at Libertador Bolívar. At the top of the 
seawall a promenade provides tourist recreational areas. An extension of 287 meters 
(0.17 miles) to the southern beach was still under construction as of September 2019.  
In the comunas of Montañita (Figure 8) and Manglaralto (Figure 9), the municipality 
reinforced protection walls previously built. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Coastal protection at Comuna La Entrada. Source: Author (2018) 
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Figure 8.  Seawall at Comuna Montañita. Source: Author (2018) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Seawall at Comuna Manglaralto. Source: author (2018) 
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The Prefecture of Santa Elena which, according to the General Code of Territorial 
Organization, Autonomy, and Decentralization, is responsible for river basins and micro-
basins, has also built mitigation works to prevent flooding in Santa Elena's cantons. For 
instance, the slow-flow rivers in Montañita, Manglaralto, and Libertador Bolívar (Figure 
10) are currently armored with retaining walls. Similarly, the Ministry of Transportation 
and Public Works built protection walls (translated in Spanish as Muro de Escolleras) in 
some areas of route E-15, which connects the coast of Ecuador from north to south. 
Notably, in Santa Elena canton, between the comunas of San Pablo and Pacoa, 1 km of 
seawall currently protects route E-15, which runs next to the Pacific Ocean.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.  River mouth of Atravezado River protection at Comuna Libertador 
Bolívar. Source: Coastman Foundation (2018) 
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Among its benefits, hard engineering stabilizes the upland and protects 
infrastructure. Conversely, shoreline armoring increases erosion on the beach adjacent to 
the wall and increases the loss of dry beach, thus decreasing the recreational use of the 
beach (Shipman et al. 2010). More concerning are the effects of man-made protection 
walls on marine habitats. Some academic works show changes in ecological function of 
marine organisms (Chapman and Underwood 2011). Moreover, some coastal states in the 
US have restricted and banned physical constructions along their shoreline (O’Connell 
2010). No reports on detriments have been as yet documented on Santa Elena’s armored 
beaches. The comuneros continue using the beach as their way to improve their 
economies. The communes of San Pablo, Olón, Ayangue, Palmar, Bolívar, San Antonio, 
San Pedro have built cabanas on the beach to offer a variety of tourist services. The 
requirement to fill basic needs, their desire for progress, is greater than the threats of the 
sea. The Comuneros promote their small tourist entrepreneurship, while RMS power 
diminishes through several changes in the national administration.    
 
The weakening of Ecuadorian risk management machinery 
Risk management decentralization and de-concentration processes eventually 
weakened the RMS machinery introduced under anti-neoliberal practices in Ecuador.  As 
a consequence of CTOAD’s decentralization and de-concentration mandate (see above 
table 4.1), the national secretariat went through a restructuring, while municipal 
governments assumed RM planning and functioning, argues a former RMS staff (E18 
interview with author June 13, 2018).  Indeed, since 2014, the RMS no longer builds 
infrastructure as this is the role of the local government.  
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Furthermore, the social construction area merged with other government 
departments. For instance, in 2014 the Ministry of Education created a National Direction 
of Risk Management, incorporating risk criteria and social construction into all levels of 
the national school system. Each school has an RM leader, and once per month students 
and staff practice evacuation drills (for earthquakes, flood, tsunami, etc.). In Santa Elena, 
the Ministry of Education practices drills and distributes educational material in 
collaboration with RMS officials.  
By 2018, Santa Elena’s RMS office had only two areas: monitoring and response, 
while staff also collaborate with other governmental offices. Thus, the situation room 
works monitoring threats 24/7 year-round.  In case of an emergency in the Province of 
Santa Elena, RM activates an EOC, by which the Technical Working Groups gradually 
actuate according to the level of damage caused by the event. Both EOC and TWG are 
interdisciplinary working groups with decision-making power to confront an emergency 
in accordance with the Risk Management Manual, issued in 2014. Additionally, the RMS 
office in Santa Elena joins the Ministry of Education to provide training (particularly 
drills) and education (capacity enhancing) using educational material.  
Since 2014, the RMS-BEDE project does not subsidize infrastructure 
construction. According to the RMS-BEDE agreement signed in 2011, BEDE subsidized 
50% of any risk reduction project (sometimes more than 50%), while RMS assumed the 
other 50%. However, since 2015, BEDE applies a credit line to municipalities that 
request funds for mitigation work. Thus, currently, local governments have to prudently 
manage their annual budget for building risk infrastructure.  Municipalities are 
responsible for managing their own risks, for developing and executing risk reduction 
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programs, developing response strategies to strengthen cities, and even designing 
recovery strategies in the event of a disaster. 
At the provincial level, the Prefecture of Santa Elena has a different agenda from 
the municipality of Santa Elena because the CTOAD stipulates two different areas of 
action for each local government. On the one hand, the municipality controls and 
regulates beaches, riverbanks, lakes, and lagoons, and manages prevention services. On 
the other hand, the prefecture is responsible for river basins and micro-basins.  In 
previous years, the prefecture was devoted to building river retaining walls in several 
comunas of Santa Elena, for instance, in Libertador Bolívar (Figure 10) and Manglaralto 
(Figure 11). Nowadays, the Prefecture's RM department is creating elaborate provincial 
programs to address Climate Change adaptation and to prevent forest fires (Juan Antón, 
current RM Director, interview with author, June 13, 2018).  
 
Figure 11.  Manglaralto river wall. Source: The author (2018) 
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At the national level, the April 16, 2016 earthquake (7.8 Richter scale) revealed 
the weakness of the RMS. The government failed in rapidly responding to the disaster 
and post-disaster recovery. (See Carrion et al. 2017). One year later, a new government 
took presidential office, introducing profound actions that reduced RMS’ power. On 
October 3, 2018, President Lenin Moreno signed the Decree No. 534-2018, derogating 
Executive Decree No. 42-2009, by which the Technical Secretariat of Risk Management 
became a National Secretariat of Risk Management in 2009. The decree 534-2018 
changed the name of RMS to National Service of Risk Management and Emergencies. 
Said decree also created the National Service of Risk Management and Emergencies 
Committee, an interdisciplinary committee responsible for regulating, planning and 
coordinating the National Decentralized Risk Management System. The committee 
integrates the President of Ecuador, the National Planning and Development Secretary, 
Housing and Urban Development Ministry, National Defense Ministry, Finance Ministry 
and the Director of the National Risk Management and Emergencies, who can participate 
but cannot vote in the committee.  
Thus, the former ubiquitous and powerful secretariat returned to being an office 
dependent on an inter-institutional committee, which will lead and coordinate risk 
management and emergencies. Alexandra Ocles, RMS Secretary at the time the president 
issued the decree reorganizing RMS, explained that those changes mean “that actions 
RMS has been taking must go up to the committee to be executed," (Radio Publica, 
October 11, 2018).  Furthermore, the current Ministry of Defense, a retired General, 
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submitted to the National Assembly, a proposal drawing together defense, strategic 
intelligence, security and risk prevention, as it was during the neoliberal regime. 
According to the former Risk Management Secretary, Pilar Cornejo, Moreno's 
decision "sets back risk management in Ecuador” (personal e-mail).  She argues that risk 
management in Ecuador comprises not only the last ten years of anti-neoliberal state 
practices, but also risk criteria started as far back as the early 1990s. Currently, the 
constitutional mandate is at risk, Cornejo states, because the Ministry of Defense follows 
a rigid command chain, top-bottom decision-making that ignores the bottom-up approach 
implemented by RMS.  
Significant here is the political instability that characterizes Ecuador. A decade of 
anti-neoliberalism filled RMS with autonomy and power. RMS could circumvent the 
weakness coming from the decentralization and de-concentration by enacting new laws. 
However, the new government moved RMS back, eventually minimizing RMS' 
autonomy and power. The new Servicio Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos y Emergencias 
or National Service of Risk Management and Emergencies will retain measures to train 
people as first responders. President Moreno justified RMS reorganization as part of the 
state's budget policy.  At the local level, RM responsibility stays within the municipal 
structure.  
However, as several current RM municipal officials argue, politicians are not 
truthfully concerned about prevention. The political decision is a significant issue when 
technically managing risk. Populist politicians are in search of voters during elections, 
and they take advantage of emergencies, argue some RM staff. Thus, emergencies locate 
politicians as key actors in meeting public needs. Then, the emergency gives the 
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politician a good chance of being re-elected.  Moreover, politicians do not understand the 
culture of risk promoted in the era of an anti-neoliberal rationale ruling the country, 
instead they focus on political benefits, viewing risk as merely technical. However, in 
actuality, risk is highly political. The risk is in the center of everyday lives since hazards 
have become a condition of the possibility of development (Reid 2018).  In Santa Elena, 
risk management criteria led decisionmakers to armor the beaches to protect the 
population and the tourism infrastructure, crucial for seaside comunas’ development. 
Conclusion: making resilient comuneros?   
In this chapter, I analyzed the neoliberal and the anti-neoliberal rationale for 
managing disasters in Ecuador in general, and the coastal province of Santa Elena, in 
particular. From 1980 to 2006, Ecuadorian governments espousing neoliberal practices 
engaged global trends on disaster management. The risk variable became part of 
sustainable development, a pivotal discourse organizing Ecuador’s modernization during 
the 1990s.  However, the triad development-environment-risk failed to confront natural 
disasters impacting the country during the same decade. In the coast of Ecuador, ENSO 
1997-1998 revealed legal mismatches mixed up prompt and appropriate responses to 
disaster relief. In addressing such concerns, the Ecuadorian governments paved the way 
for embracing international frameworks on disaster and risk management.  
As Pilar Cornejo, former RMS Secretary, states, the risk criteria started in the 
1990s, but the anti-neoliberal government embraced such concepts with the goal of 
improving the population’s wellbeing. To address disaster management failures, the anti-
neoliberal legal framework combined planning, development and risk management. 
Planning replaced the environment in the neoliberal triad, particularly because nature 
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became the primary threat to the population, after the catastrophes of the 1990s.  Viewing 
nature as a threat, then, the government adopted UNDRR frameworks to prevent and 
respond to natural disasters. Consequently, to construct more resilient and less vulnerable 
communities, RMS 1) imprinted a logic of prevention that locates nature as a threat, a 
culture of risk, and 2) intervened by building hard engineering.  Indeed, RMS spread a 
culture of risk throughout comuneros, along with armored beaches to protect socio-
ecosystems.  
A biopolitical approach to disaster and risk management in Ecuador unpacks the 
creation and introduction of a system of knowledge of risk and the techniques the anti-
neoliberal resilience building applied in the coastal comunas of Santa Elena.  The anti-
neoliberal State practices achieved a total re-conceptualization of disaster and risk 
management by de-centralizing it into local governance. Consequently, armored beaches 
now mitigate seaside villagers’ exposure to unpredictable hazards, while the comuneros 
have adopted this new discourse that centers potential risks in their everyday lives. RMS 
mobilized mechanisms of active participation and collaboration while the comuneros 
voluntarily accepted and adopted the culture of risk. In doing so, RMS aimed to 
strengthen locals' capacities for first responses in the case of a catastrophe. Then, locals 
had more opportunity to subsist when prone to a disaster. Comuneros are now aware of 
their vulnerability to floods, and rising sea levels, ENSO-related events, and tsunamis, 
but they are also trained to respond to a disaster. Ultimately, the risk machinery 
positioned a new set of worries, a new normality, strongly influencing their present 
affairs.   
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  Thus, in Santa Elena, RMS spatialized disaster through social and non-social strategies 
and techniques deployed in rural coastal areas. However, such bureaucratic, decentralized 
and participatory methods were not new to the comuneros of Santa Elena.  Prior to RMS, 
a long-lasting development program based on resilience in ecology criteria pervaded 
comuneros’ everyday lives. The next chapter analyzes the creation, functioning, and 
effects of this development program, which promoted the sustainable use of Santa 
Elena’s beaches. 
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CHAPTER V 
A different genealogy of resilience in Ecuador through integrated coastal resource 
management 
 
Since the 70s, sustainability had emerged as a critique of production-oriented 
resource management. The critique of this traditional resource management revealed 
entrusted distant technicians, who were ignorant of local conditions and overlooked 
human-environment complexity (Ostrom et al. 2007, Berkes et al. 2003). Furthermore, 
such conventional view assumed predictability and control of nature. However, command 
and control’s myopia led to management policies that weakened resource sustainability 
(Grove 2018a). Resilience in ecology converged with the critique of conventional 
management of resources, introducing uncertainty, adaptation, and pluralism in resource 
management (Berkes, 2010).  Thus, resilience ecologists incorporated the role of social 
institutions, organizations, networks, and agency into environmental management (Folke 
2016). Under this light, resilience scholars advocated for and promoted adaptive forms to 
manage resources. Adaptive management pursues ecosystem feedback through 
collaborative process between experts and local managers through the experience 
simulations at local level that will inform alternatives to improve resource management.  
Resilience ecologists broadened the scope of adaptive management by including 
governance of natural resources. According to Folke (2006), ecosystem management 
should incorporate ecological dynamics which entail a continuous learning from local 
knowledge and the importance of ecosystem feedbacks. In doing so, instead of command 
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and control resource management, governments should build adaptive capacity to deal 
with internal or external stressors in a multi-level governance, argues Folke. Similarly, 
Berkes et al (2003) argue that ecosystems governance should strength local self-
governance while connect local ecological feedback to higher scale governance 
institutions.  Consequently, adaptive governance advocates for governments transferring 
decision-making and power to a local scale within a circumscribed local authority 
(Olsson et al 2004).  However, adaptive governance does not supplant adaptive 
management techniques. Rather, “if adaptive management placed new demands on the 
process of managing and generating knowledge about complex ecosystems, adaptive 
governance places new demands on the governance system that forms the institutional 
context in which management and knowledge generation occurs” (Grove 2018a, 123).  In 
addition to monitoring back loops and enhancing self-organization, several case studies 
also revealed the need for participatory processes in adaptive forms of governance (Dietz 
et al. 2003).  Thus, adaptive governance allocates responsibility and authority among 
national and local levels of governance while fosters stakeholders’ active participation. 
Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel prize economist who became an influential resilience 
scholar, provided foundational analysis to the critique of global formulas distant from 
local realities that manage natural resources (Ostrom et al. 2007, Ostrom and Janssen 
2004, Ostrom 2008, Grove 2018a). After acknowledging human-environment complexity 
introduced by resilience ecologists, resource management should diagnose and monitor 
the multiple processes occurring in nested SES, claims Ostrom (Ostrom et al. 2007, 
Ostrom 2008).  In this sense, the back loops of the adaptive cycle should inform 
environmental managers to design policies according to local realities. According to 
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Grove (2018a), who traces the development of adaptive management and adaptive 
governance, among Ostrom’s major contributions were eight principles to design 
successful management of resources. Through these principles, Ostrom aimed to counter 
resource management panaceas to which locals should adapt, since those resource 
management mainly responded to market-based solutions or state-led plans (Grove 
2018a).  Additionally, argues Grove, those principles for institutional design allows to 
identify governance levels and policy interventions toward improving environmental 
management outcomes.  
This chapter traces a methodology that adopted Ostrom’s principles to manage 
coastal resources: Integrated Coastal Management (ICM). In the early 70s, the Coastal 
Resource Center of the University of Rhode Island (CRC-URI) developed and 
implemented ICM methodology in the US, to address coastal resources management 
deterioration as a consequence of federal and state governance mismatches.  Ecuador 
adopted an Integrated Coastal Management in the mid 80s pursuing Ecuadorian coastal 
areas conservation after the changes the shrimp-industry introduced in estuaries and the 
extensive mangrove deterioration. I argue that ICM offers connected but distinct 
genealogy of resilience, one that predates disaster management and development 
institutions in Ecuador. To understand ICM worldwide development and influence, I 
trace the emergence of ICM in the first section of this chapter. The second section details 
the ICM methodology. Later, in the third section, I move down the analysis to Ecuador. I 
trace twenty years of ICM in Ecuador, nationally promoted by the Coastal Resources 
Management Program (CRMP). The section particularly provides a genealogy of ICM in 
the now province of Santa Elena until CRMP merged to the Ministry of Environment in 
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the year 2008, a time when the anti-neoliberal government restricted relationships with 
influential organizations such as IMF, WB, IDB, USAID. The fourth section focuses on 
the effects of ICM and CRMP in Ecuador.  Finally, I conclude the chapter comparing 
ICM in Ecuador and adaptive governance methodology introduced by resilience 
ecologists. In doing so, I contextualize resilience morphing alongside other ways of 
governing life, distinct from the traditional disaster management scope.  
 
International concern on coastal management 
Ecological deterioration of coastal areas introduced actions towards adequate 
management of coastal resources in the 60s. In the US, ecological concerns on coastal 
zones – where the marine and terrestrial environments interface – rocketed after President 
Kennedy requested to the US Congress to expand efforts in ocean sciences. In the year 
1966, through the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act, the US Congress 
created the Commission on Marine Sciences. Chaired by Julius A. Stratton, the 
commission issued the report “Our Nation and the Sea,” in 1969. The report details the 
then-current conditions of coastal areas in the US and the policies on coastal management 
ruling the country.   
The 1969 report addresses coastal zone including seaward and landward 
(particularly of the tidal zone), the Great Lakes, port and harbor facilities, marine 
recreational, industrial, and commercial areas. Despite, US coastal states autonomously 
ruled coastal management, regulations to control coastal zone activities overlapped 
between the Federal, the State, and the local agencies, the report revealed. In addition to 
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conflicts and lack of coordination, the report also revealed the lack of law enforcement in 
coastal areas.  
Thus, the Stratton Commission suggested to keeping vested in the states the 
primary responsibility of the management of the coast, with federal legislation and 
agency assisting coastal management.   In addition to regulatory framework, the Stratton 
commission also purposed the creation of a national agency and a national policy. Thus, 
the National Oceanic Atmospheric Agency was created in 1970, encompassing former 
agencies that were applying systematic scientific studies on marine areas and weather 
forecasting.  This agency had to assist in environmental monitoring, safety, and 
enforcement functions, stated the report. Additionally, the Stratton Commission strongly 
recommended providing policy objectives through the Coastal Zone Management Act. 
The regulation passed in 1972, establishing “a framework for a federal and state coastal 
management partnership to balance economic growth with coastal protection” (Tang et 
al. 2010,106). This act became a strong policy towards coastal management in the US.  
 The 1969 report also recommended to increase funds for marine sciences and to 
promote an International decade of Ocean Exploration. The UN welcomed this idea. It 
was precisely a time when environmental problems started to be a concern in 
development goals. Indeed, the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment had 
admitted a crucial reconciliation “between the needs of development and the need to 
protect and improve the environment” (UN 1972, principle 14). The UN had beforehand 
started to coordinate scientific problems related to oceans and marine biology, 
establishing an Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in 1960 (UNESCO 2006).  
This commission adopted the 1971-1980 initiative of ocean exploration to expand ocean 
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sciences, including environmental forecasting and research on the phenomenon known as 
El Niño.  
 By the mid-1980s, environmental problems became an important global issue. 
The report of the UN World Commission on the Environment and Development 
(UNWCED, 1987) emphasized ecosystems sustainability to warrant future global 
economy. This report paved the way to reformulate bureaucratic policies on 
environmental resources management so far implemented at international level. 
Particularly in the coastal zone, scientific knowledge had revealed a disconnection 
between management and development (Adams 2009). In 1992, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development integrated environmental needs to the process of 
development.  
 The cornerstone Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 urged the countries to “increase 
preparedness to deal with the potentially far-reaching impact of climate change upon the 
coastal zone” (Post & Lundin 1996, 2). The Agenda 21 Chapter 17, which, addresses to 
oceans and coastal areas, called for an “integrated approach to protection and 
development of marine and coastal resource” (Birch & Reyes 2018, 8).  The purpose of 
integration was to optimize the relationships between coastal uses in conjunction with the 
protection of coastal ecosystems (Heemskerk, 2001). Ten years later, the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development discussions also addressed to ensuring the 
sustainable development of the oceans and coastal areas.  
The UN 2002 report Section IV item 30 explicitly states nation-states must 
promote the program of action provided by the Agenda 21. Particularly, Item 30(e) 
stipulates: 
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“Promote integrated, multidisciplinary and multisectoral coastal and ocean 
management at the national level and encourage and assist coastal States in 
developing ocean policies and mechanisms on integrated coastal management” 
(UN 2002, 23). 
Overall, the UN declaration connects the integrated management and the 
sustainable development of coastal areas under an ecological approach.  The goal was 
then to address fundamental development issues, such as poverty alleviation and equity in 
coastal areas. However, ecologists warned on the effects of the rapid socio-economic 
development, particularly in developing countries (Haq et al. 1997). Paradoxically, the 
ecological scope “urg[ed] the need for conservation and protection of the natural 
resources and environment” while economists “had traditionally advocated resource 
exploitation to support growth and development” in “near ecological vacuum” (Haq et al. 
1997, 1). In a similar vein, ICM criteria acknowledge the awareness of human activity 
particularly over the coastal environment system and the continuous process in which 
decisions are made for the sustainable use, development and protection of coastal and 
marine areas, and coastal resources (Avellar et al. 2014). In the next section, I detail the 
methodology ICM introduced in worldwide coastal resource governance. 
 
Integrated coastal management methodology 
Stephen Olsen, founding CRC-URI director, pioneered ICM in the US and several 
tropical countries. In 1971, the CRC-URI partnered the Rhode Island Coastal Resource 
Management Council to initially evaluate the then-current condition of Rhode Island’s 
coasts and to develop strategies for fisheries and beach conservation. In 1976, Rhode 
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Island had the first Coastal Zone Management Plan under the ICM criteria. In the US, 
coastal management had unpacked political resistance among coastal resources 
stakeholders (Olsen et al. 2006). Mainly, while locals rejected central government 
initiatives, the central government rejected local initiatives. Later, the US-based CRC-
URI experiences demonstrated that ICM reduced the functional mismatches between 
different levels of government by promoting cross-boundary integration of government, 
community, the private sector, NGOs, universities. 
In 1985, the CRC-URI partnered with the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to apply ICM pilot projects in tropical countries (Ochoa 1995). 
The goal was to introduce and experience ICM in countries with fragile governments, 
high levels of poverty among the rural population, and fast-paced changes in ecosystems 
(Olsen & Christie 2000). Thus, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and Thailand became ICM pioneers 
out of the US. By the year 1990, several other Latin American counties engaged 
integrated approaches to coastal management, among them: Costa Rica, Barbados, 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Chile (Olsen 2000). CRC-URI aimed to document 
challenges and means to achieve horizontal and vertical integration in coastal 
management. Furthermore, the CRC-URI Director, Stephen Olsen, became member of 
the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection 
(GESAMP), which joined experts from different UN offices (UNESCO-IOC, FAO, 
WHO, UNEP, and others) concerned on improving “the life of human communities who 
depend on coastal resources while maintaining the biological diversity and productivity 
of coastal ecosystems” (GESAMP, 1996, iv). Thus, CRC-URI projects became influential 
on ICM methodology improvement and promotion. 
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According to Post & Lundin (1996) ICM aims to encompass “all of the sectoral 
activities that affect the coastal zone and its resources and dealing with economic and 
social issues as well as environmental/ecological concerns” (1-2).  Consequently, ICM’s 
integral approach promotes spatial integration of the coastal zone (land and sea), 
horizontal inter-sectoral integration, vertical intergovernmental integration, 
interdisciplinary integration (science and management), and international integration, 
argue Post & Lundin. Thus, ICM integrates objectives and management cycles 
(information collection, planning, decision-making, management, and monitoring) in a 
long-term process for sustainable management of coastal resources.  
However, ICM goals, approaches, scopes, and findings vary considerably 
according to national and local management (Tang et al. 2010, 106). Indeed, “the very 
definition and delimitation of the coastal zone varies considerably among coastal States” 
(Meltzer 1998, 13). Thus, ICM practitioners must tailor strategies according to local 
processes while stakeholders must actively participate in elaborating and implementing 
versatile programs to manage coastal resources (Avellar et al. 2014, Olsen 2003, Arriaga 
2000, Hap et al. 1997). Importantly, Elinor Ostrom’s eight principles toward robust 
ecosystem governance guide tailoring ICM programs to “integrate” governance and 
management into coastal stewardship (Kearney et al. 2007, Ochoa et al. 2001, Olsen et al. 
2006, Olsen et al. 2009). 
ICM also adopted and developed adaptive management criteria toward 
sustainable coastal development (Olsen & Christie 2000). Adaptive management of 
governance is a model developed by resilience ecologists that emphasizes to enhancing 
the self-organizing capabilities of an ecological system and improving locals' self-
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regulatory social mechanisms towards a successful adaptation (Berkes and Folke 1994, 
Berkes et al.1995, Berkes et al. 1996, Ostrom 1990 cited by Berkes 2006, Gadgil et al. 
1993). Moreover, Kearney and colleagues argue that the role of the communities in 
management decision-making is vital for ICM because the communities know “what will 
work in a local situation” (Kearney et al. 2007, 86). 
In addition, the CRC-URI introduced the criteria of nested institutions into coastal 
governance. According to Olsen et al. (2006) “governance should employ a mix of 
institutional types using a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase 
information, monitor use and induce compliance” (47).  Furthermore, Olsen (2003) 
emphasizes on a management-governance relation for tailoring strategies under local 
processes and needs: 
 “‘governance’ sets the framework within which management occurs, where 
‘management’ is the process by which human and material resources are 
organized within an institutional structure (such as a protected area) for a known 
goal (such as fisheries enhancement or biodiversity conservation)” (Olsen 2003, 
328).  
To bridge top-down and bottom-up approaches to manage natural resources, ICM 
promotes a two-track strategy “by simultaneously and incrementally building capacity 
both within central government (both national and provincial) and at the selected 
geographic sites” (Hale 2000, no pagination). On the one hand, the ICM includes a top-
down approach by which the central government enacts policies, procedures, and 
structures. On the other hand, a bottom-down approach “enable[s] change at the 
community level, site, and local government” (Hale 2000, no pagination). Thus, ICM’s 
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two-track strategy allocates responsibility and authority among governance levels: 
national, provincial, municipal and communities through a process of decentralization of 
power and decision-making. Consequently, the two-track strategy aims to build 
constituencies at both the national and community levels.   
Furthermore, CRC-URI admits the two-track strategy can also be termed co-
management (Olsen 2000).  Co-management “is one form of collective action whereby 
resource stakeholders work together with a government management agency to undertake 
some aspect of resource management” (Tompkins and Adger 2003, 8).  Overall, co-
management aims participatory governance to allocate power in the different layers of 
management. According to Kearney et al. (2007), ICM’s “participatory governance 
would involve a much wider sharing of powers than those shared in the management of 
coastal resources” (82).  Similarly, Olsen states, “decisions should be made at the lowest 
level of society as is practical and consistent with the public good. This requires the 
allocation of power among several levels of authority” (Olsen 2000, 29). This 
“Subsidiarity Principle” entails a system for avoiding power and resources concentration 
in top levels of hierarchy and share the responsibility with those who experience the 
consequences of the decisions (Ochoa et al. 2001, Olsen et al. 2006, Olsen 2000).  
 
An adaptive model of coastal resource management 
The integrated logic of coastal resource management proposed by Olsen and the 
CRC-URI includes cycles through which management adapts to achieve coastal resources 
sustainability.  ICM applies Learning Cycles and Policy Cycles.  According to Olsen et al 
(1997, 158) “adaptive management calls for learning by doing.” Thus, ICM firstly applies 
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Learning Cycles, or continuous cycles of action and reflection previously developed in 
organizational management (Olsen et al. 1997). According to Emilio Ochoa, an 
international ICM consultant who partnered Olsen in Ecuador (interview with author 
August 31, 2018), learning cycles allow to defining issues, to creating constituencies, and 
to promoting stewardship of resources through five steps. The five steps of the learning 
cycle include: create awareness, assessing options, deciding practices, experiencing, 
processing outcomes (Olsen 2003). The learning cycles include a variety of participatory 
techniques on the ground, among them workshops, meetings, and practical exercises. In 
this way, ICM model evaluates effectiveness or ineffectiveness achieved to build local 
institutional capacity. The cycles of learning are permanent during the whole life of the 
ICM. 
Learning cycles continuously feed the level of governance, which exclusively 
address resource management.  ICM Policy Cycle entails: 1) Issue assessment, to 
understand how the country manages coastal resources; 2) Program preparation to define 
and set coastal resource management goals and correct legal, administrative, and 
financial deficiencies; 3) Formal adoption of ICM at national level governance to assure 
the legal foundation and operation;  4) Implementation of ICM policies in specific zones 
of coastal management, known as Special Management Zones; and 5) Evaluation of 
national and local outcomes (Olsen et al. 2009). Once reached the last step, another ICM 
phase starts.  
Additionally, CRC-URI adaptive model of coastal resource management expects 
four level of outcomes.  Callie et al. (2007) describe the outcomes as follows: First Order 
outcomes, include pre-condition arrangements to know the current environmental and 
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governance situation of the coastal zone. Second Order outcomes focus on behavioral 
changes toward good practices, including decision-making, resource use, 
infrastructure/services, and local identity’s strengthening through development 
opportunities. Accordingly, changes in behavior encompass institutions, user groups, and 
the public at large. Third Order outcomes harvest scalar changes in quality of life and 
environment. Ultimately, the fourth order outcome achieves sustainable societies. It 
includes sustainable resource use, social responsibility, legal framework, and ethical 
values. 
Integrated costal management in Ecuador 
By the 1980-1900, shrimp-farming reached to be one of the main Ecuadorian 
GDPs component. However, shrimp-farming, which started by the late 60s in Ecuador, 
had devastated large extensions of mangroves. By the mid-eighties, 26.7% of mangroves 
and 93% of saline areas (areas flooded once or twice a year by extraordinary tides) 
disappeared as a consequence of the shrimp industry (Pazmiño et al. 2018). In 1986, the 
Government of Ecuador signed an agreement to implement USAID’s International 
Coastal Resources Management Program. The program was a ten-year initiative, 
implemented by the CRC-URI, “for testing whether the concepts and techniques of 
integrated coastal resources management that had evolved in the previous decade could 
be applied to developing tropical nations” (Epler and Olsen 1993). USAID particularly 
addressed tropical countries where “conservation and biodiversity protection [were] 
rarely foreseen in the political agenda; instead the priority is on economic growth and 
livelihood development” (Olsen 2003, 46).  
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In Ecuador, the ICM project focused on rural and poor zones in the coast. These 
areas showed high levels of coastal deterioration due to climatological processes and, 
mainly, the expansive shrimp-industry. The main ecological concern was the high 
degradation of the mangroves.  According to ICM approach, such natural and anthropic 
effects must inform to environmental policymakers to organize a more sustainable coastal 
resources management.  Later on, the program extended its operation to protected areas, 
water quality issues, land use, ecology and environment, shrimp farming and aquaculture, 
construction on beaches, mangrove ecosystems, navigation, fisheries and tourism (Olsen 
et al. 2006). Consequently, the purpose of promoting ICM in Ecuador widened to 
conservation, restoration, protection and sustainable development of coastal resources in 
the Pacific coast provinces: Esmeraldas, Manabí, El Oro, and Guayas (which included 
Santa Elena region before the year 2007).  According to Olsen (2003), by the year 2001 
the CRMP fulfilled a whole policy cycle.  The following subsections briefly explain each 
step of the completed phase one policy cycle, locally known as CRMP I. 
 
Issue assessment 
At the national level, the pilot project was initially charged to understand issues in 
Ecuadorian coastal management by collecting national legal frameworks on coastal 
management and by inventorying ecological, social and economic data in the Ecuadorian 
coast. The CRC-URI issued the document “A Profile of Ecuador’s Coastal Resources” 
(Epler & Olsen 1993), which compiled the conditions of the Ecuadorian management of 
coastal resources.   
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Program preparation  
Initially, the project defined the coastal zone in Ecuador; it circumscribed the 
highest tide line up to 50 km inland. The previous phase entailed active and participatory 
networking, from the seaside villager to the top-ranked government official, while a main 
office located in Guayaquil, the main coastal city of Ecuador, bridged such broad 
network.  The project engaged leaders from across the political spectrum – including 
government, industry, academia and so on. They signed a manifesto in support of coastal 
management in Ecuador. Thus, the country was ready for formally adopting and 
institutionalizing a coastal management program.  
 
Program formalization 
Under the name Programa de Manejo de Recursos Costeros or Coastal Resources 
Management Program (CRMP) the Ecuadorian government formalized the ICM initiative 
in 1989. The Executive Decree #375 established the creation of a National Commission 
of Coastal Management, an Executive Directorate, Units of Conservation and Vigilance 
(UCV), 6 Special Management Zones (SMZ), while the office in Guayaquil became the 
center of operations.  
In 1992, the Executive Decree # 3399, restructured and decentralized the CRMP, 
giving to the Executive Directorate considerable autonomy while the National Committee 
retains the individual authority and responsibilities on resource management policies 
(Olsen et al. 1997).  In doing so, the ICM program in Ecuador was ready for the 
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implementation phase of the Policy cycle, which required a different, non-USAID, 
financial assistance.   
 
Program implementation 
USAID supported Ecuador in looking for funds for implementing an integrated 
coastal management. In 1994, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a 
first loan for funding the CRMP (US$14.9 million through the Loan 913/SF-EC).  
Consequently, the government of Ecuador took the whole administration of the program, 
while previous members of the USAID-CRC-URI pilot project became consultants for a 
couple of years more. Transitioning from the USAID-CRC-URI program to the IDB 
Loan management worried ICM promoters. The primary concern was on the capacity to 
“maintain a dedication to an adaptive and participatory approach to resource 
management” (Haq 1997, 285) and to continue building coastal management upon the 
integrated coastal management values.  
At the local level, CRMP I promoted the ejercicios prácticos de manejo integrado 
or practical exercises of integrated management in all SMZ, under the logic of the 
learning cycle (Rodadue 1995). They are mini cycles applied at the local level, which fed 
the ICM learning cycle, the management cycle of adaptive governance. Experts worked 
together with locals in developing an appropriate methodology by experimentation. 
“People gave their ideas, the program put them in practice” comments Emilio Ochoa, one 
of the main CRMP promoters in Ecuador and Latin America (Interview with author 
August 31 2018). Robadue (1995) reports two practical exercises in Santa Elena:  
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Lifeguard group formation and equipment in Montañita beach continually operated by 
three years and a center for shrimp larvae collection in Valdivia, which did not start 
operations.  Similarly, Arriaga (2000) reports the experience of improving the nets for 
capturing wild shrimp larvae, shell farming, and experiments on mangrove reforestation 
(Arriaga 2000). Zambrano (2011) additionally reports a failed case of community-based 
tourism initiative in Libertador Bolívar. 
 Arriaga (2000), former CRMP director, highlights the opportunity CRMP gave to 
the people of the rural coast, mostly illiterate and poor, to participate in decisions and 
actions toward social and economic development. They participated in cross-level 
committees that CRMP created looking for best coastal resource management. Coastal 
rural people had never had this opportunity before CRMP achieved to build local 
capacity by participative collaboration and learning-by-doing.  Small projects were 
crucial for planning local management and for building local audiences (Olsen et al. 
1997).   
In Santa Elena, the first coastal management plan was ready in 1993. The plan 
included five components: environmental sanitation, aquaculture, fishing and tourism in 
the Manglaralto Parrish, northernmost parish of the area. Regarding tourism, the plan had 
clear outlines including beach zoning, tourist peak season’s management, community-
based hostels, and technical training on food manipulation and customer services. Beach 
ordering also included carrying capacity measurement, because one of the main issues 
was the unequal distribution of visitors during the peak season (January to April), and the 
damage that a large number of visitors produce to the beach system. The CRMP also 
aimed to reduce beach damages by diversifying tourist services – out of sun and beach 
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options. CRMP worked next to the Ministry of Tourism to create and operationalize 
inland ecological routes, such as Dos Mangas in Manglaralto and other routes less 
demanded. Nowadays those initiatives continue being main tourist attractions in Santa 
Elena. The CRMP also articulated socio-organizational processes in order to preserve 
natural resources and promote economic activities in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 El 
Niño Phenomenon.  
Since its origin, the pilot project included the Manglaralto Parish within Special 
Management Zone. In this area, CRMP trained several community leaders and initiated 
self-employment alternatives after the shrimp larvae and the shrimp farming industry 
decreased in the late 1990s. A report from the Rural Promotion Center (CPR-AeA 2014) 
reveals that in 1998, the CRMP announced its annual operative plan, which included 
financial resources for workshops, implementation of tourist hostels, and tourist 
promotion. To develop the project, CRMP hired Fundación Pro Pueblo, a private non-
profit organization funded by the Swiss HOLCIM group. From 1999 to 2001, the CRMP 
chaired the Zonal Committee, which, mainly, regulated tourism development processes 
of the communities located on the edge of the Pacific Ocean. In coordination with other 
institutions, beach cleaning, road cleaning, and water supply were carried out. The CRMP 
also financed tourism promotion through the opening and closing seasons events, and 
control prices and the offer of community hostels (Zambrano 2011). 
IDB assessment 
CRMP I also achieved second order outcomes, which entails “changes in behavior 
of institutions and stakeholder groups; changes in behaviors directly affecting resources 
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of concern; and investments in infrastructure (Olsen 2003, 26-33). Caille et al. (2007) 
assert, the CRMP project achieved good decision-making and good practices on effective 
resource uses. Indeed, a report collecting eight years of ICM in Ecuador states: 
“CRMP […] has encouraged local populations to perceive themselves as part of 
the ecosystem and to attempt to resolve environmental and social issues within 
this context. Some user groups whose existence depends on accessing or 
exploiting a given resource, are being educated on the implications of resource 
exploitation. They are learning to accept responsibility for their actions and to 
consider alternative actions on management efforts that will increase the value 
and/or sustainability of their activity.” (Robadue 1995, no pagination)  
 
Local training and teaching became a crucial strategy to achieve the second order 
outcome. For instance, Olsen (2003) asserts “CRMP also builds individual capacity 
through education and training” (51). Training particularly addressed awareness of the 
benefits of natural resources and understanding the systemic integration of environment 
within several subsets of ecological, social, economic systems. For instance, CRMP 
raised locals’ consciousness on sustainable use of resources and some side effects of local 
practices such as shrimp-larvae capture by-products and estuarine systems importance 
through the methodology of practical exercises.  
Regarding the Third Order Outcome, the program achieved social and 
environmental goals. Particularly on social system, Olsen (2003, 114) states:  
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“The biggest, but unquantified, achievements were undoubtedly in the generation 
of hope and empowerment—important indicators when assessing quality of life—
that the CRMP process brought to the poorer segments of coastal society”  
 
In addition, the CRMP phase I contributed to protecting and preventing further 
deterioration of mangrove. However, efforts did not achieve environmental quality 
improvement.  Former ICM promoters and practitioners admit CRMP failed in creating a 
clear policy on integrated management despite having completed a policy cycle. 
Particularly because the IDB loan conditions “contradicted the fundamental strategies of 
the program, put carefully nurtured relationships at risk, and proved impossible to meet,” 
argues Olsen (2003, 115).  
The IDB evaluation also revealed CRMP had not completed the quality and the 
activities depicted in the agreement. For instance, eco-tourism was “attracting few 
visitors and were beyond the capabilities of the local volunteer environmental groups to 
administer or maintain” (Olsen 2003, 108). However, the 1990s natural disasters and 
political instability justified CRMP’s failure. In the coast, the 1997-1998 ENSO 
surpassed the 1982-1983 event, causing damages over two million dollars. At the national 
level, presidential impeachments and relinquishments, the war and peace agreement with 
Peru, and the loss of the national currency pervaded the 90s. Thus, the IDB agreed to 
embark in a second loan for spreading coastal sustainable development to other sites in 
the coast of Ecuador. 
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Ecuadorian coastal resource management program phase II 
CRMP I, particularly under the CRC-URI advising, have been broadly 
documented. Various working papers, academic journals, and books on ICM developed 
in Ecuador exist, mainly published by the CRC-URI. On the contrary, the second phase 
of CRMP – after a second IDB loan, has not called attention to scholarship in general, 
and ICM practitioners in particular. In this section, I trace the second phase of CRMP, 
through which I pursue an overarching analysis of ICM in Ecuador.  
After the first loan evaluation, the IDB demanded new requirements for signing a 
new contract. In response, the Ecuadorian government issued Executive Decree No. 772 
on August 23rd, 2003. This decree provided to the CRMP exclusive management of IDB 
agreement. On October 26, 2004, the IDB and the government of Ecuador signed the 
Credit 1531 OC/EC. As stated in the agreement, IDB borrowed US$ 12,400,000 while 
the Ecuadorian government would provide two million dollars to complete the total cost 
of the project. Overall, the second phase (CRMP II) aimed to transfer a total territorial 
consolidation of coastal ordering as CRMP I achieved in the special management, to 
implement sustainable development and poverty alleviation in all coastal cantons (131 
total). 
CRMP main office and director continued bridging the national and local 
governance. At the national level, CRMP II became an interlocutor of all activities the 
ministries of Environment, Fishery, and Tourism undertook in the coast, argues Paola 
Galvez, former Tourism Undersecretary (interview with author June 14, 2018). Similarly, 
Victor Osorio, former CRMP II Director asserts, “CRMP II was an axis among the 
Ministries [Environment, Fishery, Tourism] to discuss and make consensual decisions on 
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the coastal area despite having different local management goals and actions” (Interview 
with author July 11, 2018). Thus, CRMP II integrated the ministries in coastal 
management issues. 
At the local level, CRMP’s scope of action widened. CRMP II included 
environmental and development programs toward sustainable development of the coastal 
villages. In Santa Elena and other beaches, CRMP II promoted and executed several 
environment-related activities, among them: garbage management, sanitary landfills, 
drinking water, cliffs stabilization, mangroves reforestation, fishing ordering, beach 
cleaning, and beach safety, and also development first risk maps.  However, CRMP II 
emphasized small-scale developments, including marketing and promotion.  
CRMP II increased the Hospederias Comunitarias or Community operated 
hostels, as a way of developing the community as a whole.  Similarly, CRMP promoted 
privately owned restaurants and handcraft shops. Seaside villagers worked together with 
CRMP II technicians and government staff in designing and building projects, as they 
were used to doing since the previous CRMP I. According to Osorio, CRMP II director, 
seaside villagers actively participated in decision-making processes or during the 
construction of their small-scale business; thus, projects emerged by consensus with 
locals. Thus, CRMP’s human-centered and participatory approach kept vital in the 
development of coastal rural communities, under the flag of environmental issues and 
poverty alleviation. 
To execute all those programs and projects, CRMP II contracted private 
consultants and partnered with NGOs. Consultancy primarily devoted to environmental 
issues, constructing public restrooms, latrines, cleaning beaches, managing solid waste. 
 
185 
In the case of tourism initiatives, private consultants produced marketing material and a 
few advertisements within the country. Similarly, NGOs and private consultants provided 
a variety of technical workshops for improving tourist business. Workshops addressed to 
notions of accounting, taxation, food and beverage business operation, and so on. 
Interestingly, IDB agreement established a limiting clause for providing funds. In line 
with the agreement, CRMP II can finance up to 80% of locals’ project. Locals had to 
contribute at least 20% of project’s total cost. Such contribution was not wholly in cash. 
Mostly, locals interested in developing small projects contributed with direct labor or 
with local materials provision. Thus, CRMP projects pursued securing seaside villages’ 
economic survival while participation and training continued a way to improve 
comuneros’ local capacities. 
The analysis of CRMP II also reveals controversial outcomes among participants. 
High-ranked government staff agrees in the success of the program. For instance, Paola 
Galvez, former Tourism Undersecretary (interview with author June 13, 2018) points out 
that numerous families transformed their homes into hostels supported by technical and 
financial assistance provided by NGOs under CRMP II strategies. Additionally, CRMP II 
introduced concepts on planning, beach carrying capacity, beach management plans, and 
beach zoning, achieving a clear distinction between fishing and tourist communities in 
the coast of Ecuador, states Veronica Sion, former Ministry of Tourism (interview with 
author June 19, 2018). CRMP II Director, Victor Osorio, asserts,  
“CRMP II’s best achievement was to empower coastal communities to go in 
search of sustainable development, in a time when municipalities did not have 
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financial availability, and rural areas were barely included in the national 
budget” (interview with author July 11, 2018). 
Overall, in the tourism field, CRMP II successfully built and financed tourism 
facilities and small-business underpinning comuneros’ opportunity to become tourist 
services providers. Nowadays, many owners of successful hostels, restaurants, and 
handicraft shops acknowledge and thank CRMP II project for improving their quality of 
lives and economy. This new economy allows locals to progress, and, currently, be a 
benchmark for new generations of local entrepreneurs. 
Conversely, sharp critiques of CRMP II also appear. For instance, the president of 
an NGO operating in the area since 2003 critique CRMP II’s excessive developmental 
criteria while appreciates more CRMP phase I, because it “really promoted sustainable 
development in the coast of Santa Elena” (Isabel Cando, interview date June 21, 2018). 
Furthermore, CRMP II projects “were not locals’ own needs; instead, they were 
persuaded needs the community leaders embraced,” argues Cando.  Additionally, Emilio 
Ochoa (interview with author August 31, 2018), ICM expert in Latin America, argues 
that CRMP II became a project for poor people who needed assistance of any kind. 
Similarly, Efrén Mendoza, former CRMP staff in Santa Elena, critiques CRMP II 
because it became “a paternalistic project” and “a building machine” (interview with 
author June 22, 2018). Overall, Mendoza argues, CRMP II “reduced locals’ active 
participation while locals became passive recipients of project.” The critique of CRMP II 
reveals a distant programming of coastal sustainability while locals became recipients of 
designed projects and active workshops attendees. Thus, CRMP II took into account 
locals needs, ideas, and projects. However, CRMP II operated through consultants and 
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partnering NGOs for detecting “issues” and strengthening “constituencies” toward 
sustainable coastal development technicians analyzed and decided in a distance what they 
consider the best for locals. Thus, locals’ participation in decision-making turned into 
accepting what CRMP II brought to the community.  
The Blue Flag Certification project instantiates CRMP II’s critique. In 2006, 
CRMP II together with the Ministry of Tourism aimed to implement an international 
beach certification called Blueflag (www.blueflag.global/). Blue flag is an eco-label 
awarded to beaches that reach environmental, educational, safety, and accessibility 
criteria. In Santa Elena, the program selected the comuna Libertador Bolívar to 
participate in such certification. Community Assembly logbooks collect discussions 
about this project. The tourism committee in Libertador Bolívar highly promoted the 
beach certification. Thus, the comuneros contributed to providing a land slot at village’s 
south entrance. In this plot, CRMP II built a tourist information facility. Locals also 
participated by cleaning the sandy beach, improving garbage management, improving 
tourist services, and so on. However, the beach of Libertador Bolívar never reached the 
certification. The legal framework for beach management in Ecuador was and continues 
being unclear. The office built in Libertador Bolívar, is currently rented to a private 
paragliding operator, while locals still keep the hope of getting a beach certification. 
Furthermore, the national tourism ministry has unsuccessfully proposed a beach 
certification normative. Under the ICM approach, those failed projects feed the policy 
cycle. However, during CRMP II, ICM learning cycles did not accomplish the goal to 
provide feedback to environmental policymaking, neither at the local nor the national 
level.  
 
188 
 At the national level, CRMP II integrated coastal development issues among the 
three Ecuadorian ministries. Consequently, the “integration” came from the sectorial 
coordination but distanced from the ICM’s adaptive approach and learning cycles. In 
addition, IDB officials supervised CRMP II operations while international consultants 
annually assessed the coastal management plan. In 2008, the CRMP II merged with the 
Ministry of Environment. According to the Executive Decree No. 1254-2008, the CRMP 
did not report, “real benefit” neither “transcendent importance” in coastal areas. The 
CRMP merged to the Ministry of Environment in the midst of radical changes the newly 
inaugurated anti-neoliberal government introduced in Ecuador. The left-led government 
highly critiqued the neoliberal way of ruling the country, including governmental 
interventions on sustainable development and disaster management. 
  
Integrated coastal management legacy in the coast of Ecuador 
In twenty years of CRMP, the program achieved an unprecedented challenge 
(Table 3). The program developed government structures, coastal management policies, 
and models, analysis of marine-coastal areas, control and surveillance systems; school 
curricula including notions of ICM; tourism, fishing, agricultural, and environmental 
micro-projects; and risk prevention efforts.  Former CRMP executives and technicians 
agree that the project achieved sustainable development of the coastal areas of Ecuador 
while locals got a commitment aiming a harmonious flow between nature and the reality 
in which they live. However, the CRMP never achieved a state policy level.  
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 CRMP I CRMP II 
Phase 1986 – 2003 2004 – 2008 
Initial 
situation 
- No existence of integrated 
management of coastal 
resources policies. 
- No clear policy on integrated 
management of coastal 
resources 
Priorities - Ecosystem Degradation 
- Mangrove Ecosystem 
degradation 
- Aquaculture opportunities  
- Health problems and quality of 
life in coastal populations. 
- policies for development of 
coastal communities 
 
Outcomes - Failed attempts to create an 
integrated management policy. 
- Administrative structure 
achieved at the national level  
- Zoning of coastal areas to 
coordinate actions among 
national ministries. 
- Active participation of citizens 
living in seaside villages 
- Training local governments on 
IMC 
- Focus on municipalities 
strengthening decentralization.  
- Weakness in the canals of 
citizen participation 
 
 
 
Table 3 Coastal Management priority concerns, administrative organization and results. 
Elaborated by Author 
 
The CRMP introduced in Ecuador a coastal management approach based on the 
integration of environmental and development issues. The integrated coastal management 
methodology promoted the idea of building more sustainable communities by suitable 
resource use. The book titled “Ecuadorian Integrated Coastal Management. Beachhead 
towards a Coastal Sustainable Development” (Arriaga 2000) acknowledges the influence 
of UN’s concern on global resource threats and the integrated condition to address issues 
emerging from human-driven management of natural resources.  According to Arriaga, 
an ecological vision and citizens participation are ICM foundations. Furthermore, the said 
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book asserts, ICM embraces Eugene P. Odum’s structural and functioning 
interdependence of ecological systems. Accordingly, such approach integrated human 
beings, powerful agents to introduce significant changes in natural processes (Arriaga 
2000, 61).  
The ICM methodology emphasized learning cycles informing policy-making 
cycles. Indeed, CRMP during the late 80s and early 90s entailed effective integration of 
technicians and government staff, working together in coastal management with local 
villagers’ active participation. CRMP officials achieved to formalize IMC at the national 
government. Meanwhile, coastal villagers found in the CRMP strong support to improve 
their own ideas. In doing that, the ICM two-track strategy achieved to change the 
behavior of the coastal villager, second order outcome. Overall, CRMP I unpacked the 
virtue of reliance on local villagers’ capacities and resources while moving away from 
capitalist strategies of coastal resource management and use, such as extensive shrimp 
farming.  
Conversely, during CRMP II, the idea of “development” was stronger than the 
idea of “sustainability.” A criterion also adopted among the coastal population, including 
rural villagers and local government. In other words, as Julian Reid (2018) argues, 
sustainable development “reflected a neoliberal political agenda” (p. 647) that “shifts the 
burden of security from states to people” (647).  Thus, CRMP promoted to secure life 
from the economy “through the promotion of capacities of life for economy” (652).  
CRMP II operated similarly to a development agency, following IDB’s 
guidelines. Consequently, the CRMP II emphasized in poverty alleviation by providing 
locals with both small-scale environmental solutions (latrines, pipelines, and so on), and 
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funds for building infrastructure (particularly tourism services). In doing so, the program 
distanced from what ICM implemented almost two decades before. ICM ejercicios 
prácticos did not work anymore. Instead, funded projects replaced the ejercicios 
prácticos.  Without practical exercises, no learning cycle fed the policy cycle. 
Consequently, the adaptive governance promoted by ICM disappeared. In doing so, 
CRMP II distanced from what ICM implemented almost two decades before. 
Unquestionably, after two decades of CRMP in the coast of Santa Elena, the way 
of living in rural coastal areas changed.  A few families inland subsist through small 
agriculture, fishing, and even shrimp-industry wage labor dependency. Tourism is the 
new desire for progress and a better future. They built their cabanas with local material, 
resources and ideas. Moreover, self-employment is a new opportunity for villagers. They 
bet on small tourist entrepreneurship, in which their family and the community work 
together while the beach has become the most appreciated resource. 
 
Conclusion: a connected but distinct genealogy of resilience in Ecuador 
The mutual contribution of ICM scholars to the UN’s global concern on coastal 
resources concerns have been discussed in this chapter. ICM rooted in Eugine P. Odum’s 
contributions to ecology and adopted concepts on co-management toward the 
sustainability of coastal areas. Firstly, resilience in ecology admits the socio-ecological 
relationship. Similarly, the ICM methodology developed by CRC-URI, acknowledges the 
socio-ecological interplay in coastal zones. Secondly, the ICM also emerged as a critique 
of the one-size-fits-all resource management panaceas.  Instead, ICM emphasizes 
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tailoring coastal management according to local necessities through the Two-Track 
strategy. 
Furthermore, ICM developers admit the two-track strategy renders adaptive 
governance. Indeed, ICM incorporates the role of social institutions into coastal 
environmental management and participatory governance to allocate power in the 
different layers of management.  However, CRC-URI’s ICM practice emphasizes in 
“management” as a process to organize the human and material “resources.” A coastal 
management that requires national juridical-political frameworks.  Moreover, ICM’s two-
track strategy practiced in Ecuador achieved the four Adaptive Governance features 
proposed by Carl Folke (2006), resilience in ecology influential scholar (see chapter 2). 
Thus, ICM in Ecuador started by understanding the then-current situation of coastal 
ecosystem dynamics, applied participatory techniques to interpret Ecuadorian coastal 
ecosystem feedbacks, built capacities within the national and local government, and built 
constituencies at both the national and community levels.  
However, CRMP emphasis was the securitization of locals’ economy through the 
appropriate “management” of the coastal areas. Thus, ICM in Ecuador promoted a 
preventive logic that locates security responsibility on the population and individuals. In 
Santa Elena, CRMP promoted entrepreneurship among the comuneros to secure their 
livelihood. In doing so, ICM partners other mechanisms of security that regulates the 
social and ecological relationship, such as resilience-building. Furthermore, CRMP 
responded to international agencies largely critiqued by their neoliberal practices, such as 
USAID and IDB. In a similar vein, resilience building has also been critiqued for 
responding to neoliberal governmentalities. After twenty years of CRMP, Ecuador has a 
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financial debt to IDB while in Santa Elena, comuneros integrate the tourism industry 
pursuing sustainable development and economic securitization of the population.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Local emergencies and the politics of resilience 
 
Many rural seaside villages in Ecuador have adopted small-scale tourism 
development in the last three decades. Particularly in the province of Santa Elena, this 
tourism-led economy emerged from governmental concerns on coastal resources 
management, highly promoted during the 90s (Chapter 5). By the year 2019, the small-
scale tourism industry in Santa Elena secures communities’ livelihoods while the beach 
has become the most valuable resource for comuneros’ economic survival. Beaches in 
Santa Elena, now a natural resource that visitors enjoy, have been exposed to numerous 
anthropic interventions to improve tourism development. Those interventions in Santa 
Elena’s beach ecosystems do not exclusively respond to governmental interventions. 
Instead, the comuneros decided and mediated numerous tourist initiatives because 
according to them, the tourism industry brings progress and wellbeing to the whole 
community, as this chapter reveals. This chapter particularly discloses comuneros’ social 
organization on local tourism development within the functioning of the state.  
However, despite national and local efforts to improve tourism in coastal villages, 
small and chronic disturbances persistently threaten the local tourism-led economy. 
Firstly, Ecuadorian governments have promoted tourism development on the rural coast 
without reaching a legal framework according to rural realities. In those legal interstices, 
the comuneros deal with mis-recognized events that put their economic survival at risk. 
Most comuneros operate their tourism businesses with mismatches between risk 
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management and tourism development policies. Secondly, a chronic but small natural 
threat is also putting comuneros’ livelihood at risk.  Waves are increasingly battering the 
beaches and are unpredictably destroying the tourist infrastructure that underpins the 
local economy.  Thus, on a daily basis, comuneros are prone to small, local, chronic 
events (Anderson et al. 2019, Davoudi 2012, Povinelli 2016) that disturb the very nature 
of their comuneros-beach relationship  In this chapter, I untangle persistent perturbations 
emerging from both legal mismatches and local decision-making on the beach, a common 
property resource in the seaside comunas of Ecuador. 
In the first section, I trace tourism policies development in Ecuador, emphasizing 
community-based tourism. During the 1990s, governments ruling the country under 
neoliberal practices introduced and promoted community tourism in Ecuador, particularly 
in common-property territories. Community tourism fits within the anti-neoliberal 
rationale of the leftist government that ruled Ecuador since 2007. Thus, the leftist 
government strengthened community tourism as an alternative model of market-driven 
logic of development.  However, a lack of a comprehensive legal framework to regulate 
tourism in common-property territories still persists. This local reality complicates 
comuneros’ tourist development while opening interstices for illegal tourist operation in 
rural areas. 
The second section analyzes comuneros’ decisions over the use (and abuse) of the 
beach as a natural resource underpinning community wellbeing. In doing so, I locate my 
research in the comuna or community of Libertador Bolívar, one of the few Santa Elena 
communities that has maintained total administration of their territory. I trace tourism 
development and decisions comuneros have taken about the use of a shared resource: the 
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beach. By capturing quotidian disturbances of the comuneros-beach relationship, I 
disclose slow emergencies (Anderson et al. 2019) comuneros endure while pursuing 
community wellbeing. The third section of this chapter discusses comuneros’ chronic 
events under the light of slow emergencies, a notion introduced by Anderson et al. (2019) 
to highlight those non-punctual, non-acute emergencies, which also demand collective 
political or ethical response. However, in the case of Santa Elena, the use (and abuse) of 
natural resources, individuals living in the interstices of national policies, and 
governmental logics aimed at securing future wellbeing, configure dynamic and 
continuous subsets of political processes within the endless and complicated human-in-
nature relationship. Consequently, comuneros’ slow emergencies should entail novel 
approaches to the politics of resilience.   
 
Neoliberal and anti-neoliberal tourism development management in Ecuador 
Ecuador is a politically unstable country. This situation complicates national 
policies and administration longevity. Thus, changes in governmental decision-making 
on national development stresses local initiatives in different ways. In this section, I 
analyze the national administration of tourism development in Ecuador to understand the 
local struggles comuneros have undertaken to develop small-scale tourism in common-
property territories. 
In the last three decades, the tourism industry in Ecuador has successfully 
expanded.  According to the Ministry of Tourism, tourism achieves to being GDP's third 
non-oil exportation income and the fifth job-contributing industry. Ecuadorian attempts 
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to improve tourism management in the country date back to the 50s when the government 
created the first tourist office to marketing the country in the US. However, it was during 
the 1980s that Ecuador experienced a significant expansion of the tourism sector. 
Thus, responding to trends on modernization during early 90s (see chapter 4), the 
State created the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1992. Three years later both 
units split, positioning tourism management in the Ministry of Tourism (MT).  MT’s 
primary goal was to address the legal tourism framework in a time when decentralization 
was a state. In 1997, the country enacted both, 1) the Special Law of Decentralization of 
the State and Social Participation, and 2) the first law of tourism. The first one transfers 
tourism development to municipalities (Art. 9, item n), and the second one explicitly aims 
to decentralize Ecuador's tourism management. Then, the main goal of MT was to 
develop the tourism industry in the country.  In 1999, MT issued the National Tourism 
Competitiveness Plan, which, according to Ordoñez & Marco (2005), proposed to foster 
a tourism development model compatible with international sustainable development 
trends, which respond to conservationist and poverty alleviation criteria.  However, the 
centralist and national scope of the plan slightly mentions the participation of local 
governments, highlight Ordoñez and Marco. Nevertheless, the decentralizing process on 
tourism management continued in the following years of neoliberal practices ruling 
Ecuador. 
In hand with the neoliberal rationality, the Ecuadorian government reinforced 
tourism management decentralization.  After tourism became a national policy in 2001, 
the Ecuadorian government signed a loan contract with IDB for supporting 
decentralization of tourism. From this contract emerged the Programa para la 
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Dinamización del Turismo or Program for Tourism Dynamization and the Acuerdo para 
la Transferencias de Competencias Turísticas or Tourism Competence Transfer 
Agreement.  The goal of both IDB-funded programs was to operationalize tourism 
management decentralization in the country. The Ecuadorian government's main goal 
was to transfer decision-making power on tourism management to the local level of 
administration. MT would provide to the municipalities technical assistance to improve 
tourism management while the municipalities would manage tourism development in 
coordination with the national entity.  By the year 2002, MT had signed agreements with 
sixty municipalities, among them the three cantons at the Santa Elena peninsula. 
However, the legal framework did not endorse a complete decentralizing process. 
The anti-neoliberal practices implemented after the year 2007 addressed the legal 
disconnections inherited from the neoliberal period, through the subsidiary principle, 
stated in the 2008 Constitution and the General Code of Territorial Organization, 
Autonomies, and Decentralization (CTOAD), a central legal framework issued in 2010 to 
operationalize the constitutional dispositions (See Chapter 3). The subsidiary principle 
addresses decentralization by de-concentrating the roles of the state into the Autonomous 
Decentralized Governments (ADG). The CTOAD decentralizes and de-concentrates 
several responsibilities and roles to the provincial, municipal, and parish levels.  Local 
tourism management is one of those decentralized responsibilities. Thus, article 54 states 
municipal ADGs must promote and control tourism development in the canton in an 
appropriate coordination with parish ADGs. 
Similarly, Art. 64 designates to parish ADGs the responsibility of promoting 
solidarity economy models, including tourism initiatives, in coordination with municipal 
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office. In the year 2012, the anti-neoliberal government issued a plan for improving main 
economic production sectors by which Ecuador prioritized tourism, among other 
industries. However, as I show in the following sections, legal mismatches persist 
regarding tourism management in Indigenous and rural territories.  
 
Tourism in Indigenous and rural common-property territories 
Indigenous and rural communities, mostly living in commonly owned lands, have 
managed tourism initiatives since the 90s. They gathered in the Federación Plurinacional 
de Turismo Comunitario del Ecuador or Ecuadorian Plurinational Federation of 
Community Tourism (EPFCT) to circumvent conflicts with private tour operators before 
the State legalized community tourism.  In 2002, the updated Law of Tourism endorsed 
tourism initiatives operated by Indigenous and rural communities, and EPFCT became a 
member of the National Tourism Advisory Board. After this resolution, community 
tourism exponentially grew.  A statistical analysis done by Morales-Urrutia et al. (2017) 
shows that community tourism significantly increased from eight initiatives registered 
EPFCT in 2004 to sixty-five, by the year 2006. In this year, the Equator Initiative, the UN 
Development Program, awarded EPFCT with the Equator Prize, a biennial award to 
recognize outstanding community-based efforts to reduce poverty through the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (UNDP 2012).  
Overall, EPFCT became a hallmark for Community-based tourism (CBT) 
initiatives promoted by the UN Development Program. CBT is a locally based tourism 
that brings income directly to local families and subsidizes their sustainable way of life 
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(Wesche and Drumm 1999). This typology of tourism became a flagship for pro-poor 
tourism strategies and development projects in the 80s and 90s. Thus, under poverty 
alleviation, environmental conservation, and sustainable development rationales, 
international donors globally spread CBT projects in developing countries. A key feature 
of CBT relies on diversifying locals' economy. The multi-sectoral approach of CBT does 
not aim to display locals' livelihood. Instead, tourism becomes an additional activity to 
improve locals' wellbeing. In addition, CBT involves the participation of the whole 
community and the equitable distribution of income among all community members. 
However, after two decades of tourism management in Indigenous and rural 
communities, a particular structure known as Community Tourism has become an 
alternative to global CBT paradigms in Latin America in general, and Ecuador in 
particular.  
In Latin America, Community Tourism (CT) furthers CBT’s intimate link to 
sustainable tourism goals. According to Cabanilla (2018), CT in Latin America is indeed 
a locally based management model organized in groups of individuals intimately linked 
to sustainable tourism goals. However, the Latin American CT mainly aims positive 
cultural and natural impacts on their territories while pursues community members 
wellbeing (Cabanilla 2018). In Ecuador, EPFCT embraced CBT since the 90s; however, 
EPFCT's official position "situates tourism as a means to protect communal resources, 
including defending territory, while also promoting the visibility of alternative (native) 
cultural forms" (Bauer 2018, 125). Thus, CT in Ecuador strengthens shared values and 
practices rather than exclusively focusing on foreign concepts of sustainability of 
resources and development.  
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Furthermore, the Ecuadorian common-property regulation has influenced the 
community-based tourism model. The 1937 Law of Communes codified in 2004 (O.R. 
315-2004) mandates that communal assets and lands “will be the patrimony of all their 
inhabitants” (Art. 7). The use and enjoyment of common assets “will be adapted, in each 
case, to the best convenience” of each community, through regulations “autonomously 
and freely decided,” also states the law (Art. 7).  Thus, in the community assembly, locals 
discuss and decide over any tourist project externally or internally proposed. In doing so, 
the community keeps control over their communal territory and resources.   
Decades of CT practice in Ecuador also reveals that communities seldom achieve 
the integration of the whole community in CBT projects or rigorously distribute its 
revenues with the whole community. Ruiz Ballesteros et al. (2008) trace the development 
of CT in Ecuador by contextualizing the economic effect of tourism, both in the logic of 
the community reciprocity and in the logic of relations of the market. Ruiz Ballesteros et 
al. argue that the endogenous tourism initiatives in Ecuador have endorsed common-
property land and resources management, have vindicated the community's social 
practices of decision-making, and have reinforced autonomy and political consolidation 
of Indigenous communities. Moreover, CT complements the economic functioning of the 
community. The communities keep other forms of subsistence such as small-scale 
agriculture or fishery. However, CT complements economic diversity, which is a 
safeguard for the communities’ livelihood (Ruiz Ballesteros et al. 2008).  
Moreover, in Ecuador, each community manages tourism management and 
revenues distribution according to their own decisions. For instance, Salango, a seaside 
community in the south of Manabí (north Santa Elena Province), completely manages 
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community tourism business and revenues (Bauer 2018). In other cases, the community 
collects fees from locally owned small-scale tourism businesses. They include local 
family or individually owned entrepreneurship and legal associations as well (Roux 
2013). In the case of Santa Elena, communities admit community-based and privately-
owned tourism business. While the community manages the CBT business and its 
revenues, the comunero owners of businesses pay fees to the community. 
However, financial liquidity has been and continues threatening CT development 
in the country.  Most of CT initiatives in Ecuador started through an international or 
national sponsor, which provided funds for building tourist infrastructure, technical 
training, or promotion. Unfortunately, NGOs’ projects, in most cases, conclude after a 
couple of years and new financial struggles appear in CT-led communities. 
Community tourism fitted into the anti-neoliberal rationale of promoting 
alternatives to neoliberal practices of development. Thus, the 2009 National Plan of 
Development, prioritized tourism industry while ecological biodiversity and cultural 
heritage became allies to develop a national tourism agenda (Ministerio de Tursimo 
2010).  The first step to improving tourism in Ecuador was the inclusion of the right for 
leisure in the 2008 Constitution. In this sense, the anti-neoliberal rationale of the leftist 
government in Ecuador rejected capitalist over-exploitation of labor, overlooked during 
the neoliberal state practices in the country (Ramírez 2013).  After the enactment of the 
right to leisure, domestic tourism increased. More and more Ecuadorians used the 
improved national road system to travel within the country.   
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Throughout the country, the anti-neoliberal governmentality also addressed the 
financial liquidity issue affecting the local initiatives on tourism. For instance, the State 
financial corporations Corporación Financiera Nacional, Banco del Pacífico, and the 
Banco de Fomento created the Plan 5-5-5. This financial program particularly focused on 
those excluded from the commercial bank requirements, such as Indigenous and rural 
Community Tourism developments.  The Plan 5-5-5 provided $5,000, to be paid in 5 
years with a 5% interest rate. In parallel, the Ministry of Tourism operated the program 
Turismo para Todos or Tourism for All, which trained small-scale tourism business 
owners for accessing the Plan 5-5-5. In the year 2008, I participated in this program by 
training small tourism business owners in cash-flow and budget management in several 
coastal communities. As a result, several CT initiatives applied and got such funds for 
improving their tourism businesses. However, the CT legal framework was yet 
unaddressed. 
 In 2010, the government issued the regulation for the Centros de Turismo 
Comunitario (CTC) or Tourism Community Centers, conditioning its management 
exclusively to the community (O.R. 154-2010).  This law requires that CTC must have 
formal legal status. The regulation also acknowledges private or family-owned tourist 
businesses in the communities. However, “they must respect and subordinate to 
community norms regarding the use and management of the tourist attractions, and they 
will be registered in the Ministry of Tourism,” states Article 5. Later, the Ley de Tierras y 
Territorios Ancestrales or Law of Lands and Ancestral Territories (O.R. 711-2016), 
issued in 2016, also endorses the Ecuadorian model of CT. Articles 3 and 23 provide to 
the Community Assembly and the Cabildo the management and social control over the 
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territory, based on the uses and traditions of the community. Furthermore, Articles 23 and 
78 also state tax exceptions to the communities.   
Overall, anti-neoliberal practice supporting CT in the country increased local 
initiatives. By the year 2012, EPFCT doubled the projects, registering 135 projects 
(Morales-Urrutia 2017).  This number increased to 137 in 2015, the same article reports.  
Worthy of mentioning, the statistics documented by Morales-Urrutia, show 10% of CT 
are operating (consolidated programs), 44% are in the consolidation process, 30% are in 
the initial stage, and 3% closed. Currently, EPFCT webpage markets those twenty-eight 
consolidated programs, none in Santa Elena province. In the next section, I particularly 
focus on community tourism developed in Santa Elena after the coastal management 
introduced by CRMP, a national program for managing coastal resources in the 90s 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Community tourism in Santa Elena 
Santa Elena municipality was one of those 60 cantons embarked in tourism 
decentralization in the year 2001.  However, by those years, several communities in the 
northern parish of Manglaralto were familiar with tourism development. As the previous 
chapter details (Chapter 5), a national coastal resource management program, known as 
CRMP, engaged coastal villages under an integrated scope to manage coastal resources 
during the 90s.  Among other actions, CRMP categorized and developed some tourist 
beaches in Santa Elena to counter the vast devastation of mangroves.  
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The most popular project in Santa Elena was the Proyecto de Ecoturismo 
Comunitario (PRODECOS) or Community Ecotourism Project. The coastal resource 
management program endorsed this program, which, later on, became a member of 
Indigenous federation of tourism.  PRODECOS’ goal was to contribute to poverty 
alleviation by improving local capabilities and economic sustainability. PRODECOS also 
promoted individual entrepreneurship but required a commitment "to improve knowledge 
and reproduce it to others" (Zambrano 2011, 184). 
 The community-based ecotourism project was a project operated by Centro de 
Promoción Rural or Rural Promotion Center (RPC), a local NGO. Since 1997, RPC 
partnered Ayuda en Acción or Help in Action, a Spanish NGO, to intervene the 
Manglaralto and Colonche parishes, both devastated by 1997-1998 ENSO event (Chapter 
4). According to Ordoñez y Marco (2005), PRODECOS sponsored and financially 
assisted 300 families in 19 communities in north Santa Elena. Later, a report issued in the 
year 2014 informs PRODECOS developed and co-financed twenty-five restaurants, ten 
beach tents/seat rentals, seventeen hospederías comunitarias in Manglaralto and 
Colonche, the parishes CPR intervened (CPR-AeA, 2014).  
In an interview with the author (July 2, 2018), Carlos Floreano, a comunero 
owner of successful accommodation entrepreneurship in LB and PRODECOS 
beneficiary, states:  
“Families who engaged the [PRODECOS] project produced handicrafts made 
out of natural resources (sea, beach, and wood), provided local gastronomy, 
tourist guidance in ecological trials, and hospedaje comunitario.”  
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Hospedaje comunitario or in-family-house accommodation promoted by 
PRODECOS and CRMP spread throughout the rural comunas of Santa Elena in the early 
2000s.  The comuneros redesigned some sections of their homes to provide tourists with 
accommodation while Hospedaje Comunitario became a way to improve families’ cash 
economy. According to David Zambrano, CRP Director (interview with author August 
12, 2018), this rural modality of tourism furthers the usual understanding of tourist 
accommodation because the provision of a room within a family house enables 
interacting and holding talks with the members of the family while the tourist engages 
with the local culture. PRODECOS not only provided funds but this project also 
“achieved to create an organizational and self-management capacity among comuneros” 
and an “endogenous effect of appropriation and replication, stimulating an autonomous 
diversification of multi-sectoral entrepreneurship" (Zambrano 2011, 182). Thus, 
PRODECOS’ project and the Hospederias Comunitarias in Santa Elena reveal a 
neoliberal rationale centered on the promotion of self-capabilities pursuing the economic 
security of individuals (Reid 2013, 2018). 
In the year 2007, the territory of the peninsula of Santa Elena became an 
independent province under the anti-neoliberal administration of Ecuador. The leftist 
government intensively intervened the new province through programs, such as the Plan 
5-5-5 and legal frameworks such as the CT, both explained in the previous section. 
Concurrently, the subsidiarity principle was getting into effect in the cantons of Santa 
Elena. For instance, in 2010, the municipality of Santa Elena created the Empresa 
Publica Municipal de Turismo, a municipal corporation to manage tourism in the canton. 
This municipal office works in compliance with national MT policies and programs. 
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However, as León (2013) argues, Santa Elena's tourism reveals a historical disorder 
between tourism development and second home (or vacation home) development. This 
controversy in the municipal tourism management worsens when tourism gets into the 
common-property regime, which explicitly has autonomy over the land and resources.  
The next section addresses negotiations and decision-making within the complexity of 
beach tourism development, while the national government maintains its concern about 
the security and protection of its inhabitants. 
 
Tourism, beaches, and local threats in the seaside village of Libertador Bolívar 
A beautiful view of the Pacific Ocean, mixed with cliffs and hills, welcomes 
visitors entering from the south of the comuna of Libertador Bolívar. It is a rural 
community in the north of Santa Elena, parallel to the seashore. The route E-15, part of 
the binational tourist route called Spondylus Route, crosses a portion of the village. 
Along the E-15, the comuneros of LB have built homes and small businesses, in roughly 
0.62 miles of beachfront. At the end of this area, the Route E-15 turns right and continues 
toward northern communities. While the road crosses the town south to north, the 
Atravezado River crosses the town east to west dividing the commercial and residential 
areas. 
Tourism in LB has become crucial for comuneros’ wellbeing and has also 
transformed their life in almost two decades. Table 4 compares LB tourist services in the 
years 2002 and 2018. Thus, in sixteen years, restaurants increased from 6 to 20. 
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Similarly, from 3 hostels (54 beds7) operating in the year 2002, by the year 2018, LB had 
17 hostels (205 beds). Additionally, thirteen cabañeros now offer tourist services in the 
north beach, a group of women rents tents and chairs at the beach, other groups of women 
sell roasted ripe plantain, a couple of families produce and sell traditionally baked corn 
tortillas, and fifteen artisan shops sell locally elaborated handcrafts.   
In addition to the privately-owned providers, the community manages a hostel, 
called Hospedería Comunitaria, rent a ballroom, lease contract with the paragliding tour 
operator, which includes an office in the village and a field on the hill. During high 
tourist seasons, the comuneros organize lifeguard provision and events for tourist 
entertainment. This economic revitalization also includes fishers, divers (to catch octopus 
and bivalves), and farmers, who are also part of the local tourist economy supply-chain.    
 
Tourism services Year 2002 Year 2018 
Restaurants 6 20 
Hostels 3 17 
Beds 54 205 
 
Table 4. Tourism services in Libertador Bolívar. Elaborated by the author.  
Source: Isabel Cando Coastman NGO President 
 
Thus, tourism activities in LB integrate and benefit the economy of the whole 
community.  The comuneros are genuinely aware of this new economy in LB.  For instance, 
 
7 Beds are accommodation statistics in the tourism industry. 
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Smeling Suarez, comunero leader, in an interview with the author (August 10, 2018) 
asserts: 
"We cannot separate our economy. We cannot? operate our economy by sectors. 
They are all correlated." 
 Similar statements appear in the Community Logbooks. For instance, in a lively 
discussion held on August 29th, 2014, the minute records: 
"When we discuss on tourism, it is not a single sector. It is about the whole 
community." 
The same log of minutes also reveals the meaning of tourism industry among the 
comuneros of LB: 
"Making Tourism is development for all." 
Thus, in Libertador Bolívar, the tourism industry secures local economy and 
communal wellbeing. The main resource for tourism in LB is the 2.07 miles (3,325 m.) 
long beach strip – from the south (Playa Bruja) to the river mouth in the north. The beach 
is divided into two sections: the north and the south beach. LB’s tourist development 
started in south beach, where six comuneros built the first tourist cabañas by the late 90s 
and early 2000s. Nowadays, the south area is full of rural houses, small artisan/handcraft 
shops, groceries, hostels, and restaurants. Most of the hostels and restaurants occupy the 
outer slope of the cliff, facing the sea. Visitors enjoy going down to the beach, where the 
shoreline contrasts with the warm colors of the sand. On the beach, other comuneros have 
built thatched sun umbrellas, which they rent to the visitors. Another group of comuneros 
has built larger thatched kiosks, known as cabañas, where they offer beverages and 
traditional seafood snacks.  
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On the north, the beach has witnessed accelerated tourism development after the 
year 2009. By the year 2013, the comuneros built a dirt road to welcome tourists (detailed 
in next section). However, the dirt road occupied the upper part of the beach berm, the 
ultimate natural defense of the coast.  Three years later, the community assembly 
authorized building tourist cabañas in the northern beach. In 2017, the local government 
built a seawall in this area, beautified with a promenade, a paved street, an open stage, 
and thirteen cabanas, which are currently providing a variety of tourist services. 
Thus, since the late 90s, tourism development in rural communities of Santa Elena 
has introduced numerous processes into the comuneros’ everyday lives. In particular, 
these processes include decision-making on the use of the beach within both common-
property management and gaps within rural legislation. The next section analyses 
processes of self-organization, decision-making, and mediations over the use of the 
beach, a common-property resource in Libertador Bolívar. 
 
Tourist beach management in a common-property territory  
A tourism-led economy in the rural coast of Ecuador introduced new discussions 
about beach use into a communal-land property system. Traditionally, the Cabildo 
approves land possession certificates to build comuneros' homes.  Several comuneros, 
owners of handcraft shops subdivided their homes into workshops, where they sell a 
variety of hand-made products. However, it has worked differently in tourism businesses. 
By the late 1990s, the Cabañeros del Sur built their thatched tourist kiosks on inhabited 
areas at the southern cliff.  By the year 2003, they claimed for possession titles. The 
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community assembly approved and issued land possession certificates to the cabaneros 
after several debates. Later on, new cabañas expanded down to the beach.  
The expansion of tourist cabanas to the beach brought disagreements among the 
comuneros, particularly on the appropriate use and possession of beaches. For instance, 
logbooks of community minutes record: 
"The beaches belong to the community" (February 27th, 2004) 
"Respect the beach area. You cannot grab those lands" (March 8, 2008) 
"No one can conceive they own the beach, but the beach can be rented" 
(December 27, 2009) 
     A particular condition the comuna stipulates for private providers is to be 
registered in the national ministry that regulates common property territories. In this way, 
the community does not allow foreigners investors in their territory.  Only local families 
can own and manage businesses in LB. The only non-community member is the 
paragliding operator, who does not participate in the communal management or live in 
the community.   
 Businesses owned only by locals differentiate LB from other communities in 
Santa Elena, where foreign-owned business and second homes development have 
displaced comuneros from the best sites. For instance, Cedeño (2017) traces changes on 
the land property in Montañita, a surfing hotspot five miles north from LB. Cedeño 
reveals that 10% of Montañita lands now belong to foreigner-business, a process that 
started in the 80s. Similarly, in the communities of Olón, San José, and Punta Blanca, 
where wealthy Ecuadorians have built luxury second homes.  Furthermore, comuneros of 
LB constantly remember local episodes defending their territory.  For instance, during the 
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eighties, shrimp farming grabbed vast extensions of estuaries in communal lands (Latorre 
et al. 2015).  However, in the comuna Libertador Bolívar, it was different. In 1982, LB 
comuneros confronted land grabbers in an episode they remember as The War. Sadly, 
they remember a comunero leader died during the armed confrontation. Since then, the 
comuneros recall this episode when land issues reach the village.  Indeed, this memory 
was important during the recent land struggle. Since 2014, a foreign investor deceitfully 
grabbed some lands in LB. The investor promised second home developments would 
bring paid work opportunities into the community. However, after three years, the 
supposed real estate development never started. During 2017, the community leaders 
were incarcerated after leading a riot to recover those lands. Finally, leaders demonstrated 
in court the foreign investor issued fake documentation. After that, LB comuneros legally 
recovered the plot of land. Thus, land claims have become a pivotal principle guiding 
comuneros’ processes of self-organization and decision-making to keep and manage their 
common-property territory. 
The beach is part of the common-property territory in LB. Accordingly, the 
comuneros decide the appropriate administration of this resource. Thus, in the year 2009, 
the comuneros decided to embark into a new tourism initiative. They aimed to expand 
tourism services to the north beach, next to the river mouth. The goal was to transform 
the pristine beach into a tourist beach. This area in the north was the backyard of the 
community, where pigs looked for food from the garbage. Thus, the comuneros executed 
several communal initiatives to improve the area. First, they forged a campaign to remove 
pigs from the beach. Then, they cleaned up the garbage and removed the brush in the 
north beach sector in collaboration with municipal staff (community meeting September 
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11, 2009). However, in April 2012, the Risk Management Secretary (RMS) together with 
the Ministry of Environment, both national government offices, notified the comuna 
about the prohibition against carrying out projects next to the shoreline.  Despite this 
warning, the comuneros in unison declared to continue improving the north beach.  
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Dirt road in the north beach in November 2016. Source: author (2016 
Fieldwork) 
 
Thus, the comuna requested the municipality to construct a road next to the north 
beach. The municipality supported the construction but clarified that "the road that will 
be built will not run onto the sand; the road will go through the land" (Community 
Meeting August 31, 2012). On early 2013, the comuneros inaugurated a dirt road in the 
beachfront (Figure 12). In November 2013, the Community Assembly approved ten 
cabañas in this area, despite municipal warnings on beach banned constructions. 
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According to Community Assembly minutes, cabañas owners must pay fees, keep an 
area for a sand volleyball and soccer fields, and cooperate with annual festivities. 
However, the then-president imposed a clause: "If they do not comply, those plots will be 
returned to the community” (Community Assembly minute, November 28, 2013). It was 
a communal ownership reminder.  
Negotiations with the municipality continued during early 2014 to transform the 
dirt road into a Malecón, or promenade. Malecón’s municipal design shows a cobbled 
sidewalk, landscaping, and an open stage. The design did not include tourist cabañas 
because municipal ordinances ban constructions on the beach. The municipality of Santa 
Elena demanded an organized re-construction of the cabañas after constructing the 
malecón. According to municipality design, cabañas will not continue on the beach; 
kiosks would be built on the promenade. In doing that, the municipal staff aimed to 
support comuneros to legalize their tourist cabañas since they would comply with RMS 
norms. 
Conversely, it was not the best option according to LB tourist business owners. 
For instance, Oswaldo Chancay, tourist cabaña owner, (interview with author June 6, 
2018), asserts: 
"Tourists like to be served here on the beach"  
Similarly, Milton Cordova, tourist cabaña owner (interview with author June 21, 
2018), argues:  
"Tourists come to spend their time enjoying the sand and the sea, while we kindly 
deliver them the meals or drinks they request" 
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In sum, LB has developed a proper form of community tourism, one that admits 
privately owned and operated small-scale tourism businesses. Furthermore, the beach is 
now the main resource to secure the community’s tourism-led economy. In recent years, 
the comuneros intervened the pristine north beach to create more tourist spaces, 
consequently, more community benefits.  However, the intervention of the beach and the 
tourist operation in LB do not fulfill Ecuadorian tourism and risk management 
regulations. The next section reveals how comuneros co-exist with legal entanglements 
that, ultimately, increase community economic vulnerability.  
 
Entanglements between tourism development and risk management policies  
At LB, tourism development and risk management interplay without reaching 
coastal rural realities. First, most cabañas in LB, and Santa Elena canton as well, are 
located in what the Risk Management Secretariat has declared “risky zones,” unsafe 
zones where construction is banned. Second, a national regulation disassociated with the 
rural reality persists despite governmental efforts to decentralize national development 
policies. In this section, I trace both legal mismatches, which locate the comuneros 
tourism-led economy in spaces of illegality they endure every day, since community 
tourism secures comuneros wellbeing despite those legal entanglements. 
The comuneros are conscious they have developed their small-scale tourist 
businesses in risky zones since national offices have informed them of this in advance. 
For instance, in 2004, the Harbor Captaincy and the Municipality of Santa Elena 
informed them that anybody making business on the beach would be able to get an 
operation permit (Community Assembly minute, December 8, 2004). Community 
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Assembly minutes reveal the comuneros continued having the same reply during the next 
three years. 
This issue, seen in many seaside comunas at Santa Elena, became a concern 
highlighted on official documents when the leftist government took the national 
administration and requested to plan local development. For instance, an analysis of 
territorial issues in Manglaralto Parish conducted in the year 2011 states: 
 
 "Some businesses that offer tourist services do not meet certain specifications 
required by law and regulation, as in the case of some food and beverage 
businesses that because of their infrastructure, services or size could not be 
categorized or also the community hostels that do not have the minimum number 
of six rooms, could not be classified as hotel. Therefore, they are outside the 
cadaster of tourist services, distorting the real existing tourist offerings" (GAD-M 
2011, 85) 
 
The next Manglaralto Development Plan issued three years later, repeats those 
two main issues on tourist regulations at Santa Elena (GAD-M 2014). Thus, the anti-
neoliberal state practices did not manage to appropriate rule tourist operation in the rural 
coast.  By the year 2018, the Ministry of Tourism had certified only one of the seventeen 
hostels operating in LB, while the restaurants and thatched cabañas on the beach do not 
achieve any certification.  
Importantly, other communities in Santa Elena replicate the same feature. For 
instance, according to municipal records, the community of San Pablo has seventy-two 
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cabañas operating in risky areas. The community of Ayangue has seventy-four cabañas in 
less than seven hundred linear meters (0.43 miles). The community Olón has fifty-six, 
other communities have an average of twenty cabañas, and other communities, such as 
San Antonio and Valdivia, started building new cabañas in the year 2018.  However, all 
cabañeros in Santa Elena operate with a permit issued by the National Police, which does 
not mean a tourism certification.  
In addition, the National Public Health Regulation, Control and Vigilance Agency 
(PHRA) issue a permit that warrants public health regulations to restaurants. At LB, only 
the cabañeros del Sur (restaurants) got this permit in the year 2018. However, most of the 
restaurants do not have PHRA permit because they do not have a Registro Unico de 
Contribuyentes or Income Taxpayer Identification Number. According to the law, an 
taxpayer identification is mandatory for all individuals or companies performing 
occasional or permanent economic activities in the country. However, given the structural 
weakness of the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue Service, rural areas are far from its control. 
Nevertheless, neither the police permit nor PHRA’s, guarantee MT’s registration and 
certification. 
Additionally, many hostels in rural coastal villages, vital for comuneros 
livelihoods – do not match with the national normative on accommodation services. 
Since 2002, MT issues the Licencia Unica de Funcionamiento, a license to operate a 
tourist service: mainly accommodation, food and beverages (restaurants, bars, cafes, 
kiosks, and so on), and community tourism. From 2015, tourism regulations admit a 
minimum of five rooms in the hosterías –accommodations adapted in houses, and lodges, 
or accommodations built with local materials and vernacular architecture. Additionally, 
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the regulation included Casa de Huéspedes or Guest Houses, lodging offered at homes, 
with at least two and up to four exclusive rooms for guests. MT regulations also require 
taxpayer identification number, assets inventory, and paid property taxes. MT's certificate 
requires compliance with the RMS regulation, which bans infrastructure on beach berms 
or river mouths (SNGR-005-2011) (See chapter 4). However, MT regulation does not 
include tourism specifically developed in collective-property territories.  
The municipality of Santa Elena created a tourist cadaster aiming for better 
management of local tourism, informed Mario Aquino, Director of Santa Elena 
Municipal Tourism office (interview date July 7, 2918). In 2018, the municipal cadaster 
registered three hotels, seven restaurants, and a tour operator in LB, in addition to the 13 
cabañas at the malecón. Other businesses in LB operate without complying any 
regulation. The municipal tourism management department cannot issue any license if 
MT does not categorize tourist businesses.  In December 2018, the Ministry of Interior 
updated the scope of the police permit to tourist businesses not regulated by the Law of 
Tourism (E.D. #623-2018).   However, at the municipal level, the Tourism Office 
Director, and Richard Flores, RM Director (interviews with author July 31, 2018), 
confirmed, the municipality of Santa Elena would not be able to certify businesses built 
on unsafe areas. However, despite regulations’ incongruences, an endogenous tourism-
led economy has continued being the pivot in Santa Elena's common-property territories. 
The next section analyses the effects of this particular tourism industry on the beach 
ecosystem.  
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Natural and human-made changes at the beach 
While the beach is vital in the LB tourism-based economy, increasingly the 
villagers are confronting the effects of coastal erosion. Coastal erosion is a process of 
long-term removal of sediment and rocks producing shoreline retreat. Natural causes and 
human activities can erode the coast. Natural driving forces are storm waves, flooding, 
tides, currents, winds, sea-level rise, geological process, and climatic effects. Figures 13 
and 14 show erosion and damages in LB beaches after the November 2015 swell and 
September 18, 2018 tides.  
Waves are dominant natural forces producing physical changes in the shoreline.  
Wind interaction with the surface of the ocean produces waves, which roll on until they 
crash on the beach. Near the coast, local wind produces the sea’s waves. In the Pacific 
Ocean, winds and storms produce a series of traveling waves from the offshore, called 
swells. They have higher energy and wavelength than waves produced by local winds. 
The direction of swells approaching the coast plays a critical role in the accumulation of 
sediments at the beach. According to the Ecuadorian Coastal and Marine Area Regulation 
Plan (SENPLADES 2017), from December through March, waves arrive in Ecuadorian 
coasts from the north and northwest, while the southwest waves dominate during April to 
October. Oceanographers use forecast techniques and regularly measure wavelength, 
direction, and height to estimate waves’ effects on the beach. Storm waves (waves 
produced by storms) are another phenomenon affecting the beach. Storm waves originate 
in the southern and northern hemisphere before reaching the Ecuadorian coast. Even 
though maximum wave breaking heights are less than 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), storm waves 
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have more extended periods (between 16 and 18 seconds), reaching the upper part of the 
beach and eroding the berm, a natural storage of sand which delays natural beach erosion.  
Tides also impact waves incursion onto the beach. Tides or the gradual rise and 
fall of the sea level result from the gravitational forces among the moon and the sun, and 
the rotation of the planet. A complete cycle of tide goes between the highest and the 
lowest sea levels. In Ecuador, a complete cycle lasts approximately twelve hours (semi-
diurnal) and the time between consecutive high tide and low tide lasts 6 hours. Thus, 
Ecuadorian beaches receive two highest sea levels and two lowest levels every day (every 
24.5 hours). When the moon locates at the right angle to the sun, the values of the tidal 
generating force decrease, producing lower than normal tides. Conversely, during the full 
and new moon, the moon and the sun line up (a configuration called syzygy), producing 
higher than normal tides or spring tides, commonly known in Ecuador as aguajes. 
Sanchez (2015) records, tidal ranges up to 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) between high and low 
tides influencing wave running onto the beach in LB.  
Additionally, Ecuador is located within the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone, an 
area converging northern and southern trade winds near the equator line, consequently 
affecting waves’ behavior. During average years, in the coast of Ecuador (and Peru) the 
strong trade winds blow the warm surface waters, producing an abundant supply of food 
for small fish, making a good living for fishers. However, during El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon, trade winds fade for some months. Later, trade winds 
start to push the warm surface water back again, going back to normality.   
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Figure 13. Damages at Libertador Bolívar south beach during November 2015. Source: 
Enrique Sanchez 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Damages at Libertador Bolívar south beach during September 2018. Source: 
El Universo (2018) 
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Associated with sea temperature, ENSO also produces other effects on the 
shoreline. First, ENSO's effect increases sea level. According to a 1998 report (CAF 1998), 
the 1997/1998 ENSO phenomena increased sea level by 1.38 feet (0.42 m). Second, ENSO 
also produces storms with significant effects on the coast. In Ecuador, the median 
precipitation in this region is 206.4 mm/year – traced from 1982 - 2011 (Garcia et al., 
2017). In the northern part of Santa Elena Province during El Niño event 1982-83 
precipitation increased up to 3,000 mm. During 1997-98 El Niño event, the CENAIM-
ESPOL gage station in nearby Libertador Bolívar recorded precipitation up to 3,500 mm 
(Sánchez, 2015). The extreme raining and sea-level rise, ENSO brings to the coast, flood 
areas close to the sea and plunge river channels natural drainage. 
Global warming aggravates the effects of sea-level rise on beaches. Nicholls & 
Cazenave (2010) demonstrate that the mean rate of sea level from 1993 to 2009 rose 
amounts to 3.3 +/- 0.4 mm/year. Rising sea levels "act as an enabler of erosion because 
higher water levels allow waves to act further up the beach profile and move sediment 
seaward” (Zhang et al. 2004, 55). Sea surface temperature is also a major driver of 
accelerated sea-level rise (Laffoley & Baxter 2016). Laffoley & Baxter demonstrate 
exceptional global sea surface temperatures in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016. Sea 
surface temperature would "double in frequency" and “intensify” El Niño events 
(Laffoley & Baxter 2016, 36). Thus, adding another threat to the beach ecosystem.  
Concerns on coastal erosion appear in official Ecuadorian documents. For 
instance, the Coastal Marine Area Regulation Plan issued in 2017, states:  
“In recent years, the influence of waves, increasing erosive processes in several 
sites on the coasts, has been notorious; many of them associated with the arrival 
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of swells produced by tropical storms at high latitudes, exacerbated by anomalous 
events such as El Niño” (SENPLADES 2017, 44).  
 At the provincial level, coastal erosion’s concern also flourishes in official 
documents. For instance, the 2015 Santa Elena Province Development Plan admits: 
"A new consideration in the analysis of the vulnerability of human settlements 
relates with the average elevation of the sea, it was registered with the presence 
of El Niño phenomena, but has become more reiterative by the swells. The 
increase of sea level causes coastal erosion and damages in the shoreline, 
especially, the tourist infrastructure built at the edge of the beach" (GAD-PSE 
2015, 10) 
Two Manglaralto Parish Development Plans (GAD-PM 2011, 2014) also address 
the erosive concern on beaches. For instance: 
“Spring tides sporadically occurring in Manglaralto has affected the shoreline of 
the Manglaralto Parish, coastal erosion threats the communities of San Pedro, 
Libertador Bolívar, San Antonio, Cadeate, Manglaralto, Montañita, Olón, Curia, 
San José, and las Núñez; they are prone to sea destruction” (GAD-PM 2014, 18) 
Enrique Sanchez, a coastal engineer who traces the coast of Santa Elena since the 
1990s, explains that several beaches in Santa Elena "could not recover the sand and the 
erosion continues" after ENSO 1982-83 and 1997-98 (interview with author June 18, 
2018). According to the diagnosis Sanchez has done (2015), 10% of Santa Elena's coasts 
are currently eroded, and another 10% is vulnerable to erosion.  
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Furthermore, argues Sanchez, erosion in Santa Elena increases when high tides 
concur with spring tides or aguajes; and more damage, when they both also concur with 
ENSO. However, concerns increased during the year 2015, when waves severely battered 
the coast of Ecuador.  Swells battered Santa Elena beaches on January 5 and 31, March 
26, May 2, July 23, August 2, 5 and 9, September 28, and October 9. The events on 
January and May went along with spring tides while the September's event concurred 
with the perigee – the closest the moon comes to the Earth. News reported similar 
conditions occurred in previous years (El Comercio 2009, El Universo 2011)  
At the local level, inhabitants of LB have also noticed the coastal retreat. For 
instance, Carlos Floreano, owner of a hostel in the meeting held on August 31st, 2012, 
states: 
"The sea is winning space from us..… When we started our tourism businesses, 
we had more space [at the beach], now, the sea has beaten us, at least 9 meters" 
(29.5 feet). 
 Pedro Suarez, an elder and inspector at Libertador Bolívar, also comments: 
“It seems like a lie, that the sea could be where it is, but the sea also grows. If 
there had not been growing, we would not have lost the two rows of houses. Years 
ago, the sea was well below." (interview with author August 10, 2018). 
Similarly, another elder of Libertador Bolívar states:  
"The sea was very far…. We who live here, know that the sea has been 
rising…The sea has continued rising, growing up. It is rising. We have the force 
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of the sea, the aguajes during the full moon" (E15 interview with author July 15, 
2018). 
Sanchez (2015) also analyzes contemporary erosive processes at Libertador Bolívar 
beaches. At the river mouth, sedimentary processes have developed low areas, which 
produce a berm, the natural storage of sand. This berm delays natural erosion in the north 
beach explains Sanchez. On the contrary, on the south beach, the cliff naturally restricts 
the development of the berm and minimizes the sand reserve. Sanchez found evidence of 
erosion in the southern part of the beach next to the cliff in addition to low berm levels, 
exceeded by storm waves’ impacts and during El Niño occurrence, as well.  
Additionally, human activities can also be responsible for wearing away beaches 
and bluffs along coastlines. Particularly in LB, tourism-led development has exacerbated 
beach changes. At the south beach, locals built the original cabañas in the unstable slope 
of the southern cliff. In order to protect their tourist businesses, the comuneros have 
inadequately filled the cliff, with deficient material and without technical procedures.  
Indeed, the comuneros are aware of the threat they coexist with. For instance, the 
Community Assembly Minute January 17, 2004, records:  
“The [southern] cabanas are located on unstable land.”  
Similarly, comunero owners of restaurants in the south cliff assert:  
“I struggle with the mud coming from the hill during severe rains” (E9 interview 
with author July 8, 2018) 
“When I was a child, we saw the mudslide going down from the cliff toward the 
beach.  However, my uncle cemented it to protect the land. Now it is safe” (E8 
interview with author July 7, 2018). 
 
226 
“During the night, trucks brought gravel and stone to fill this area, until the dune 
disappeared” (E18 interview with author June 30, 2018). 
Despite comuneros’ acknowledgment of unstable areas, they remain at the bottom 
of the cliff, where tourists enjoy the sun, the sand, the beach, and cocktails and seafood.   
The north beach of Libertador Bolívar has also suffered human intervention. 
Google Earth images comparing the years 2006 and 2016 reveal the transformation of the 
beach. The 2006 image (Figure 15) shows seagrass naturally growing between the beach 
and houses built along the beachfront. According to the comuneros in LB, the 
construction of a road in the north beach benefits their tourism-led economy: 
“No, there was not that street. We built it to receive more tourists. They can park 
their cars and go to the beach” (E7 interview with author November 15, 2016). 
“Now we have this area for tourist parking. It will increase visitors to our beach” 
(Milton, Comunero owner of a cabana interview with author June 21, 2018) 
The 2016 Google Earth image (Figure 16) shows that a dirt road replaced the 
natural seagrass and several cabañas built on the beach. In 2017, the local government 
constructed a seawall to protect the north beach. The dirt road became a beautified 
promenade built on the top of the seawall, where comuneros re-built their thatched 
cabañas and tourists spend their leisure time.  
All those anthropic interventions in the north beach of LB have changed the very 
nature of the beach ecosystem. Sanchez (interview with author June 18, 2018) estimates, 
beaches in LB have retreated roughly ten meters (32.8 feet) between the years 2006-
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2015. This condition, and the fact that the seawall does not wholly stop coastal erosion’s 
effects, implies imperceptible processes that modify the beach, concludes Sanchez.   
In sum, the beach ecosystem in Libertador Bolívar, is constantly prone to natural 
processes of sediment removal, which, eventually, erode or retreat the beach. Even 
though erosive processes are continuous and dynamic, other stressors are increasing 
changes of the beach. On the one hand, a tourism-led economy that requires beaches as a 
natural resource to develop the industry. On the other hand, global threats emerging from 
atmospheric and oceanographic phenomena are  increasingly frequent disturbing the 
beach ecosystem and increasing the threats, including the possibility of El Niño events. 
The next section addresses to Comuneros decision-making and mediations to confront 
increasing threats at the beach.  
 
 
Figure 15. Libertador Bolívar north beach in 2006. Source: Google Earth. 
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Figure 16. Anthropic effects at Libertador Bolívar north beach in 2016. Source: Google 
Earth  
 
The increasingly frequent local threats 
Since LB tourism-led economy depends on the beach, any disturbance at the 
beach affects the whole community. As I show in chapter 4, Santa Elena is prone to 
seasons of extreme rainfall and droughts, effects of ENSO phenomena. Tsunamis are also 
a threat, according to RMS. However, the sea is more frequently battering the beaches of 
Santa Elena, particularly affecting the local tourism-led economy.  Swells destroyed 
cabanas and houses at Santa Elena during 2009, 2010, and with more frequency and 
intensity during the year 2015 (Sanchez 2015). The swell of May 2, 2015, that concurred 
with the syzygy (when the moon and the sun line up producing higher than normal tides), 
impacted the inhabited area at the north beach of LB. Figure 17 shows a picture captured 
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by a comunero during the onslaught of waves, when seawater ran onto the houses’ 
backyards, covered the dirt road, destroyed several cabañas, and reached sewer system 
pipes. Consequently, this event increased LB population’s risk.  
 
 
Figure 17. Waves battering the dirt road on May 2, 2015. Source: Enrique Sanchez 
Immediately after, comuneros convened a special Community Assembly, where 
they decided to request governmental protection. In response, RM municipal staff built a 
temporary protection made out of rocks and activated an Emergency Operation 
Committee (Chapter 4). This action would allow the municipality to have accurate 
information about the emergency, and then take effective mitigation interventions.  In 
result, the need for permanent protection to the whole LB beach emerged, states RM 
Director (Richard Flores, interview with author July 31, 2018).  Furthermore, the 
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technical study issued after the emergency recommended prioritizing seawall 
construction rather than the malecón. In addition, by the time this local emergency 
occurred, the RMS 50/50 program had concluded.  Consequently, the municipality would 
need to finance the whole construction: the seawall and the previously promised 
promenade.  Accordingly, the municipality prioritized the population’s protection rather 
than the safeguarding of the local tourism-led economy. This fact brought disagreements 
between the municipality and the LB comuneros. 
On August 2, 5 and 9, and September 28, 2015, waves severely battered the 
village again. Since the last event surged the tidal pond, the Prefecture had built retaining 
walls in the river mouth (see Figure 10). However, the beaches are under municipal 
management and control. Thus, comuneros made another claim to the municipality for 
protecting the beaches of Libertador Bolívar. The mayor needed to decide between a 
seawall protecting the whole beach strip but without Malecón, or to build a seawall and 
the promenade in the north beach. The Municipal decision was to protect the north beach, 
where the inhabitants are at higher risk since infrastructure at the south beach does not 
include houses, only tourist businesses. 
However, this proposal brought another disagreement between the municipal 
government and the comuneros: the seawall’s technical height compliance. Seawalls are 
6 or 7 meters (19.7 to 23 feet) deep. On the top, they need to fulfill technical 
specifications regarding height. The height of a seawall is related to the level a maximum 
wave can reach in extreme conditions. It depends on local oceanic and topographic 
conditions. Regulations in European countries require 100% of protection, that is to say, 
waves’ impacts will never destroy beach infrastructure. In Ecuador, there is no regulation 
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on this parameter. LB’s seawall was designed with a 2% risk of being overcome by the 
height of the sea (Sanchez 2015). That means that there is a possibility that, three days 
per year, waves can surpass the seawall’s height, explains Sanchez (interview with author 
June 18, 2018). However, the comuneros demanded a seawall with a height lower than 
the technical specifications. Otherwise, the coastal protection would make a barrier 
separating the beach from the village; consequently, destroying LB’s major tourism 
attraction. 
The beautified Malecón was inaugurated in December, 2017, with much rejoicing 
among inhabitants. After eight years, their greatest desire had become true. A six-meter-
deep seawall underpins the Malecón. This protection has the specific function of resisting 
the energy of the waves. However, it does not meet the height specified in the technical 
study.  Consequently, the risk waves can rise above the protection wall doubled. This is 
even more true in extreme conditions, such as ENSO concurring with aguajes and 
syzygy, as it occurred during the 97/98 event. Furthermore, between the Malecón and the 
sea, locals built their tourist recreational cabañas again. The municipality is aware of this 
situation and is driving efforts to reduce such risk through constant monitoring and alerts. 
The 2018 tourist season was successful, as visitors enjoyed the new infrastructure 
that LB offers. However, on September 13th, 2018, swells again battered LB (El 
Universo 2018). This time the waves destroyed the tourist infrastructure at the south 
beach.  The claiming process started again. The Community Assembly meeting with the 
Mayor and the Tourist and Risk Management municipal departments activated an 
Emergency Operation Committee while the Comuneros submitted a claim for protection. 
While I write this dissertation, discussions on the construction of the seawall at the south 
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beach continue.  However, like Milton, whose family income depends on a tourist cabana 
at the malecón, argues: 
"We are at risk, but if we do not risk, tourist will never visit this place." 
Thus, the comuneros’ major concern is the economic security while they are 
conscious of the risk that the tourist infrastructure is prone to at the beach. Paradoxically, 
neither the Ecuadorian RMS policies, nor international hegemonic frameworks, include 
small but quotidian threats, such as the waves increasingly battering the beaches of Santa 
Elena. Both national and international policies on disaster and risk management focus on 
efforts to protect the population from catastrophes.  However, local events threaten 
comuneros’ economic security and impact the beach ecosystem. The next section 
discusses what these local, small, and, chronic events entail within the politics of 
resilience.  
 
Conclusion: local threats, slow emergencies, and the politics of resilience 
More than three decades ago, the comuneros of Libertador Bolívar decided to 
secure the future of the whole community by embarking in a global industry: tourism. 
However, since the comunas of Santa Elena exist in rural areas and include common-
property lands regimes, the comuneros have developed a tourism-led economy within 
legal entanglements. Consequently, their tourism-led economy is constantly at risk. 
While the comuneros circumvent those local legal incongruences through processes of 
self-organization, decision-making, and mediation, other factors also threaten the tourist 
infrastructure at the beach.  The moon converging with the sun, gravitational factors, and 
other hydro-meteorological stressors affect waves’ force and, consequently, their impact 
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at the beach. Furthermore, global warming aggravates the effects of waves and sea-level 
increase, impacting the village of LB. In Santa Elena, waves threaten but are not 
catastrophic. However, wave disruptions on the beaches are more and more frequent. 
Consequently, legal entanglements and waves’ unpredictable behavior have become local 
stressors the comuneros endure in a daily basis.   
Thus, the comuneros coexist with small, local, and misrepresented events that, 
in a global scale, “never quite achieve the status of having occurred or taking place” 
(Povinelli 2016,13).  Small but quotidian processes are important since they can also 
change the very nature of systems over time (Chapter 2). Furthermore, in the interval of 
catastrophic but sudden disruptions, such as ENSO, the comuneros deal with those slow 
and chronic events.  The contemporary history of the comuneros also reveals processes of 
self-organization, decision-making, and mediation addressing those “quasi-events” 
(Povinelli 2016).  On the one hand, they decide over their territory management. On the 
other hand, they mediate governmental intervention and demand constitutional rights of 
protection. 
Since the comuneros made their claim for protection, comuneros’ quotidian 
struggles with waves battering the beach also instantiate what Anderson et al. (2019) call 
slow emergencies. Anderson et al. (2019) propose the descriptor slow emergencies to 
understand ordinary circumstances that demand urgent governmental action. Slow 
emergencies highlight those not punctual, not acute emergencies, which also demand 
collective political or ethical response. Thus, slow emergencies are constant and 
imperceptible episodes, locally endured by those who coexist with small but non- or mis-
recognized threats. 
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The concept introduced by Anderson et al. also counters the disaster-led 
emergency management promoted worldwide. Instead, slow emergencies focus on the 
effects of ordinary events that demand governmental intervention. Similarly, comuneros 
struggles between waves and tides break the dominant focus on catastrophic events. First, 
the municipal government applied mitigation techniques to prevent waves’ constant 
damages on the beach infrastructure rather than responding to RMS programming. 
Second, since the comuneros are conscious that tourist infrastructure is prone to waves 
and tidal threats, then local realities at LB reveal alternative approaches to risk. 
Comuneros coexist with recurring small uncertainties. Paraphrasing Berkes et al. (1995), 
the comuneros allow small and unpredictable perturbations to enter in the socio-
ecological system instead of locking them out, as a risk and disaster management 
rationale aims to do.  
Furthermore, at the coastal rural communities in Santa Elena, economic security 
is their main concern. Consequently, comuneros self-organization, decision-making, and 
mediations revolve around an economized life. In LB, community economic survival is 
more lifelike than any possibility of catastrophic events the national government 
addresses, such as ENSO or a tsunami (Chapter 4). Moreover, economic security justifies 
beach intervention, changing the pristine landscape into a modern promenade while a 
seawall – a human-made wall that reduces erosion and resists waves energy – protects the 
population. 
Then, resilience is not exclusively an external program imposed through 
governmental techniques. Instead, focusing on local and chronic disruptions turns the 
analysis of resilience into internal processes within the interplay of the social, the 
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ecological, the economic, and the political. At the local level, resilience entails political 
processes that include nature, population, and governmental security techniques.  First, 
LB beaches are prone to erosion; a natural chronic process nowadays exacerbated by 
human interventions and global warming. Second, on a daily basis, the population deals 
with slow emergencies to secure the village economy. Third, governmental resilience and 
sustainable development programs in Ecuador failed to reach rural realities appropriately. 
Thus, the case of Santa Elena, the use (and abuse) of natural resources, individuals living 
in the interstices of national policies, and governmental logics towards securing the 
population’s wellbeing, configure dynamic and continuous subsets of political processes 
within the endless and complex human-in-nature relationship.  
An uneven political process between nature, population, and security techniques 
will lead to unnoticeable socio-ecological damages. Thus, the politics of resilience should 
include not only social demands, as in the case of Libertador Bolívar, but also the claims 
made by nature. In LB, the beach is suffering the effects of local self-capabilities 
pursuing the economic security of the community. However, within the socio-ecological 
relationship, nature demands to be approached as an object of political struggles. In the 
next section, I reveal how the Ecuadorian government’s rationale of securing population 
problematize interventions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Between development and security: the governmental problematization of nature 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have unraveled different stressors interplaying in 
seaside communities of Santa Elena, Ecuador. In doing so, I disclosed changes in Santa 
Elena from the 1980s – after the decline of the shrimp farming industry – through 2018, 
one year after the anti-neoliberal government left the presidential office. The 
management of coastal resources and tourism development mainly relate to those 
changes in Santa Elena. While the initial concern regarding deterioration of coastal 
resources in Santa Elena was the impact of the shrimp farming industry, after three 
decades, a tourism-based economy is exacerbating the use of sandy beaches. The 
dynamics of environmental deterioration intertwined with tourism development reveal 
consistent governmental concerns on securing the wellbeing of Santa Elena’s comuneros.  
On the one hand, the neoliberal recipes adopted in Ecuador during the 1980s and early 
2000s aimed to improve coastal conservation by enhancing comuneros’ capacity to create 
a sustainable economy – based on appropriate use of the beaches (Chapter 5). On the 
other hand, the anti-neoliberal government ruling Ecuador from 2007 through 2017 
aimed to reduce comuneros’ vulnerability to natural disasters, such as severe floods, 
ENSO or a tsunami (Chapter 4). 
Drawing upon Julian Reid’s work on the sustainable development–resilience 
nexus (2013, 2018), this chapter brings together the ongoing nature-development-security 
problematization on the coast of Santa Elena. According to Reid, the sustainable 
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development-resilience nexus reveals the neoliberal appropriation of both sustainable 
development and resilience. In doing so, Reid aims to decenter the security discourse 
supporting neoliberal adaptation that allows it to survive despite changes in government. 
Security has been the rationality underpinning Western development, argues Reid.  
“Sustainable development deploys ecological reason to argue for the need to secure the 
life of the biosphere,” however, “neoliberalism prescribes economy as the very means of 
that security” (Reid 2013, 354).  Thus, sustainable development, advocating ecological 
reasoning, actually subjugates individuals to live for economic security. However, 
continues Reid, resilience is now the rationality underpinning sustainable development. 
On the one hand, resilience appeals to security by inculcating a permanent exposure to 
threats and risk. On the other hand, in line with neoliberalism, resilience also advocates 
for decentralized responsibility at the local level (Smith 2015, Joseph 2013, Coaffee & 
Fussey 2015).  
In this chapter, I trace the shifts between the ecological and developmental issues 
in Santa Elena to reveal the sustainable development-nexus in Ecuador.  In order to 
elaborate on the case, I turn to the genealogy of resilience traced in the previous chapters, 
which has shown three decades of changes and interventions in the coastal areas of the 
Santa Elena peninsula.  By tracing the security concern for the lives of comuneros, I 
observed a constant nature, development and security problematization justifying the 
continuous deterioration of ecosystems despite neoliberal or anti-neoliberal state 
practices.  
 
 
238 
The ongoing problematization of nature in the coast of Ecuador 
Shrimp farming in Ecuador became one of the most important industries 
contributing to the country's economy during the last decades of the twentieth century. 
However, the shrimp industry also brought deterioration of the coastal ecosystem. In the 
thirty years from 1969-1999, Ecuador lost 26.5 % of its mangroves, mainly because the 
construction of shrimp farms required extensive areas of saline waters (Arriaga 2000). 
The particular detriment of mangroves caught the attention of Stephen Olsen, then-
Director of the Coastal Resource Center at the Rhode Island University (CRC-URI). 
Olsen teamed up with Howard T. Odum, an American pioneer on ecosystem ecology, to 
analyze the relationship between the ecological and economic processes of shrimp 
farming in Ecuador. The final report issued in 1991 opens the discussion with the 
following statement:  
“The [shrimp farming] industry has, in a mere fifteen years, become Ecuador’s 
second largest earner of foreign exchange. It has also brought greater changes to 
the country’s coastal ecosystem than any other human activity. The industry has, 
with minor exceptions, transformed every estuary by the construction of ponds in 
former salt flats and mangrove wetlands, channelizing water flow and in some 
cases significantly altering water quality. Through the capture of seed shrimp and 
egg-bearing females, the industry has increased the pressures on all estuarine 
fisheries. It has also brought employment, and, to some, great wealth” (Odum & 
Arding 1991, i). 
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Indeed, the shrimp industry in Ecuador requires extensive estuarine areas where 
salinity levels are vital for the growth of shrimp.  Initially, this industry also depended on 
the natural larvae captured in the sea. The seed shrimp were transferred to large shrimp 
ponds to complete their growth cycle. In Ecuador, larveros’ or shrimp larvae collectors’ 
contribution to the shrimp industry tripled in fifteen years, from seven billion seed shrimp 
in 1986 to twenty-four billion in the year 2000 (Arriaga 2000).  In Santa Elena, the 1993 
Manglaralto Management Plan (CRMO 1993) estimates that more than 80% of the 
economically active population in the parish of Manglaralto collected shrimp larvae 
during the aguajes, periods of high tides.  Consequently, for an average of sixteen days 
per month, the agricultural laborers abandoned their crops and went into the sea to collect 
shrimp larvae.  In Santa Elena, the larveros collected shrimp larvae in two ways. 1) 
Artisanal fishing at 25–50 meters offshore, operating pangas or boats adapted with conic 
nets and floaters made out of mangrove. 2) At the surf zone area, the larveros collected 
shrimp-larvae with manually handled nets. This artisanal method for capturing shrimp-
larvae produced high mortality of shrimp and other species while conflicting with the 
incipient tourism in the north of Santa Elena peninsula (Arriaga 2000, PMRC 1993). 
Thus, Ecuador’s shrimp industry threatened mangroves and the natural shrimp cycle in 
the sea.  
The Coastal Resource Management Program (CRMP) addressed the effects of the 
shrimp industry on the coast of Ecuador. As I show in chapter 5, the program operated 
from 1986 to 2008, the time when Ecuadorian governments adopted neoliberal state 
practices. During the first phase (1986-2003), the program applied Integrated Coastal 
Management (ICM) methodology. The CRC-URI had successfully experienced ICM in 
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some US coastal areas since the 1970s and partnered with USAID to test the ICM in 
tropical countries. From 1994 when the project entered its implementation phase, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) funded the CRMP until it concluded. 
Initially, the coastal management program included the ecological impact of Santa 
Elena’s larveros. The provision of natural shrimp-larvae to the shrimp industry could 
cause the collapse of the natural shrimp life cycle in the sea.  As shown in Chapter 5, 
after several initiatives, the CRMP changed Ecuadorians’ behavior on the use and abuse 
of coastal ecosystems and promoted locals’ entrepreneurship capability. For achieving 
those goals, the ICM operated the Two-Track Strategy, a co-management that included 
collaborative participation and decentralization. At the national level, CRMP addressed 
environmental degradation by legal frameworks, banning mangrove exploitation and 
controlling shrimp-farming permits for use in estuarine areas. At the local level, CRMP 
raised consciousness on the ecological damage the shrimp industry had introduced to 
comuneros’ communal lands, while the participatory process of decision making 
disclosed novel forms of sustaining livelihoods. 
The longitudinal analysis of the CRMP’s operation also reveals that its initial 
concern for environmental conservation turned into adopting sustainable development 
criteria, particularly after the IDB funded the project. Sustainable development was 
emerging globally in the late 1990s. According to the UN, sustainable development was 
the solution to the need for developing local economies and protecting the environment. 
Indeed, by early 2000, when Ecuador signed a second IDB contract, sustainable 
development “c[ame] to be viewed increasingly as the potential bearer of an alternative 
security paradigm” (Doran 2002, 12). In the Ecuadorian coastal areas, the second IDB 
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loan devoted to CRMP’s operation targeted mainly poverty alleviation, understood as the 
problem of underdeveloped countries, while putting aside the ICM approach.  
By the end of the 1990s, the shrimp industry had almost collapsed. The 
1997/1998 ENSO deeply impacted the shrimp farming cycle, and, later on, the outbreak 
of a severe shrimp disease decreased shrimp production (Chapter 3). ENSO 1997/1998 
damaged the shrimp larvae-based economy at the north of Santa Elena. Thus, as I showed 
in Chapter 3, people in Santa Elena strengthened their capacity to rebuild their social 
lives by embarking on community tourism and handicrafts. It was an alternative the 
CRMP had already promoted on the coast of Ecuador. The CRMP continued supporting 
and promoting small-scale tourism entrepreneurship, community-operated Hospederias 
Comunitarias, and a few of other tourism-related businesses. Accordingly, Santa Elena 
was to achieve economic and resource sustainability through tourism development. 
Small-scale business tourism was less harmful than the extensive shrimp industry.  
More importantly, CRMP’s collaborative participation techniques allowed locals 
decision-making over their common-property land as well as the defense of their 
territories (Chapter 5). In Community Assemblies, locals discussed the new opportunities 
CRMP was bringing to their comunas, mainly tourism. Small-scale business tourism 
development fit with their cash-strapped economy. As I pointed out in chapter 6, since 
the CRMP started, community tourism had revitalized livelihoods in seaside comunas of 
Santa Elena. Comuneros are now entrepreneurs, while the community decides social, 
economic and environmental arrangements in their territory. Many comuneros in Santa 
Elena operate their own small-scale tourism businesses, employ wage-labor, pay fees, 
promote their business, and decide over their lands and their wellbeing.  
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Thus, the coastal management program in Ecuador inserted the comuneros into 
"the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of the population to 
economic processes" (Foucault 1978, 141).  Paraphrasing Julian Reid (2013), CRMP’s 
development criteria reduced comuneros’ lives to an economized form, by which 
development becomes synonymous with economic improvement. However, the classical 
biopolitical critique of development argues that it “functions to subject people to 
economization of life of the subject and its society” (Reid 2018, 645). Thus, a biopolitical 
approach to CRMP’s effects on Santa Elena reveals that comuneros were made subjects 
of Western forms of development, highly influenced by the marketization of their labor 
and their livelihoods.  
Nonetheless, the small-scale tourism development Santa Elena undertook in the 
late 1990s (Chapter 6) instantiates “how vulnerable the ecological reasoning that 
underpins sustainable development has been to the economic reasoning of neoliberalism” 
(Reid 2018, 645). After the CRMP intervention, sandy beaches had become a vital 
resource for the economy of the comunas, the Parish of Manglaralto, and the Canton of 
Santa Elena. Comuneros’ economy relies on beach ecological, recreational and economic 
value. On the beach, the comuneros have built the cabanas, the primary source for the 
community economy circulation. Many of the cabanas are occupying the natural areas, 
such as seagrass areas and berms (Chapter 6), which are needed to protect the beach from 
erosion. Indeed, tourism-led development has exacerbated the use of the beach 
ecosystem.   
 Reid concludes the quote I cited in the previous paragraph by pointing out the 
vulnerability of ecosystems in front of the economic reasoning of neoliberalism. 
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However, the case of Ecuador is different. The ecological reasoning underpinning small-
scale tourism business development was more subsumed under the anti-neoliberal 
government ruling Ecuador from 2007-2017.  On the one hand, the anti-neoliberal 
rationale found the tourism development of Santa Elena crucial for the endogenous 
development and solidarity economy which the government pursued (Chapter 3) and on 
the other hand, the risk management security rationale armored the beaches to protect the 
population from floods, ENSO or tsunamis (Chapter 4). As I will explain in the following 
paragraphs, Santa Elena’s beach ecosystem is currently vulnerable to economic and risk 
management reasoning.  
 In 2009, the comuneros of Libertador Bolívar self-organized to transform the 
north beach into a promenade (Chapter 6). Later on, in 2015, the demand for the 
promenade construction turned into claims for protection of the population. On many 
occasions, intense waves run up the beach, impacting beachfront infrastructure and 
destroying the cabanas, while the sandy beaches momentarily disappeared. Destruction 
increases when high tide converges with the moon syzygy.  Evidently, when both concur 
with the ENSO phenomenon, catastrophic damage could result.  Ultimately, this natural 
process of waves running up and down creates beach erosion. Indeed, small but 
increasingly frequent impacts can change the very nature of a system (Davoudi 2012).  
Additionally, the anthropic intervention of the beaches, such as seagrass removal and 
berm occupancy, also increases beachfront infrastructures’ vulnerability to high tides. 
Consequently, the tourism-led economy and populations' security are now at risk. Thus, 
while the solution to the ecological degradation of coastal resources was to shift toward a 
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market economy, twenty years later the tourism market has generated the problem of 
security for comuneros.   
 Thus, in response to the increasingly frequent rise in sea level – mainly present 
during the aguajes, and the emergency claims demanded by the comuneros, the 
municipal government has built seawalls in several seaside villages in Santa Elena 
(Chapter 6). The Risk Management criteria, introduced in Ecuador during the anti-
neoliberal decade, considered engineering a structural measure to mitigate populations’ 
vulnerability to the effects of rising sea level (Chapter 4). Between 2016 and 2017, the 
local government built retaining walls at the river mouth and a seawall on the north beach 
in the comuna of Libertador Bolívar, and now in 2019, the seawall underpins the tourism-
led economy and the wellbeing of the comuna.  On top of the seawall, the municipal 
government built the promenade, an initiative the comuneros started in 2009.  Alongside 
the promenade, thirteen cabanas are currently the new tourist attraction of Libertador 
Bolívar; tourists enjoy the sandy beach and local gastronomy. Locals take advantage of 
peak tourist seasons while they are aware that the waves might batter the beach at any 
moment. The ongoing security issue detailed in the previous paragraphs justified 
changing the very nature of the beaches.  The socio-ecological relationship between the 
beach and the locals keeps shifting between the constant nature, development and 
security problematization that justifies continuous ecological deterioration, whether the 
government is neoliberal or anti-neoliberal.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
Conclusions 
 
My dissertation traces a genealogy of neoliberal and anti-neoliberal resilience 
organizing coastal rural lives in Ecuador, to understand how practices of resilience-
building morph alongside new ways of governing lives.  In doing so, my work posits a 
critique of current discussions of resilience that view the concept as embedded in 
neoliberal governmental rationalities. On the one hand, the research charts the 
development and deployment of adaptive management criteria that underpinned 
sustainable development programs during the late 90s and early 2000s, when Ecuadorian 
governments ruled the country through neoliberal practices. On the other hand, an anti-
neoliberal government ruling Ecuador from 2007-2017 deployed resilience criteria 
through disaster and risk reduction management.  
Thus, longitudinal analysis of Ecuadorian governance of comuneros’ economic 
and environmental relations reveals how Ecuadorian governments, whether ruling 
through neoliberal or anti-neoliberal practices, have both relied on elements from wider 
discourses on resilience, which ultimately justify governmental intervention to secure the 
population’s growth and development in the face of uncertain futures.  Indeed, both 
neoliberal and anti-neoliberal governments have promoted tourism-led development 
strategies within comuneros’ communities. Both neoliberal and anti-neoliberal 
interventions in coastal villages implemented similar techniques, such as legal 
regulations, various form of decentralization, unique styles of technocratic planning, and 
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participatory adaptive management. But importantly, each style of governance deployed 
distinct constellations of these techniques in response to specific problems of social and 
environmental change. For example, the tourist economy in rural Santa Elena is now 
threatened by increasingly frequent of waves and sea-level rise at Santa Elena’s beaches, 
particularly during El Niño phenomenon. But waves pummeling Santa Elena’s beaches 
did not meet the national government’s categorization of a natural disaster. Instead, the 
local government responded after locals demanded the protection of their villages. Thus, 
as this dissertation demonstrate, diverse approaches to resilience-building reflect distinct 
governmental strategies to secure tourist-led development against social and 
environmental uncertainties. Thus, while many scholars have become dismissive of 
resilience for its close ties to neoliberal governance reforms, this dissertation shows how 
the particular form resilience takes is shaped by shifting and dynamic relations between 
prevailing governmental ideologies, uncertain environmental impacts, and the 
effectiveness of public demands for government response to these impacts.  
Research contribution 
The current dissertation analyzes a unique collection of resilience policies in both 
neoliberal and anti-neoliberal governments. It contributes to critical resilience scholars' 
endeavor to capture resilience malleability by which it transcends contexts and 
institutions.  As a result, this research furthers scholarship mainly focused on the 
ubiquitousness of neoliberal resilience.  Indeed, critical resilience thinkers’ emphasis on 
neoliberal institutionalization of resilience is actually replicating what they critique, 
overlooking other alternatives. My post-colonial approach brings to academia a case from 
a politically unstable country in general, and from coastal rural lives in particular. By 
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emphasizing small quotidian events rather than catastrophic events, this dissertation 
captures the constructive role of local emergency claims – frequently missed in the 
analysis of complex interconnections. Additionally, those slow emergencies in Santa 
Elena disclosed local decisions on the use of natural resources and locals’ co-existence 
with increasingly frequent tidal threats. Local decisions over, and co-existence with, 
coastal threats largely counter the Western hegemonic approaches to risk.  
Replication of this longitudinal transformation’s analysis can provide insights in 
contested spaces between nature, population, and mechanisms of governance. The 
methodology I applied to understand the indeterminacy of complex interconnections 
includes: 1) the adoption of resilience as a style of thought to transgress social-
institutional interplay with nature.  As a style of thought, resilience shines light on 
reciprocal feedback between the social and the ecological components of the system that 
take place within nature, development, and security arrangements. 2) A genealogy of 
resilience on the coast of Ecuador allows for the unfolding of how resilience constitutes a 
governmental security technique, operating in multiple processes and morphing alongside 
ways of governing life. 3) A process-tracing methodology allows breaking the 
longitudinal analysis to observe changes and sequences of small and local events. 
Overall, this dissertation emphasizes small but quotidian events, the slow emergencies, 
rather than catastrophic events to capture the constructive role of local emergency claims 
in complex adaptive systems’ feedback loops. 
My contribution exceeds conventional critiques of institutions that wield power 
over the population. In stark contrast, my case combines the analysis of powerful global 
and national institutions ruling Ecuadorians’ lives with local claims on emergency that 
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focus on the slight but chronic local effects on nature.  In doing so, the history of coastal 
lives sets new directions for research on how local socio-natural struggles are increased 
by climate change. Thus, my dissertation moves debates of resilience from a mere 
critique of the effects of resilience thinking to unveil resilience in the realm of politics.  
 
Limitations 
Despite the richness of regulatory practices and local voices captured throughout 
my dissertation, the lack of data regarding Santa Elena frustrated me during my 
longitudinal analysis. Few and separate anthropological, sociological, or geographical 
accounts regarding rural lives on the coast of Ecuador exist. Anthropological work 
published during the 1980s and 1990s continues to be the only source shedding light on 
current research in Santa Elena.  Similarly, little technical data specific to rural areas in 
Santa Elena exist. For instance, census data collects population and macro-economic 
information at the parish level but does not categorize data regarding communal 
administrative divisions. 
Similarly, neither the tourism ministry nor the municipal tourism office accurately 
records Santa Elena's tourism business in rural areas. As shown in my research, coastal 
rurality in Santa Elena exists within interstices where national laws and regulations 
contradict one another.  Finally, I acknowledge that I have not developed discussions on 
the political ecology of water despite focusing on hydro-meteorological threats in coastal 
zones. Indeed, my interest throughout this research focused on critiquing resilience 
analyses and practices while paving the way towards a political ecology of resilience, 
which ideally should be part of further research. 
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Further research 
This research has traced resilience in a country characterized by political 
instability, uncovering almost thirty years of policies based on resilience. Thus, research 
on resilience implementation and effects in countries with political instability, or 
characterized by state rule rather than neoliberal rule, can shed light on resilience 
discussions and critiques. The analysis of the effects of coastal resource management 
programs introduced in tropical countries under the criteria of ecological resilience 
remains unclear. Thus, future research should take into account the original resilience 
ecology criteria that contributes to the political ecology of resilience. Finally, the analysis 
of disaster-led resilience should shift the focus to slow, small, and chronic emergencies.  
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Appendix 1 – IRB approved interview templates 
 
Interview group A: Risk Management Secretariat officials and technicians 
Since 2007, Ecuador created a National Risk Management System, I would like to know, 
in general, how that system worked and still works.  
a) How was risk management conceptualized before 2007?              
b) How did risk management operate before 2007?              
c) Since 2007, how does the government conceptualize risk management? d) What was 
the main concern of the government in conceptualizing risk management?              
d) Was risk management related to environmental sustainability, climate change, 
natural disasters and development?              
e) How did the government connect the protection, development and welfare of the 
environment?              
f) Was the notion of "Sumak-Kawsay" (Good Living) the main link to implement risk 
management policies?               
g) How was the process of creating a complete risk management system in the 
country?              
h) Do risk management policies incorporate concepts of resilience? If so, how does 
RMS incorporate resilience in Ecuadorian policies?              
i) Many people talk about resilience, what does resilience mean to you? How do you 
define resilience?                
Risk management in Ecuador includes international resilience frameworks. How was 
resilience conceptualized in Ecuador? 
a) How did the RMS incorporate resilience building into national risk management 
strategies?              
b) What was the relationship between the creation of risk management frameworks and 
international resilience? What did this relationship respond to?              
c) How did RMS create resilience policies?              
d) How did the RMS operationalize resilience policies?              
When addressing national risk management as a whole, how did it relate to other 
government spheres, particularly development plans?  
a) Are risk management and resilience programs connected to national development 
strategies?              
b) If yes, what happens to tourism development? How does RMS connect the Risk 
Management System with tourism development strategies?              
c) Do you work according to the officials of the Ministry of Tourism? What project do 
you manage together with tourism officials?              
d) At the local level, particularly in the Province of Santa Elena, how does RMS work 
with officials / technicians of the Ministry of Tourism?              
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Moving to the local level, how were the concepts of risk management and resilience 
introduced in coastal communities, especially in the province of Santa Elena?  
a) How did RMS approach coastal communities?              
b) What did Santa Elena's coastal communities know about risk management and 
resilience?              
c) What were the methods used by RMS technicians / technicians to promote resilience 
building?              
d) What social, political or cultural factors limited the implementation of resilience 
policies?              
e) How did the Santa Elena communities get involved in these national 
initiatives?              
f) What type of rejections did you find during the implementation process?               
g) What do you think was the most problematic during the implementation 
process?              
h) Do risk / resilience management policies limit cultural or environmental knowledge 
among the communities of Santa Elena?              
Continuing at the local level, what are the effects of implementing risk management and 
resilience programs among coastal communities?  
a) What are, in your opinion, the benefits of implementing risk management / resilience 
programs among the coastal communities of Santa Elena? What are its 
limitations?              
b) In your opinion, the coastal communities of Santa Elena win or lose with risk / 
resilience management programs?              
c) How do you conceptualize resilience?  
 
Interview group B: Ministry of tourism officials and technicians  
 
Tourism strategies in Ecuador began in the late 90s, what are the differences with current 
tourism strategies?  
a) How was tourism conceptualized before 2007?              
b) How did tourism development work before 2007?              
c) Since 2007, how does the government conceptualize tourism development 
strategies?              
d) What was the main concern of the government in conceptualizing tourism 
development?              
e) Was tourism development related to environmental sustainability, climate change, 
natural disasters and risk management?              
f) How did the government connect tourism development, environmental sustainability 
and well-being?               
g) Was the notion of "Sumak-Kawsay" (Good Living) the main link to implement 
tourism development policies?              
h) How did the Ministry of Tourism incorporate tourism development strategies into 
national risk management strategies?              
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Moving to the local level, how were tourism development strategies introduced in coastal 
communities, especially in the province of Santa Elena?  
a) How does tourism operate in coastal communities before 2007?              
b) How did tourism officials/technicians’ approach coastal communities?              
c) What did the coastal communities expect from tourism officials / technicians?              
d) What were the methods used by tourism officials / technicians to promote tourism 
development?              
e) How do coastal communities receive these national initiatives?              
f) What type of rejections did you find during the implementation process?               
g) What do you think was the most problematic during the implementation 
process?              
h) Do national tourism policies restrict cultural or environmental knowledge among the 
communities of Santa Elena?              
  
The coastal communities in Santa Elena are prone to climatic phenomena such as El Niño 
with its rainfall, La Niña brings severe droughts to the area, the Colonche Mountains 
have been deforested for quite some time, communities fight for water in the dry season, 
and so on.  
a) Are tourism development strategies linked to risk management and resilience 
strategies?              
b) How do tourism development strategies connected to RMS connect to the Risk 
Management System?              
c) Do you work according to RMS officials? What project do you manage with RMS 
officials?              
d) At the local level, particularly in the Province of Santa Elena, how do Tourism 
officials / technicians operate with RMS officials / technicians?              
  
Continuing at the local level, what are the effects of implementing risk management and 
resilience programs among coastal communities?  
a) What are, in your opinion, the benefits of implementing risk management / resilience 
programs among the coastal communities of Santa Elena? What are its 
limitations?              
b) In your opinion, the coastal communities of Santa Elena win or lose with risk / 
resilience management programs?              
c) How do you conceptualize resilience?              
  
Interview group C: leaders and community members   
 
 Ecuadorian governments have been working in Santa Elena for a while, bringing 
initiatives towards well-being. 
a) What are the benefits that the government has brought to your community in recent 
years?              
b) What are the limitations that the government has brought to your community in 
recent years?              
c) Before 2007, how did the community benefit from government initiatives?              
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d) Which government officials / technicians have been closest to the 
community?              
  
What about the risk management officers / technicians, have they been working near the 
community?  
a) What was your main objective?              
b) How did you implement risk management / resilience programs in your 
community?              
c) What do you know about RMS programs? What were these risk management 
programs about?              
d) Have you participated in any risk management program? If yes, what was its main 
function? If not, do you know someone who participated in those programs? e) Do 
risk management programs include concepts such as resilience, development, well-
being?              
e) Many people talk about resilience, what does resilience mean to you? How do you 
define resilience?              
f) What benefits does risk management and / or resilience bring to the 
community?               
g) What limitations does risk management and / or resilience bring to the 
community?              
h) Does the risk and / or resilience management program limit its own ways of 
managing environmental threats?              
  
El Niño phenomenon has a constant impact on this area with severe rains and rising tides 
on the coast.  
a) What do you know about El Niño?              
b) Do you remember when El Niño severely affected the community?              
c) Can you detail how the community faced and survived? What damage did you 
remember from such a catastrophe? Were they injured, injured?              
d) Did the community receive emergency government assistance? Was it a quick 
response? How was such help? How long did the government provide emergency 
help and help?              
e) What about the NGOs? Did the community have any help or support from an NGO? 
If yes, did they respond quickly? How was such help?              
f) Does the community still have a consequence of such a catastrophe? Infrastructure, 
health, economic?               
Connecting your experience on the El Niño phenomenon with risk management and 
resilience programs recently operationalized by the Ecuadorian government,  
a) Is the community now prepared to face the impacts of El Niño? Are you more or less 
prepared than before the risk / resilience management training?              
b) What is the difference between before and after risk management officials trained the 
community to face climate threats?              
c) Is there any social, cultural or political factor that limits the implementation of 
resilience policies in your community?              
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d) What type of rejections did you find during the implementation process?              
e) What do you think was the most problematic during the implementation 
process?              
f) Are risk management and resilience programs connected to the development of 
tourism in your community? How?               
Tourism has become an alternative to its community. Can you tell me how your 
community participated in the development of tourism? 
a) When did the community realize that tourism would improve their income?              
b) Did tourism development begin before or after 2007?              
c) How does the community organize tourism services?              
d) Does the community measure the income of tourism? How does the community 
measure tourism activities?              
e) Does the community participate in tourism development by itself or does the 
community respond to government strategies?              
f) Does the community have any associations to develop tourism?               
g) Has the community collaborated with any foreign development assistance? NGO? 
Ecuadorian Government?              
What about the officials / technicians of the Ministry of Tourism, have been working near 
the community?  
a) What was your main objective?              
b) How did you implement tourism strategies and programs in your community?              
c) What do you know about tourism strategies and programs? What were these tourist 
programs about?              
d) Have you participated in any tourism development program? If yes, what was its 
main function? If not, do you know someone who participated in those 
programs?              
e) Do tourism programs include concepts such as resilience or well-being?              
f) What benefits have tourism programs brought to the community?               
g) What restrictions have tourism programs brought to the community?              
h) Does tourism restrict your own ways of managing environmental threats?              
i) Does tourism restrict your cultural values?                
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Appendix 2 – Matrix of codes 
 
Code Sub-code Abbreviation Definition 
Neoliberal 
practices   
NEO-
PRACTICES 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, generated or 
applied before the year 2007  
  
Neoliberal risk 
management NEO-RM 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, specifically 
addressing to Disaster and Risk 
Management, Mitigation, Prevention, and 
Response before the year 2007 
Neoliberal 
Development NEO-DEV 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, specifically 
addressing to development (in all fields) 
before the year 2007 
Anti-
neoliberal 
practices  
  ANTI-NEO-PRACTICES 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, generated or 
applied after the year 2007  
  
Anti-neoliberal 
disaster 
management 
ANTI-NEO-
RM 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, specifically 
addressing to Disaster and Risk 
Management, Mitigation, Prevention, and 
Response after the year 2007 
Anti-neoliberal 
development 
ANTI-NEO-
DEV 
Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, specifically 
addressing to development (in all fields) 
after the year 2007 
Coastal 
Management 
Program I 
  CRMP-I 
Plans, Agendas, laws, rules regarding the 
Coastal Resource Management Program 
before 2003 
Coastal 
Management 
Program II 
  CRMP-II 
Plans, Agendas, laws, rules regarding the 
Coastal Resource Management Program 
after 2004 
ENSO 1997-
1998     
Plans, Agendas, laws, rules, responses 
regarding ENSO 1997-1998 
Resilience 
practices   RES-PRACT 
How do people practice resilience in 
Ecuador 
Resilience 
Definition   RES-DEFIN 
Definitions of resilience, particularly 
provided by interviewees and Ecuadorian 
policies of RM 
Resilience 
perceptions   RES-PERCEP 
How people perceive resilience, 
vulnerability, risk 
Other 
resilience 
practices 
  RES-OTHER Any practice not included in formal practices of resilience building 
Resilience 
Building   RES-BUILD 
Plans, Agendas, laws, rules regarding the 
making community more resilient, less 
vulnerable 
Resilience 
Building 
Approach 
  RES-BUILD-APPROACH 
Ideas, perceptions, criteria that reinforce 
the construction of more resilient 
communities or individuals 
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Resilience 
Building 
Political 
Influence 
RES-BUILD-
POL 
Governmental rationale underpinning or 
promoting the construction of more 
resilient communities or individuals 
Resilience 
Building 
Structured 
RES-BUILD-
STRUC 
Governmental actions to construct 
infrastructure to protect population from 
catastrophes. Include mitigation 
infrastructure 
Resilience 
Building Non-
Structured 
RES-BUILD-
NONSTRUC 
Governmental actions to social 
construction of resilient communities 
Resilience 
Building at 
Local Level 
RES-BUILD-
LOCAL 
Localized governmental actions and 
practices. It is different from governmental 
discourses.  
Risk 
Management   RM 
A general coding that collect Risk 
Management practices 
  
Foreign 
Influence RM-FOREIGN 
Worldwide accepted rationale 
underpinning or promoting risk and 
disaster management reduction 
Organization/
Management 
RM-ORG-
MANAG 
Origin, Organization, Management of the 
National Risk Management System and 
Secretariat after the year 2007 
Risk 
Management 
in Santa Elena 
RM-SE 
Origin, Organization, Management of Risk 
Management in the Province of Santa 
Elena. Includes Santa Elena, Libertad, and 
Salinas cantons and all parishes.  
Climate 
Change RM-CLIMATE 
Relation of Risk Management and Climate 
Change 
Tourism 
Development 
RM-
TOURISM 
Relation of Risk Management and Tourism 
development, particularly in Santa Elena 
Tourism 
Development 
in Ecuador 
  TOURISM Plans, Agendas, Laws, rules, specifically addressing to Tourism development 
Rural Santa 
Elena  
Manglaralto 
Parish 
PARISH-
MANGL 
Any information regarding the parish of 
Manglaralto  
Libertador 
Bolívar LB 
Any information regarding Libertador 
Bolívar 
Community of 
Manglaralto 
MANGLARA
LTO Any information regarding Manglaralto 
San Pablo SANPABLO Any information regarding San Pablo 
Chanduy CHANDUY Any information regarding Chanduy 
La Entrada LAENTRADA Any information regarding La Entrada 
Olón OLON Any information regarding Olón 
Community of 
Montañita MONTAÑITA Any information regarding Montañita 
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